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# THE WRITINGS

OF

# JAMES MONROE

VOLUME V.

1807–1816

*Of this Letter-press Edition*
*750 Copies have been Printed for Sale*

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# THE WRITINGS

OF

# JAMES MONROE

## INCLUDING A COLLECTION OF HIS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED

EDITED BY

STANISLAUS MURRAY HAMILTON

"In great emergencies a Nation must support its character. An overcautious policy often risks more than a bold one."—MONROE.

VOLUME V.

1807–1816

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# ANNALS OF THE LIFE

OF

# JAMES MONROE.

## GOVERNORSHIP—CABINET.

---

1807. June 22. British frigate *Leopard* fires on the United States frigate *Chesapeake* off the Chesapeake Bay, killing three, wounding eight, and impressing four seamen.

1807. Nov. 11. The "Order in Council" by the British forbidding neutral nations to trade with France or her allies except under tribute to Great Britain.

1807. Dec. 17. The Milan Decree by Napoleon forbidding trade with England or her colonies, and confiscating any vessel paying tribute or submitting to British search.

1807. Dec. 22. An embargo laid on ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States.

1809. Feb. 8. Counting of the electoral votes: Republicans, James Madison, President, 122; George Clinton, Vice-President, 113. Federalists, Charles C. Pinckney, 47, and Rufus King, 47.

1809. Mar. 1. Commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France interdicted.

1809. Ap'l 19. President terminates non-intercourse act.

1809. Aug. 9. Great Britain not revoking her Orders in Council the President proclaims the non-intercourse act still in force.

1810. Mar. 23. The Rambouillet Decree by Napoleon (issued in May) ordering the confiscation and sale of over one hundred seized American vessels with their cargoes.

1810. May 16. Engagement between the United States frigate *President* and the British sloop of war *Little Belt.*

1810. Nov. 1. Revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees.

1811. Again elected Governor of Virginia.

1811. Ap'l 2. Commissioned Secretary of State during recess of the Senate; nominated Nov. 13 and confirmed Nov. 25.

1811. Nov. 7. Defeat of the Prophet at Tippecanoe by General Harrison.

1812. Mar. 9. Case of the political adventurer John Henry and the New England Federalists laid before the Senate.

1812. Ap'l 4. Ninety days' embargo on all vessels in ports and harbors of the United States.

1812. Ap'l 8. Admission of Louisiana into the Union.

1812. Ap'l 14. Florida west of Pearl River annexed to Louisiana.

1812. Ap'l 20. Death of the Vice-President, George Clinton.

1812. June 1. President Madison transmits his "war message" to Congress.

1812. June 17. Great Britain abandons her "Orders in Council."

1812. June 18. Act declaring war between the United States and Great Britain.

1812. Aug. 16. General Hull's surrender of Detroit.

1812. Aug. 19. Meeting of Federalists in New York City in opposition to the war.

1812. Aug. 19. Capture of the British frigate *Guerrière* by the United States *Constitution.*

1812. Dec. 25. Court-martial of Brigadier-General Wilkinson.

1813. Feb. 10. Counting of electoral votes: Republicans (in favor of war), Madison, 128; Elbridge Gerry, 131 for Vice-President. Federalists (opposed to the war), De Witt Clinton, 89; Jared Ingersoll, 86.

1813. Mar. Russia tenders her mediation between the United States and Great Britain.

1813. May 9. Albert Gallatin, James A. Bayard, and John Quincy Adams appointed Commissioners upon Russia's offer of mediation.

1813. July 15. Remonstrance by the Massachusetts Legislature against the war.

1813. Nov. General Jackson's campaign against the Creek Indians.

1814. Aug. 8. John Quincy Adams, Jonathan Russell, Albert Gallatin, James A. Bayard, and Henry Clay appointed American Commissioners to negotiate peace with Great Britain.

1814. Aug. 9. Treaty with the Creek Indians ceding their territory to the United States.

1814. Aug. 24. Battle of Bladensburg and the burning of public buildings at Washington.

1814. Sep. 3. Resignation of General Armstrong, Secretary of War.

1814. Sep. 26. Monroe nominated to be Secretary of War, confirmed the 27th.

1814. Dec. 15. Meeting of the Hartford Convention at Hartford, Connecticut.

1815. Jan. 8. Battle of New Orleans.

1815. Feb. 17. Ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.

1815. Mar. 3. Repeal of the non-intercourse and non-importation laws.

1815. Mar. 3. Declaration of war against Algiers.

1815. June 30. Treaty of peace between the United States and Algiers.

# *THE WRITINGS OF*

# *JAMES MONROE.*

---

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

LONDON Jany 11–1807.

DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure to receive yours of Oct^r 26 and shall not fail to bring with me the articles mentioned in it from Jones the Instrument maker in Holborn. I am more indebted to you than the sum they will cost on an old account so that that matter will rest of course for the present. I am very thankful to you for the information given me respecting the state of my aff^rs in Albemarle. They are precisely in the order in which I had supposed they were. I expected that my plantation was in a great measure in a state of desolation, & that I sho^d have no resource in it on my return home; every thing to do, without any aid from it, to enable me to make it comfortable. I left many books, valuable articles of furniture, which we had been long gathering together; I hope these will be in the state I left them.

On the subject of our treaty we have said so much.

in our publick letter[1] that nothing remains to be added here. It will be recollected that no aid has been derived in this business from any neutral power, Denmark being indeed the only one that coᵈ be thought of in such a case, & she in a situation more to require than to give aid: that in all the points on which we have had to press this govᵗ, interests of the most vital character were involved to it, at a time too when the very existence of the country depended on an adherence to its maritime pretentions. I trust it will be seen that we have gained something on those questions, and on the whole done as much as could reasonably have been expected. It is important for us to stand well with some power. I think the U States have sustained the attitude they took with dignity, and that by this arrangement they will terminate a controversy, not in favor of themselves alone, but of neutral rights, with some degree of credit. The mov'ment has drawn the attention of Europe, & will make us better known & more respected as a power. It is a singular circumstance that most of the northern powers tho' at war with France have wished us success against England, without however being able to give us any the slightest aid.

On general subjects I beg to refer you to Mʳ Purviance. We expect to sail early in April provided a good ship can be had for the Chesapeake. We are at present in good health and desire our affectionate regards to yourself Mʳ & Mʳˢ Randolph, whom we hope soon to have the pleasure of seeing.

[1] State Papers, III., 142.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

LONDON April 20th 1807.

SIR,—The trial of Captain Whitby took place on the 17th inst. at Portsmouth, before a court martial, by which he was acquitted. As I have not heard from Mr Canning since the decision, and no statement is given in the gazettes, of the proceedings of the court, it is not in my power to inform you, on what ground he was acquitted. I shall endeavour to obtain correct information on that point, which I shall not fail to communicate to you. I have the pleasure to enclose you a copy of my correspondence with Mr Canning relative to the trial since the arrival of our witnesses. I have heretofore forwarded to you copies of what had passed before their arrival.

I had some difficulty in deciding what part it became the United States to take in the trial of Captain Whitby. You had given me no instruction on that point, and it was, in many respects, a very delicate one. As the British government was responsible to the United States, for the outrages which were committed by the squadron under his command at the port of New York in April last, and had charged itself with the prosecution of him, as the means of satisfying their just complaints, I was persuaded that the more the management of the trial was left to it, the greater would be its responsibility. It seemed to be equally proper, for me to avoid taking any step on my own part, which might be imputed to a want of suitable confidence in the fairness of the proceeding. No invitation was given me by this government,

either to take a part in the trial, or to appoint a person to attend it on the part of the United States. General Lyman however, at my request, accompanied our witnesses to Portsmouth, and presented them to the President of the Court, who received him and them with suitable respect. The General attended the Court, the first day of the trial, and to his report of what occurred while he was present I have the honor to refer you.

The necessary expenses of the witnesses have on application from them been defrayed by me, and an account of them shall be transmitted to you.

I have only to add the respect & esteem, with which I have the honor to be Y^r^ ob^t^ humble servant.

---

TO WILLIAM BRANCH GILES.

LONDON April 30. 1807.

DEAR SIR,—I have just rec^d^ your letter of March 4^th^ and beg you to be assured that I have seen in it a very strong proof of your personal friendship, tho' I cannot dissemble that its contents have equally surprised and distressed me. Under the impression given you of what had been done here, it was natural, that you sho^d^ entertain the sentiments that are conveyed in your letter, & it was due to the claims of an antient and sincere friendship, that you sho^d^ express them in the free & unreserved manner you have done. I feel myself called on in return to meet all the suggestions in your letter, of a publick and private nature, and you may be assured that I have it

much in my power to satisfy you, that in both views they are unjust. I will add that I am equally confident when you know all the circumstances belonging to the topicks alluded to that you will agree that no portion of my publick life has corresponded more strictly, with what you would expect, & wish, than my conduct here has done.[1] But it is improper for

[1] Unfinished draft of letter to Jefferson dated June 1, 1807

"It is painful to touch on other topicks but I sho^d feel myself deficient in candour if I did not observe that at no period of my life was I ever subjected to more inquietude than I have suffered since my return from Spain. I have found myself placed in a situation thro' the whole of this interval altogether unexpected & in consideration of the parties to it equally novel. It was my wish to have sailed for the U States, on a visit or by resignation, as you preferred, soon after my arrival here, which I intimated to M^r Madison from Madrid, in the hope that I sho^d have obtained the expression of y^r sentiments on it. But none was communicated to me at that time or at any other afterwards that was applicable to the then state of things. The permission of which I spake in some papers was far from being positive; it was inferred from circumstances only, which with another administration would have had but little weight on my mind. In the most favorable state of things I should have hesitated to have taken such a step on so vague a sanction. But the seizures which had commenced left me no alternative. I thought it my duty to remain at my post which was attacked, & to defend it in the best manner I could. I did so in the daily expectation of receiving some letter which should mark my course. But months elapsed and I received none. Without regarding my preceding labors, or the let^s which I wrote from the continent of a private and confidential nature to which some attention seemed to be due, the interesting occurrences of this theatre furnished at an early period a motive for some plan respecting them. That could not be conceived as I was on the ground without reference to me. I expected as well by the claims of private friendship as from public considerations that I sho^d receive early notice of it. I was ready to do anything that might be suggested to me, either to remain at my post so long as the emergency required it, or to retire to make way for another. I was only anxious in case the latter was preferred, that I might be enabled to do it, without any imputation on my character. I soon took the ground myself of an extraordinary agent, by announcing to this gov^t that I staid for the adjustment of differences only, which my late return to the country, and recent employment in the same character, could not fail to countenance; not to mention my long publick service in high trusts & my supposed standing with the administration. That measure seemed likely to give support to my remonstrances here, while it

me to enter into this subject at this distance & time. I have adverted to it to put you on your guard not to yield to impressions, which your sense of justice will compel you to remove.

On the publick subject I will enclose you a copy of a joint letter to Gen[l]. Armstrong at Paris which gives a tolerably correct view of the treaty, & also of the paper referred to in yours, of which a very eroneous idea was communicated to you. I send you this paper in confidence. It ought to be before

put me in a situation to obey with greater promptitude any hint that might be given to make my return advisable. But I was neither permitted to return nor instructed to remain. Perfect silence was observed towards me, or what was equal to it. Things remained in this state till the first of Febr[y]., when it was reported that the gov[t] was about to send a federalist, on a special mission, to take charge of the business that I was engaged in ; and accounts of such appointments were continually published since in these papers. It was the natural effect of such reports, especially as I could not contradict them, by drawing the attention of the gov[t] to the other object, to weaken my standing here ; to fortify it in resisting my pressures, & even to authorise a suspicion that they proceeded from selfish if not dishonorable motives. Had the late Ministry stood, I am perfectly satisfied that those reports would have gone far not to injure me alone, but in a most essential degree to confirm it in the measure it had taken. But at that period M[r] Fox came into the Ministry, who brought with him the best dispositions towards our country. Unfortunately all the members of the Cabinet, which was formed by compromise, were not, as I have reason to believe, of the same character. He pursued with zeal the object of an adjustment from a sincere desire to accomplish it, but I could give him little aid in the consideration which had most weight with others, because it was believed that a new tone would be taken, that I should be swept away, & a federalist take my place. Such was the state of things from the time that M[r] Fox came into the Ministry till the 25[th] of April ; an epoch very promising, but thro' which I acted under these disadvantages. On that day M[r] Fox, whose mind had doubtless rec[d] some impression from these reports, asked me if it was true that M[r] King or M[r] Burr was to be sent here. I replied that I did not believe it (as was then the case) tho' I could not speak positively on the subject. He was more explicit in declaring that it was not true than I have stated in my letter to M[r] Madison of April 29. You will perceive that at this moment the business was completely at issue, and that my prospect of bringing it soon to a

the Senate when the treaty is submitted to it & I presume will be.

TO LORD AUCKLAND.

PORTLAND PLACE Sep$^{r}$ 25. 1807.

MY DEAR LORD AUCKLAND,—I beg you to be assured that I feel with the sensibility I ought, the kindness which I have uniformly received from you, and that wher'ever I may be, I shall always recollect the relation which has subsisted between us, with great satisfaction. I am convinced that the object of us all was

satisfactory conclusion was quite favorable. M$^{r}$ Fox renewed to me the assurance that I sho$^{d}$ soon receive from him a letter in the spirit which he had heretofore promised. It was on my return from this interview that I found M$^{r}$ Madison's letter of March 11$^{th}$ which gave me reason to believe that a special mission would be employed in this business, and of course that I had left M$^{r}$ Fox in error on that point. From that time I scarcely knew how to act. It was not proper on a communication which left the result in a state of uncertainty, to suspend the business, or even to cease pressing it. Still I felt myself restrained by the consideration that as it was probable M$^{r}$ Fox might expect such a mission, my urgency would produce no effect, and might even by him be attributed to improper motives; as that it was likely to produce a similar effect in the minds of others in case the measure was adopted. In this situation I acquitted myself in the best manner that I could in regard to my publick duty, holding in view what I owed to myself in the delicate relations that were connected with it. My publick letters give minutely everything that occurr'd from the 25. of to June 7$^{th}$ so that I shall not repeat it. From that day I had no communication from M$^{r}$ Fox till his reply to my note announcing the arrival of M$^{r}$ Pinkney at Liverpool. In that he invited an interview which I declined for reasons you will perceive, tho' in a manner to hide from him as much as I could my motive for it.

On these details I shall simply remark that it does not belong to our nature for me not to have felt with much concern proceeding from various causes the negative state in which I have been plac'd thro' the whole of this period; or not to be affected, after my services which I know to be zealous active & faithful to my gov$^{t}$ & country, with the manner in which I am now plac'd. So much for the past. There let it rest. With respect to the future, my decision is taken. The trust which is assigned me in the prosecution of the business I do not hesitate to undertake. Had I been at home and sent on it, I sho$^{d}$ have "

to promote on just & fair terms, as far as it was believed to be practicable, in reference to the claims of the opposite party, the great interests of our respective governments; and I am equally satisfied that altho' all the advantage which we promised ourselves, will not result from our labours, they will still be productive of good. I shall like you take great interest in the future good understanding and friendship of our countries, which I trust will not be interrupted. We expect to be able to sail for the U States in the course of the ensuing month. The period of our departure is still uncertain, and quite beyond my controul. Mrs Monroe and our daughter desire their affectionate regards to be presented to Lady Auckland, in whose welfare & in that of your amicable family they beg me to assure her they will always take a deep interest. I hope to be able to bid you in person an affectionate farewell before we sail, but whether I have that satisfaction or not, I shall always retain that strong sentiment of regard for you. I am with the best wishes for your happiness very respectfully & truly yours.

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TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

LONDON October 10. 1807.

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit you by Dr Bullus a copy of my correspondence with Mr Canning on the subject which was committed to my care by your letter of the 6th of July last. You will find by it, that the pressure which has been made on this govt, in obedience to the instruction contained in that letter,

has terminated in a decision to send a Minister to the U States to adjust the business there. What the powers of that Minister will be; whether it is intended to confine them to the sole object of reparation for the special outrage, or to extend them, in case the proposed separation of that from the general topick of impressment is admitted, to the latter object, it is not in my power to state. M^r^ Canning has given me no information on that head in conference, & his note is not explicit on it. It states that the Minister who shall be sent to the U States to bring the dispute relative to the attack on the Chesapeake to a conclusion, shall not be empowered to entertain, as connected with that subject, any proposition respecting the search of merchant vessels. A presumption is authorised by those terms that the Minister will have power to proceed to treat on the general topick after the special one is arranged. But it is possible that that presumption may have been raised for some other purpose, or that the terms which excite it were introduced merely to convey the idea that the mission should be confined to the special object.

In the discharge of this delicate & important trust I thought that I sho^d^ be able more effectually to promote its object by opening the subject to M^r^ Canning in conference than by an official note. As the attitude taken by my gov^t^, which was evidently supported by the whole nation, was of a very impressive nature, it seemed probable from the feverish state of the publick mind here in regard to us, that a tone of conciliation which should not weaken the pressure, would

be more likely to succeed in obtaining the reparation desired, than an official and peremptory demand. Under this impression I had several conferences with Mr Canning, the substance of which in each I will endeavor to state with precision. A knowledge of what passed in these interviews, in aid of that which is afforded by the correspondence, will enable you to form the most correct idea of the object of the proposed mission that present circumstances will admit of.

The first interview was on the 3d of Sepr, as soon as it could be obtained after the rect of your letter of July the 6th which was on the 30th of Augt I informed Mr Canning that as I wished the discussion in which we were about to enter to terminate amicably & honorably to both our govts, I had asked the interview for the purpose of promoting that desired end: that by explaining to each other fully, in friendly conference, the views of our respective govts relative to the late aggression, I was persuaded that it would be more easy for us to arrange the business to the satisfaction of both parties, than by any other mode which we could pursue. He expressed his sensibility to that which I had chosen, & his readiness to concur in it. I then stated in detail, in explicit terms, the reparation which my govt thought the U States entitled to & expected that they shod receive, for the injury and indignity offered by the late aggression: that the men taken from the frigate shod be restored to it; that the officers who had committed the aggression shod be exemplarily punished; that the practice of impressment from merchant vessels shod be sup-

pressed; and that the reparation consisting of those several acts shod be announced to our govt through the medium of a special mission, a solemnity which the extraordinary nature of the aggression particularly required. I observed that as the aggression and the principle on which it was founded had been frankly disavowed as soon as known by his govt, I was persuaded that there could be no serious objection on its part, to any of the acts which it was desired shod constitute the proposed reparation: that to the first act, the restoration of the men, there could doubtless be none, as the least that could be done, after such an outrage, would be to replace the U States as far as it might be practicable, on the ground they held, before the injury was received: that the punishment of the officers followed as a necessary consequence, to the disavowal of the act: that the suppression of the practice of impressment from merchant vessels had been made indispensable by the late aggression, for reasons which were sufficiently well known to him. I stated to him that the mode in which it was desired that the reparation shod be made, by a special mission, was that which had been adopted by other powers & by G. Britain herself for injuries less severe than the one alluded to, of which I gave him the examples furnished me in your letter of July 6th. Mr Canning took a note of what I had stated, and made some general remarks on the whole subject, which were intended to give his view of it, on each point, but without compromitting himself in a positive manner on any one. He said that by the proclamation of the

President, & the seizure & detention of some men who had landed on the coast to procure water, the govt seemed to have taken redress into its own hands; he complained of the difference which he said we had made between France & England, by restoring deserters to the vessels of the former, & not the latter: he insisted that the late aggression was an act which differed in all respects from the former practice & ought not to be connected with it, as it shewed a disposition to make a particular incident in which they were in the wrong, instrumental to an accommodation in a case where his govt held a different doctrine. I urged in reply that the proclamation could not be considered as an act of hostility or retaliation for injuries, tho' the aggression had provoked and would have justified even the strongest act of reprisal, but as a mere measure of police which had become indispensable for the preservation of order within the limits of the U States; I informed him that the men who had landed from the squadron in defiance of the proclamation, & of the law on which it was founded, had been restored to it: that with respect to the other point, the difference said to be made in the case of deserters from British and French ships I was unacquainted with the fact, but was satisfied if the statement was correct, that the difference was imputable to the local authorities, and not to the national govt, because as the U States were not bound by treaty to restore deserters from the service of either nation, it was not presumable that their govt would interfere in the business. I observed however

that if such a preference had been given, there was a natural & justifiable cause for it, proceeding from the conduct of the squadrons of France & England on the coast of the U S., & on the main ocean, it being a well known fact that the former did not maintain as a right or adopt in practice the doctrine of the latter to impress seamen from our merchant vessels. I then discussed at length, & urged with great earnestness the justice and policy of his terminating at this time all the differences which had arisen between our govts from this cause by an arrangement which shod suppress the practice on the part of G. Britain, & remedy the evil of which she complained. In aid of those reasons which were applicable to the merits of the question, I urged the example given by the late ministry, in the paper of Novr 8th presented to Mr Pinkney & myself by the British Commissrs, which had, as I thought, laid the foundation of such an arrangement. I stated that as it was stipulated by that paper, that the negotiation shod be kept open for the purpose of arranging this great interest, without prejudice to the rights of either power, it was fairly to be understood as the sense of both parties, that our rights were to be respected, till that arrangement was concluded; whence it would follow that the same effect would be produced in practice, as it had been provided for by treaty. I relied on this paper & the construction which I thought it admitted, with which however the practice had since in no degree corresponded, to shew the extent to which the former Ministry had gone in meeting the just views of our

govt, & thereby to prove that the present Ministry in improving that ground had nothing to apprehend from the preceding one. Mr Canning admitted that the view which I had taken of that paper derived much support from its contents, & the time & circumstances under which it was presented, but persisted in his desire to keep the subjects separate. I proposed, as an expedient to get rid of his objection, that we shod take up & arrange both points informally, in which case provided it was done in a manner to be obligatory, I offered to frame my note which should demand reparation for the outrage, in general terms, so as that it shod not appear by official document, that the subjects had any connection in the negotiation. I urged that unless it was intended to make no provision against impressment from merchant vessels, I could see no objection to his meeting me on that ground, as after what had passed it was impossible to take up either subject without having the other in view, & equally so to devise any mode which shod keep them more completely separate, than that which I proposed. Mr Canning still adhered to his doctrine of having nothing to do with impressment from merchant vessels, till the affair of the Chesapeake was disposed of, after which he professed his willingness to proceed to the other object. In this manner the conference ended without having produced the arrangement which I had hoped from it. Mr Canning's conduct was in all other respects conciliatory.

My note to Mr Canning was founded on the result of this conference. As it had not been in my power

to come to any agreement with him on the great subject of impressment from merchant vessels, I considered it my duty to combine it, with the affair of the Chesapeake in the paper which I presented him to claim reparation for the outrage. I thought it best however to omit the other acts of which it was desired that the reparation sho$^{d}$ consist. It seemed probable that a specification of each circumstance, in the note, would increase the indisposition of the Ministry to accommodate, & give it support with the nation, in a complete rejection of the demand. I expressed myself therefore in regard to the other acts, in general and conciliatory terms, but with all the force in my power. The details had been communicated to M$^{r}$ Canning in conference too recently to be forgotten. Still it was just that no improper inference sho$^{d}$ be drawn from the omision of them. To prevent it I obtained an interview of M$^{r}$ Canning immediately after my note was presented, in which, after reminding him of the omision alluded to, the motive to which I presumed he could not mistake, I added that my object in asking the interview had been to repeat to him informally, what I had stated in the former one, the other acts of which my gov$^{t}$ expected that the reparation sho$^{d}$ consist. In this interview nothing occurred without the limits of the special object for which it had been obtained. M$^{r}$ Canning did not lead the conversation to any other topick, and I could not invite it.

M$^{r}$ Canning's answer to my note was delayed more than a fortnight. Having refused to treat the sub-

jects in connection, & intimated in plain terms that if I was not authorised to separate them, it would be useless to prolong the discussion, I thought it improper to press it. My reply was equally explicit, so that with it, the negotiation ended. The measure which he announced, as being determined on by the King, in case I should not agree to the separation, is completely the act of the govt. You will observe that it is announced in a form which precludes in a great degree, the idea of its being adopted at my suggestion, as an act of reparation, and in a tone of decision which seemed equally to preclude my holding any communication with him on it.

My mission being thus brought to an end has afforded an opportunity for me to return to the U States as I have long desired. Nothing but the great interest I take in the welfare of my country, and my earnest desire to give all the aid in my power to the present administration in support of the pure principles of our most excellent constitution, would have detained me here so long. In the present state however, it is not possible, if in any it would be, for me to render any service by a longer continuance here. As soon therefore as I had answered Mr Canning's note I communicated to him my intention to return, and requested that he would be so good as to obtain for me an audience of the King for the purpose of taking my leave of him. This was granted on the 7th of this month, in which I renewed the assurance of the sincere desire of my govt to preserve the most friendly relations between the U States & G. Britain,

which sentiment was reciprocated by his Majesty. Mr Pinkney succeeds me, by an arrangement with Mr Canning, which will appear in the enclosed copy of my correspondence with him, and which I have full confidence the President will approve. I regret that in transferring the business in his hands I do not leave him altogether free from difficulty. I have the honor to be with great respect, Sir Your most obedt serv.

Not being satisfied with the undefined character of the proposed mission to the U States, and Mr Canning having communicated nothing new to me on the subject, in my interview with him on the day I was presented to the King, altho' an opportunity was afforded for the purpose, I wrote him a note after the commencement of this letter to make certain enquiries on that head, a copy of which note & of his answer is herewith enclosed. You will observe that he still holds himself aloof on it. I thought it my duty & that it comported with strict delicacy to make the enquiry, and I cannot but consider his reserve as affording cause for an unfavorable inference. It is probable however as the door is left open for further communication between us till the moment of my departure, that he will take some other occasion to explain himself more fully on the subject. You may be assured that I will take every favorable opportunity to obtain such explanation of him.

TO GEORGE ROSE.

PORTLAND PLACE Oct^r 23. 1807.

SIR,—It gives me great concern that I happened to be from home when you & your son did me the honor to call the other day, and that continual interruption since, incident to my approaching departure, has prevented my making my acknowledgment in person for that attention as well as for the obliging communication contained in your letter of the 17^th^. I shall certainly have the honor to call on you tomorrow.

The appointment of your son to the U States on a special mission is an event which gives me great satisfaction.[1] It will I trust be productive of consequences honorable & advantageous to both nations. The sentiments which you are so good as to express of the relation which ought to subsist between them, are such as might have been expected from one who had had such long experience in the great concerns of his country. They cannot fail to be highly approved by all who take an interest in their common welfare. I have full confidence that those sentiments are entertained by your son, as I have that he will be received by my government with the attention & consideration which are due to his acknowledged personal merit, & to the publick character which he bears.

It is my sincere desire that the differences which have unhappily arisen between our governments may be settled amicably & honorably to both of them, & I beg you to be assured that as I have long labored to

[1] George Henry Rose, sent as envoy for the adjustment of the *Chesapeake* affair.

promote that object I shall continue to take a deep interest in the accomplishment of it. I have the honor to be with great consideration your very obt servt

TO LORD HOLLAND.

STRATTON PARK Novr — 1807.

MY DEAR LORD HOLLAND,—It is among the last acts which I perform in England to take my leave of you, and you may be satisfied, that it is one of those which excites in a peculiar degree my sensibility. In returning to this country from Spain, to become acquainted with Mr Fox and yourself, was an object which greatly interested me. That object was attained, & I can assure you that I derived from it all the satisfaction which I promised myself. You have all the means requisite to make yourself like him illustrious in your country, in the cause of genuine liberty, & I trust & believe that you will not fail in anything which may be fairly expected from you. You have sound principles, great acquired knowledge, & do not want industry. My most earnest hope therefore is, for your own sake as well as for that of your country, that you may pursue with a steady course the career which you have begun, & succeed in it, to the full extent of your wishes.

The business in which I have been lately engaged with Mr Canning is transferred to the U States. He and I could not agree on it, and that measure, was adopted by his government, in consequence of it. You will know that I sincerely wish, an arrangement

to be made which may fix on the most solid basis the peace and friendship of our countries.

Should any friend of yours ever visit America be so good as to make him known to me. Let me hear from you occasionally. Mrs Monroe unites to mine her best regards to Lady Holland.

I leave this early tomorrow morning for Portsmouth where I expect to embark, & to sail immediately for the U States. Accept an affectionate farewell from one who takes a deep interest in your welfare. Yours very sincerely

TO JAMES MADISON.

NORFOLK Decr. 13. 1807.

DEAR SIR,—I arrived here to day, with my family in the American ship the Augustus in 28. days from Portsmouth. It is my intention to set out for Richmond without delay, & leaving my family there, to proceed thence to Washington, for the purpose of giving you all the information in my power respecting our affairs with the British government. We are much exhausted by fatigue & sickness on the voyage, & there will be difficulty in getting the means of conveying us to Richmond with any degree of comfort, so that I do not expect to leave this till tuesday or to be able to move with much rapidity till I leave that place, but you may be assured that I will be with you as soon as I can.

I had expected to hear on my arrival that I was preceded by Dr Bullus in the Revenge, & Mr Rose

who it was reported at Portsmouth had sailed two days before me, but I find that neither of them has reached the Chesapeake, to which each was destined. I sent by him a copy of my dispatch by Dr Bullus, & of some subsequent communications, comparatively of inferior importance, between Mr Canning and myself on the subject of it, & Mr Pinkney & I sent you a copy of Mr Canning's letter to us in reply to our letter to him in obedience to yr instructions. Mr Purviance, and we also communicated to you what had passed in an interview with him at his request for the purpose of asking explanations on certain parts of our letters relative to the late proclamation of this government concerning impressment. We thought it important that you should be acquainted with his observations on the latter subject, on the arrival of Mr Rose, and as there was reason to presume that he would get there before me or indeed any other opportunity that offered, deemed it expedient to make him the bearer of that dispatch. I shod send you these papers by the mail, but as I left the ship with most of my baggage in the road, it is not in my power to do it at present. I will however not fail to bring them with me. According to present appearances I shall be at Washington on Sunday next or Monday week at the latest, tho' I will be there sooner if in my power.

I beg you to present my respectful compliments to the President & to inform him that I have brought the instruments which he desired me to obtain of Jones in London, & shall send them to Richmd with

my baggage, where they will be disposed of according to his desire.

I write you this in haste merely to apprize you of my arrival, to give some idea of the communications which have already been forwarded to you, & of my intention to set out & get to Washington for the purpose of adding any other in my power as soon as possible. We beg you to present Mrs Monroe's & our daughter's best respects to Mrs Madison. I am dear Sir very sincerely yours

TO DOCTOR WALTER JONES.

RICHMOND Jany. 24th 1808.

DEAR SIR,—I had not the pleasure to receive your favors of the 18th & 20th instant till yesterday when both were presented together. I am very thankful for the information & remarks which they contain, which I am satisfied are dictated by the purest & most friendly motives to me. I will observe to you the same frankness & unreserve.

That I have not offered myself a candidate for the office to which you allude is most certain, as it likewise is that I have entered into no arrangement or compact with any one on that subject. My opinion is that the nation shod be left perfectly at liberty to make its own election, without any the slightest interference, on the part of those to whom the publick attention may be in any degree drawn in reference to that object. On this principle I have acted invariably whenever I have been applied to respecting it. At the

same time it has been far from my intention to withhold my services from my country in case they sho^d^ be called for by it. On the contrary I have been heretofore and shall continue to be, perfectly willing to serve it in case I sho^d^ be elected in the manner above stated, which *alone* is consistent with the principles of our gov^t^, & honorable to the nation and the person who may be the object of its choice.

In stating that I was not a candidate & had entered into no compact &c, you have conceived very correctly the substance of our conversation on that point. I do not understand by your letters that you had taken up any other idea, such as that I was indisposed to serve, if my country sho^d^ honor me with its suffrage. Care sho^d^ however be taken in doing justice to the principles on which I act, not to suffer such an inference to be drawn from what was said.

Resting on this ground I shall maintain it let the consequences to myself be what they may. I am under no obligation of any kind to shrink from a publick duty with a view to favor the pretentions of any one. I hold it to be equally as improper to take that step, as to endeavour to promote my own election, in the course which is too often practiced. Your anticipation however of the consequences is founded in a knowledge of human nature. Still I must disregard them. I shall be happy to hear from you whenever you are at leisure, being very sincerely your friend & servt

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND Feby 27. 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,—My great anxiety to forward to you the account and receipt for the sum which I paid for your mathematical instruments at London, when I should acknowledge your kind letter of the 18th, prevented my answering it sooner. To obtain them I was forced to ransack all my papers, which required much time, & in truth I did not succeed in finding them till this morning. I have now the pleasure to enclose you those papers, by which it appears, that the sum which I paid amounted to £34—10—I had sent the box to Mr Jefferson the day before I recd your letter, having been so much engaged in other business that I had not been able to attend to it before. To the receipt of the sum paid I have no objection, tho' I well know that I am indebted to you an equal if not greater amount. I shall be able to satisfy you of this fact hereafter when we meet. In the meantime as you desire it, I will with pleasure receive that sum & leave other matters of account to rest as they are.

I can assure you that no occurrences of my whole life ever gave me so much concern as some which took place during my absence abroad, proceeding from the present administration. I allude more especially to the mission of Mr Pinkney with all the circumstances connected with that measure, and the manner in which the treaty which he and I formed, which was in fact little more than a project was received. I do not wish to dwell on those subjects. I resolved that they should not form any motive of

my publick or private conduct, and I proceeded to execute my publick duty in the same manner, & to support and advance to the utmost of my power your political & personal fame, as if they had not occurred. The latter object has been felt thro' life by me scarcely as a secondary one, for from the high respect which I have entertained for your publick service, talents & virtues I have seen the national interest, and your advancement and fame so intimately connected, as to constitute essentially the same cause. Besides I have never forgotten the proofs of kindness & friendship which I received from you in early life.

When I returned to the U States I found that heavy censure had fallen on me in the publick opinion, as I had before much reason to believe was the case, in consequence of my having signed the British treaty. And when I returned here from Washington I was assured that that circumstance was wielded against me with great effect in relation to a particular object; that it was relied on to impeach my character in the most delicate points. Conscious that I had served my country & the administration in the several trusts confided to me abroad, with the utmost integrity, industry & zeal; that in some cases I had rendered useful service; that in all I had done the most that could be done under existing circumstances; that my private fortune had been essentially injured by those employments, it was impossible for me to be insensible to the effect produced by those attacks. They have injured and continue to injure me every day in the publick estimation. I trust how-

ever that means may be found to do me justice, without the slightest injury to you. Be that as it may you may be assured that I shall never cease to take a deep interest in your political fame & personal happiness.

. I informed Mr Madison when I was at Washington that I should write him a letter in reply to his of May 20th 1807. on the subject of the treaty to answer some of his objections to it, and place in a just light the conduct of the American Commissioners in that transaction. I informed him also that as I wished to couch that letter in the most amicable terms, if he shod find any passage in it, which failed in that respect, I shod be happy to alter it, having in view only a fair vindication of my conduct. I have almost concluded the letter & shall forward it in the course of the next week, the early part of it if possible, my private concerns have subjected me to much interruption, or I shod have finished it sooner.

In regard to the approaching election I have been and shall continue to be an inactive Spectator of the movement. Should the nation be disposed to call any citizen to that station it would be his duty to accept it. On that ground I rest. I have done nothing to draw the attention of any one to me in reference to it, nor shall I in future. No one better knows than I do the merit of Mr Madison, and I can declare that should he be elected he will have my best wishes for the success of his administration, as well on account of the great interest which I take in what concerns his welfare as in that of my country. It will not lessen my friendship for him which is sincere

& strong. I am with the highest respect and with great sincerity your friend and servant.

TO JAMES MADISON.

March 5. 1808.

DEAR SIR,—I have the pleasure to enclose you my letter on the subject of the late treaty[1], in conformity with what passed between us when I was at Washington. I have had many other objects to attend to or I sho^d have sent it to you much sooner. I have to repeat what I mentioned to you at Washington, that if there sho^d be any remark in it which in the slightest degree departed from the friendship and respect I bear the administration, which it was desired that I should modify I will be happy to do it. To write anything in vindication of my conduct is most distressing to me; but it was impossible to avoid it, after receiving your letter.

I shall set out for Albemarle this afternoon & return here in a week or ten days. I have not yet been there & my affairs are suffering by my absence. M^rs Monroe and our daughter desire their best regards to M^rs Madison & M^rs Cutts—I am dear Sir with best wishes for your welfare sincerely yours

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND March 22^d 1808.

DEAR SIR,—I had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 11^th instant the day after I returned from

[1] Proceedings upon the treaty: State Papers, III., 173.

Albemarle. It is very distressing to me to discuss with you the topicks on which it treats, but in the state in which things are it is certainly best to come to a perfect understanding on every point & to repair on both sides any injury which may have been received. To do you an injury or indeed any one in the administration, never entered into my mind, for while I laboured under a conviction, not only that I had been injured, but that the friendly feelings which you had so long entertained for me had ceased to exist, the only sentiment which I indulged in consequence of it was that of sorrow. At present I am happy to say that all doubt of your friendship towards me having experienced any change is completely done away, and that the only anxiety which I feel is to satisfy you, that the impression was not taken on light ground, nor imputable to communications made me by persons out of the administration.

The mission in itself, of Mr Pinkney or any other person, would not have produced such an effect. It resulted from a chain of circumstances of which that measure was only a part. When I left Madrid I communicated to Mr Madison, in aid of our publick despatches every idea which I had formed of the state of our affairs there and in all their relations, by sending him a copy of my private journal, and adding in private letters which it did not contain. Altho' it was my earnest desire to get home and look to my private concerns, which I proposed to do after my return to London, I intimated to him that I was willing in consideration of the existing crisis, to act in any

situation in which I might be useful. On my return to London I found that the seizures which were commenced in my absence had imposed on me a new and important duty. I resisted them & not without some effect. By announcing to the British minister my intention to return to the U States that autumn, I assumed the character for every essential purpose, of a special Envoy, with which M^r^ Madison was made acquainted, as he was likewise with my determination to remain there till the business was concluded. The evidence before him seemed to be satisfactory that, as nothing could be gained of the existing ministry but by force, any change of the attitude taken on our part was likely to do harm, & if the ministry retired that the danger—if such an effect—would be increased by a change of attitude. This latter idea was strongly urged in a private letter to him of Feby 2^d^ 1806. with my earnest advice against such a mission. As the ship by which that letter was sent arrived at Phil^a^ on the 26^th^ of March I concluded that he had rec^d^ it on the 30^th^. It was written in consequence of intelligence from the U States that such a mission was decided on by the gov^t^ As I had rec^d^ no answer to any of my communications from Madrid, or London after my return, nor any acknowledgement of my services at either place, or expression of a desire that I would come home or remain there, it seemed by the measure alluded to, as if it was considered that I was rather in the way of than of use to the administration. Its reserve to me for so long a time, and appointment of an associate after the

receit of my private letter of Feby 2d & a publick letter of nearly the same date & after the change of the ministry was known, made a strong impression on my mind to that effect. A special mission was never gratifying to that on the ground; and perhaps never will be, while men are governed by those useful passions which stimulate them to virtuous actions. Such a mission reduced the resident minister, however respectable for his talents & character to a cypher from the moment it is known that it is contemplated, and if it does not destroy him it is because his character is sufficiently strong to bear the shock. The footing on which I had left my country; a consciousness of the zeal and integrity of my conduct in the publick service, and of my personal attachment & devotion to the administration, and a firm belief that no change could be made to advantage, most probably increased my sensibility to the measure. Had such an one been contemplated I thought that I shod have been the first to hear of it in a private letter from yourself or Mr Madison, but I had to gather the intelligence from the newspapers, the correspondence of others, the hints of Lord Holland & even of Mr Fox. Mr Madisons first letter to me on that subject, as on every important one of the kind alluded to, which entered at all into them, was of the 11th of March 1806, almost ten months after I had left Madrid, & 8 after my return to London. It was recd on the 25th of April. It seemed to be intended to apprize me of the proposed measure, and from its stile taken in connection with the preceeding circum-

stances, contributed greatly to confirm the impression which they had already made. The facility which it afforded to my departure appeared to me to be the strongest feature in it. The letter which Mr Pinkney brought me, which was delivered to him & by him to me open, was in the same tone. It stated that I was included in the special mission, but that Mr Pinkney had brought a separate commission with him to take my place in case I chose to return home. It expressed no desire that I would remain & unite in the negotiation. The joint commission too seemed to be peculiarly adapted to favor my return, by authorising one commissioner to act in the absence of the other, in which it differed from those which I had carried with me abroad, they giving that power to one in case only of the death of the other. I could see no reason for his bringing with him a separate comn to succeed me in the ordinary mission, if my immediate return had not been contemplated, as sufficient time would have been allowed for supplying it, if I remained & joined in the negotiation, before it could be concluded, or for the variance in the conditions of the joint one. All those circumstances tended to convince me, that the administration had withdrawn its confidence from & really wished to get rid of me. I was struck with astonishment and deeply affected by the reflection, as it was utterly impossible for me to trace the cause. Had I followed the impulse of my feelings, it would have been to have withdrawn on the arrival of Mr Pinkney, but many considerations of great weight

admonished me to pursue a different course. I had had much communication with Mr Fox, and entertained great hope that through him our affairs might be settled to advantage. It did not seem probable that any other person could derive the same aid from those communications that might be done by a party to them. By remaining I thought that I might give support to the administration at home, which I most earnestly wished to do. For these and other reasons of the same kind I resolved to remain & unite in the negotiation, with such character as might be just; of which I informed Mr Madison in my letter of the 29. of April which was written a few days after the receit of his of March 11th, and in which I gave him distinctly to understand that that measure would be no cause of disagreement between the admn & myself. I remained & acted accordingly & did everything in my power to accomplish the views of my govt & country, & finally concluded with Mr Pinkney the best treaty which it was possible to obtain of the British government. In uniting in the negotiation & signing the treaty I committed my reputation on the result, and it is only by the course which the business afterwards took, that any unpleasant occurrence has arisen between the admn & myself.

These were the circumstances which produc'd the impression which I have acknowledged in the commencement of this letter, that your friendship had been withdrawn from me. But the assurances which you now make me & the perfect knowledge which I have of your rectitude & sincerity have completely

effac'd that impression and restored to my mind that entire & friendly confidence which it had always been accustom to cherish.

I am perfectly satisfied that you never meant to injure me & that a belief that I had suffered by any act to which you were an innocent party would give you great pain. Still the circumstance of my having signed a treaty, which was disapproved for imputed great defects; of having exceeded our powers in signing it, which I should not have done but in a firm belief that I promoted thereby the best interests of my country & of the administration, while I exposed myself to great responsibility by the measure, have given a handle to those who have wielded it with great effect against me. You can little imagine to what extent the mischief has been carried. I could give you many details which it would be as painful for you to read as for me to recite.

When I saw that I was depressed in a country which I had so long served with fidelity & zeal, I could not be indifferent either to the cause or the consequence resulting from it. My sensibility was naturally increased by the excitement of those on the ground, who, by taking part in my favor, had essentially compromitted themselves. I replied to the denunciation that was circulated against me here for improper purposes, to many of my friends who called on me, in decisive terms, and complained earnestly of the injury done me by it. The sum of these conversations which were always of a nature confidential, it is not in my power to recollect with precision. It

is possible that in some cases I may have expressed myself with too much zeal, and in others been misconceived. You may however be assured that my sole object was to do justice to myself, in a case of peculiar injustice & that I never went beyond its just limit.

I look with extreme concern to the violent course which is pursued in the discussion which now agitates the country & trust that it will be possible to moderate it. This sentiment is excited in a peculiar manner by what I have seen in the Enquirer of friday last. I neither know the author of the piece or from whom he derives his information in the passage to which I allude, nor indeed do I recollect the circumstance on which he relies in one case.

I feel happy that we have had this explanation with each other. It has satisfied me that I had misconceived your feelings & disposition toward me. Nothing remains but to prevent as far as possible all further inquietude. From the period above alluded to of peculiar excitement I have been attentive to this object & shall pursue it in future with still greater zeal. I estimate the acts of my friends by the intentions only. Being satisfied on that point I can bear with patience any consequence which may casually result from them. I am aware that under free govt, it is difficult to avoid those of the kind alluded to, for perhaps no important good was ever altogether free from some poison of alloy. I am however equally aware that the evils which are incident to the system, if indeed there are any, even to the individual who suffers

by them, are trifling when compared with the great bliss which it imparts. I am my dear Sir with the highest respect & esteem your friend & servant

P. S. From an expression in your letter that you had not supposed that I had entertained any objection to the association of any one with me in the business at London, I perceive that you have not read or if you have read that you have forgotton my letter of Feby 2. 1806. I therefore send you a copy of it, which I have to request that you will be so good as to return me after perusing it.

## TO JOHN RANDOLPH.[1]

RICHMOND March 23, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . . On political topickes I have nothing to communicate being a distant and inactive spectator of the mov'ment. I have regretted extremely that such has been the state of affairs, since my return to the U States, that from a sense of delicacy to you as well as to myself, a great portion of reserve on both sides, was necessary to protect us from imputations, which however false, might have derived a sanction from a different conduct & done harm. I can assure you that this circumstance has given me real concern on publick as well as personal considerations. The motive for it however cannot be durable. I trust that I shall have the pleasure to see you here after the adjournment of Congress and

[1] From a copy courteously furnished by Mrs. James Lyons.

can assure you that my whole family will participate in it. I am my dear sir very sincerely your friend and servt.

TO JAMES MADISON.

RICHMOND March 26th 1808.

DEAR SIR,—I had the pleasure to receive yesterday your favor of the 21st instant. I have examined since all my papers, and cannot find a copy of the project of the article relative to impressment which Mr Pinkney and I presented to Mr Canning after the receit of your instructions by Mr Purviance, for the correctness of which I can vouch. I presume it was the same, in effect, with that which we presented to the British Commissioners in Novr 1806. of which a copy was forwarded to you with our letter of the 11th of that month. I transmit you a copy of that project, which I believe to be correct, tho' I am sorry even in respect to it that I cannot be positive, as it is not noted in any document to be a copy of that project. It corresponds however in all circumstances with the explanation given of it in our letter of Novr 11th, and with my recollection of its contents. Shod a copy have been sent with our letter of Novr 11th & shod it differ from this, it will of course be preferred to it. I send you a copy of the alterations which we proposed to the treaty after the receit of your instructions by Mr Purviance. I forward to you also the two papers which you sent me after I left Washington, & desire you will be so good as to return them at your leisure.

I am persuaded that the more comprehensive the

submission to Congress is, of the documents relating to the late negotiations with G. B., the better the effect will be. I am not aware that they contain anything with which the British Commissioners or the friends of Mr Fox, or those who were parties to the negotiation before him, should it be deemed proper to go so far back, ought to be or would be offended. The greatest delicacy was observed towards all the parties to the negotiation in all the communications to you of what occurred in it. I endeavored to draw a line of seperation between the parts which ought to be communicated to Congress & withheld on my return from Washington, & I found, that it would be extremely difficult to do it on any consistent principle. I suggest this only as a general idea. On receiving the list which you promise me I will endeavor to render you all the aid in my power, to enable you to supply everything which may be wanting.

I am very sorry to hear of your indisposition but hope that you have before this recovered from it.[1]

TO JAMES MADISON.

RICHMOND April 5th 1808.

DEAR SIR,—I have recd yours of March 30th with a list of the documents lately submitted to Congress,

[1] "I omitted to state in my letter of saturday last that the copy which I then sent you, of a proposition which Mr Pinkney & I presented to the British Commissioners relative to impressment, which was mentioned in our letter of Novr 11. 1806., & which as I believe we afterwards renewed to Mr Canning, was a copy only of an amendment which we offered to your original project. You will I presume understand my communication in the sense in which it is now explained; I hasten however to give the explanation to prevent any misconception in the case. I hope you have recovered your health."—March 28. 1808.

and the papers sent you from this place. I return to you these latter papers on a presumption that you have not copies, of them, or rather the originals; if you have they can be of no use to you, & in that case I will thank you to send them back, or that you will send me copies at your leisure. My only motive in desiring them is to retain a set of all the documents appertaining to the transactions to which they relate, of which I believe but few are wanting. I am sorry that I have not a copy of the project of the article relative to impressment, which we presented to M.r Canning with the amendments to the treaty proposed in obedience to your instructions by M.r Purviance. I think it was the same in substance and form with that referred to in our letter of Nov.r 11.th We understood your letter to sanction that one & (to the best of my recollection) we declined altering it.

I send you a note on the subject of the documents relating to G. Britain, all of which except the two first mentioned are submitted to Congress. In addition to the maxim given in the enclosed papers I think it due to the memory of M.r Fox to let it appear that he had not forgotten his promise in our last interview. However I am not particularly solicitous about them, if there is any difficulty in the case. The memoranda relative to the other documents, is sufficiently explanatory in each case, of my idea of what ought or ought not to be published. It is probable that the submission already made corresponds with it. I am far from insisting that it sho.d be complied with where there are good reasons to the contrary, sho.d there be

any difference between them. I have some thoughts of taking a trip to Loudon in the course of a few days, to look after my interest there, and after that of the son of our late most estimable friend Mr Jones. I am dear Sir sincerely yours

MEMORANDA.

April 5. 1808.

2nd of Febr 1806. to Mr Madison— This is noted [illegible] whole of it is to be published.[1]

11th March 1806. to the same— and the [illegible][2]

18th of April to the same— this is noted to be published improperly. I could wish that

[1] Vol. iv., 398.

[2] "LONDON March 11. 1806.

DEAR SIR,—I have seen Mr Fox and Mr Grey and had long conversations with each on our affairs, and have the pleasure to inform you that the sentiments which they expressed were of the most conciliatory character. I cannot say that our affairs *will* be arranged to our satisfaction, but I have the utmost confidence that it will be the case. I ask'd Mr Fox if he had read my notes &c.? He said he had. Cannot we agree? He saw no reason to suppose the contrary. If you were to insist on the principle of the late decisions you would embroil your self with Russia. Yes, said he, and with other powers. He seemed to admit that the ground of the Russian Convention could not be opposed by G. Britain. But he added that he was not authorized to state that by any decision of the Cabinet. I have no doubt however that the Cabinet will be brought into it. He assured me that the business should be concluded as soon as possible, and certainly at no distant day. With Mr Grey I conferred principally on the impressment of seamen, tho' I took occasion to give a sketch of the other, on which latter he was reserved as I supposed because it was not in his department. He informed me that great abuses were committed in granting protections, of which he gave me some examples that were most shameful. He expressed however a very sincere desire to remedy the evil complained of on both sides, which he seemed to think a practicable thing. On the whole I have great confidence in the opinion expressed above. The 13. Janr is the

the whole of the first part [illegible] at "Jan.ʸ 13th." might be published.[1]

last letter which I have from you. The pamphlet is received and will I think be re-published here. I think it may be useful to have a sufficient number of copies struck to be put into the hands of the Ministry, and circulated among the members of Parliament. I hope that as soon as it is known that the Ministry here has changed, our proceedings will assume a conciliatory tone, and that it may even be understood that the more liberal and just character of the present one which inspires confidence in the adoption of a system of just measures is the cause of it. I am satisfied that such a change on our part would produce the happiest effect. Should every thing fail, we shall be where we were before, after giving a new proof of our disposition to conciliate. I write you in haste this private letter to be sent by different conveyances.

I am dear Sir your friend and servant

JAMES MONROE.

P.S. Lord Selkirk is appointed to succeed Mr. Merry."

[1] "LONDON April 18. 1806.

SIR,—I received yesterday a note from Mr. Fox appointing to-morrow (Saturday 19.) for an interview with which I shall of course comply. I met him afterwards and had a conversation with him in the Queen's drawing-room, which being of an interesting nature, I hasten to communicate to you. He took me aside and observed that we must soon settle our business. I replied that I hoped he was ready to do it. He intimated that he was essentially; that we would begin on Saturday and pursue it without delay 'till it was concluded. Some remarks of his having led the conversation to the merits of the principal topick, I told him that he must leave us in the enjoyment of the trade in question, and pay us for the property taken. To the first proposition he immediately consented. To the second he said there would be objections. He added that he had taken steps to prohibit the further condemnation of our ships & cargoes, as I had desired, of which he intended to have informed me by note, but had been prevented by other business; he had no objection however still to do it. I cannot be positive whether he said that the prohibition extended also to the seizure of our vessels, tho' I rather think it did. When I see him tomorrow I shall easily ascertain this. He observed that we must make some arrangements to accommodate them in return;—that the practice of buying or pretending to buy enemies vessels, as was done in the North ought to be suppressed, and he hoped that I would join him in it. I said that we would do all we could to prevent fraudulent practices; that such purchases were rarely made by our citizens as we were rather sellers than purchasers of ships. He considered it in that light, and I found wished some precedent from us, which might avail him in the North, and make more acceptable at home the accommodation

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|---|---|
| 20th [?] April 1806. to the same— | I shod be glad that [illegible] last paragh of this [illegible] -ished. It probably [illegible] by the note in the [illegible] it may be.[4] [illegible] |
| 29th April 1806. to the same— | This is noted to be published entire & properly so.[5] |
| 30th April 1806. to the same— | of this I have no knowledge. This is not in the book.[6] |
| 17th May 1806. to the same— | to be published entire.[7] |
| 20th May 1806. to the same— | I could wish that [illegible] be published entireif no [illegible] appears to the contrary.[8] [illegible] |
| 9th June to the same— | noted in the paper sent me to be published in part only. The last paragh [illegible ] objectionable one.[9] |

given us in other respects. I left this topick however open, having said nothing to compromit myself on it. As the whole of this conversation tho' apart was in a publick room full of company, it was impossible to make it more precise ; I could not therefore attempt to ascertain to what extent he was willing to leave the commerce with enemies colonies free. I shall doubtless collect his idea on that point to-morrow, since it seems best to hear his proposition before I say anything on it, and I shall not fail in any case to attend to your instruction of Jan : 13th."

[4] "He [Mr Fox] told me explicitly, in confidence, that he did not see any reasonable prospect of peace, that communications had taken place with the French Government on the subject, and in terms of greater conciliation than heretofore, but that they furnished no ground on which to rest the hope of such an event at any early period."

[5] See Vol. iv., p. 432.

[6] The editor has been unable to find this letter.

[7] State Papers, III., 124,

[8] See Vol. iv., p. 434.

[9] See Vol. iv., p. 445.

To M^r^ Fox of Aug^t^ 4, 1806. }
To M^r^ Madison Sep^t^ 18. 1806. } relative to Cap^t^ Whitby. As these papers respect an important occurrence in our relations with G. Britain I sho^d^ be glad they were published, as the omission might expose me to a suspicion that I had neglected my duty in it. In the latter of Sep^t^ 13. it will be necessary to publish the two first paragraphs only ending with "circumstances." [10]

[10] "PORTLAND PLACE August 4. 1806.

SIR,—The outrages which were lately committed at the port of New York, within the jurisdiction of the United States, by several of His Britanick Majesty's Ships of war, more especially the Leander, commanded by Cap^t^ Whitby, are already known to you. They were the subject of a conference between us soon after the intelligence was received, in which I was happy to find the expression of such sentiments on your part as that extraordinary occurrence was calculated to inspire in a mind so capable of viewing it with justice and candour. It has now become my duty to submit the subject more formally to the consideration of His Majesty's government, that such attention may be paid to it, as the nature of the aggression merits, and is due to the just claim of a friendly power. That the act by which John Peirce an American seaman lost his life, an event which has excited in a very high degree the sensibility of the whole nation, was committed within the jurisdiction of the United States, seems not to have been denied by any one. The documents which I have the honor to enclose prove clearly the fact, as also that by the disposition of the Leander and two other ships of war, immediately before and almost within the harbor of New York, and by their conduct there, in harrassing the commerce of the United States, even in their coasting trade, the port itself was for some time in a great measure blockaded. Captain Whitby's letter to the Mayor of the City essentially confirms this statement, without adverting to the menaces which he used, or the hostile attitude he otherwise assumed. It is unnecessary for me to dwell on this subject, which is already sufficiently well known to you in all its circumstances. It is impossible for the President to behold with indifference aggressions which had been productive of so much injury, which was fraught with such high national indignity, and which if suffered to pass unpunished would prove an encouraging example to others to commit the like in future. He was sensible that he owed it to his station, and to the friendly policy which animates him to make them the ground of serious complaint to His Britanick

To M[r] Madison Oct[r] 18[th] 1805— This is noted to be published [illegible] only. I am not aware that it will be necessary to keep back more than the

Majesty, which I now do in full confidence that they will receive the reprehension which they justly deserve. It is far from being the desire of my government to designate the course which ought to be pursued in such a case. No government understands better than that of Great Britain what would be due under such circumstances to its violated rights and injured honor; none has ever shewn a keener sensibility or acted with more dignity thro' a long series of time; in avenging every the slightest injury of the kind. It is by respecting that sentiment in the present case, that the just claim of the United States may be ascertained; for they tho' a young nation have been accustomed also by similar causes to cherish the same sentiment with a fervent zeal. In submitting this subject to your attention, I shall be permitted to add my sincere desire, that it may be made an occasion of encreasing the good understanding and friendship of two nations, to which, it is presumed they are invited by many interesting and powerful motives equally applicable to both. I have the honor to be with great consideration, Sir,

Your most obed Serv[t]

JAMES MONROE."

"LONDON September 13. 1806.

SIR,—I have the pleasure to send you a copy of my note to M[r] Fox and of his answer respecting the misconduct of Captain Whitby at the port of New York in April last. You will find by it that that officer was removed from the command of the Leander by an order from the Admiralty of the 22[nd] of June, and that he is to be brought home to be tried by a Court Martial on that charge. I have lately received your letter of August 1[st] with certain documents, which give other examples of like misconduct in Captain Whitby, which I shall hasten to lay before his government.

The delay which took place before I presented my note respecting the late outrages at New York after they were known here, and indeed after your instructions were received by M[r] Pinkney, may require some explanation. By my letter of June 9[th] you were apprized that I had spoken to M[r] Fox on that subject on the 4[th] and 7[th] preceding, and that he had promised to write to me on it, and also on the other topicks which had been discussed in our several conferences from the time he came into the Ministry. He did not write that letter nor did I ever see him or have otherwise any communication with him on those topicks afterwards. His invitation of the 22[d] of that month to meet him the next day, was not received 'till the hour appointed for the interview had passed, whereby it became impossible; and as he was unfortunately taken dangerously ill at that time with a disorder under which he has since lingered, and which

following passage in the last paragh "in consideration of her conduct in the late negotiation," which alludes to France.[11]

To the same 20th Jany 1806.

This is dated in my letter book the 28th. I presume it is so, as it is the only one copied in it of that month.

It appears to me that the whole of the first paragh, ending with the word "moment" might be published. Some parts of the

now threatens to terminate his existence in a few days, it has continued so since. While the foreign department was thus circumstanced, its door being essentially closed, it seemed useless to address it on that or any other subject. But had not that been the case I should nevertheless have abstained from it. Until the special mission was recognized, it seemed to be my duty, with a view to promote its objects, to suspend all other business. That therefore was likewise a strong motive of my conduct. These circumstances will explain the cause of the delay alluded to. In examining the documents it will not escape your attention that Mr Fox's note of June 22d bears the same date with the order from the Admiralty for the recall of Capt Whitby. I mention it with pleasure and principally from a motive of respect for Mr Fox. Having never doubted his good faith in all the communications which had passed between us relative to our affairs it cannot otherwise than be gratifying to see new proofs of it. I had concluded that his object in the interview which he proposed at the moment when he was taken ill, had some connection with that subject, more especially with the promise which he had made me in the last one, and in that sentiment I am confirmed by that circumstance.

I shall not fail to pay due attention to the Convention respecting boundaries, by presenting the subject again to the consideration of this government as soon as the state of things will permit it.

I had flattered myself that the business which is confided to Mr Pinkney and myself with this government might have been concluded in time to allow me to sail to the United States the present season. But this has now become altogether improbable. There is however good cause to presume that everything will be adjusted satisfactorily in the course of the winter. After that very desireable object is accomplished I shall sail as soon as it may be practicable. I mention this circumstance that an opportunity may be afforded for a confirmation by the Senate of Mr Pinkney's appointment to succeed me.

I am Sir with great respect and esteem, Your most obedt Servt

JAMES MONROE."

[11] See Vol. 4, p. 352.

remaining one, which of the conduct of the King &c. at the may very properly be omitted.[13] } [illegible]

[13] "LONDON Jany 28. 1806.

SIR,—I informed you lately in a short note by Mr. Clark who sailed in the Remittance, of the death of Mr. Pitt which took place last week. The King has since resolved to commit the administration to the opposition as we are informed by all the gazettes of this day. It is said that he announced this to Lord Granville yesterday and authorised him in conjunction with Mr Fox to form a new ministry from among their friends. It is expected that this will be done in a day or two as they are now engaged in the business. This change has an aspect towards peace, & fully persuaded I am that it will be the serious object of those who may be thus brought into power to endeavour to make one. Mr. Fox it is understood will have the department of foreign affairs. I shall see if it is possible as soon as he is inaugurated to obtain a change in the policy of this government towards the U States of which I think there is great probability. About a fortnight before Mr. Pitt's death an order was sent to the suitable department to report the number of American vessels which had been seized, & condemned or dismissed, with the damages incident thereto, which looked as if a change was contemplated even under him. The disasters on the Continent doubtless tended to shew the folly of the measure, to which the eyes of the new ministry will be more open. The present is a very important epoch in our concerns with this country & Spain, as in the commerce which we are to enjoy with the W. Indies after a peace: There would be cause of regret if that event took place before they were adjusted. I have heard nothing from General Armstrong or Mr. Bowdoin for more than two months past. I shall do everything in my power to avail myself of the opportunity which is thus presented by a concurrence of extraordinary events to place our affairs with this country on an advantageous footing, & I hope not without effect. The considerations which made it improper for me to sail to the U States, at any time since my return to England, seem now to operate with peculiar force. As the seizure of our vessels had then commenced I could not withdraw without compromitment of our government and myself without remonstrating against it. And after taking that step I could not withdraw & leave the business unfinished, especially after the strong opposition which I made to it, which I thought the nature of the transaction merited, & the state of publick affairs in Europe justified. Thus engaged I have felt it imperiously my duty to pursue the business in all its windings. I shall therefore neither abandon the ground or relax in my exertions to accomplish the object till something conclusive is done, unless the President may think proper to consign the trust to some other person. I fear

To the same 12th Feby 1806. the whole of the second parag.h beginning with the words "as soon &c" might with great propriety be published. The first parag.h may be omitted.[18]

that the expectation of my return to the U States which was authorised by my first letters after my return here, as by those of an earlier date, has prevented you communicating to me so fully your sentiments on these important topicks as you otherwise might have done. I flatter myself however that you will have concluded from those which followed, as from the nature & course which this business has taken that I sho.d be detained thro' the winter & in consequence that I shall soon have the pleasure to receive such communications from you. As the health of my family has been improved by the late excursion into the country, I expect them in town in a few days, since now that the ministry is about to change, and there is a fair prospect of accomplishing something to advantage, I do not wish to be absent a moment.

The Presidents message to Congress has produced a very good effect here. I have reason to think that it was not ill rec.d by the government, as at the levee & drawing-room I was shewn rather more than usual attention by the King & Queen, soon after it appeared, & have experienced from Lord Mulgrave in an interview of ceremony at his own house since, as I had at the court, much civility. By his deportment I was also convinced that the manner in which I had opposed the measure of his government had produced no improper effect. The message is considered by the publick in general, as furnishing satisfactory proof, that our government will vindicate its rights with firmness, in case this government imposes on it the necessity; there seems to be no difference of opinion that in case a misunderstanding took place between the two countries, it was attributable to this gov.t & not to ours. In consideration of the effect which the extent of our commerce, as heretofore enjoyed, had, on the fortunes of this country, in impairing its own resources, or rather was supposed to have, & in supplying the wants of its enemies, the party in favor of the sentiments of the ministry was a strong one, as a measure of policy. But there did not appear to be any one or at most very few who approved the manner in which that measure was introduced, being without notice to our gov.t & of course a surprise on our people under circumstances too of an existing negotiation, which made it more highly reprehensible. I expect in a day or two to give you more full information respecting the arrangement of the new ministry here, & of the consequences likely to result from the change. I am Sir with great respect & esteem y.r very humble servant.

JAMES MONROE."

[18] Vol. iv., p. 409.

TO _____

RICHMOND April 6, 1808.

DEAR SIR,—My expenses abroad having exceeded by unavoidable necessity the compensation allowed me in the station I held, & the mismanagement of my estate in my absence, make it an object to me to command on loan the sum of about 10.000. dol$^{s}$. I should therefore be happy to receive the accomodation from the bank provided it would be willing to make it, on such terms as I could accept, or indeed comply with.

To enable you to answer this proposal it is necessary to give you a statement of my property & of the security which I would pledge for the reimbursement of the money. I have in Albemarle 2500. acres of as good land as any in the county & about 30 slaves, with furniture stock &c. I sho$^{d}$ suppose that my property there was worth three times the amount of the sum desired. I have in Loudon on little river 1100 acres of excellent land worth, at least, the sum in question. I have also property near this place & to the westward of some value. My object is to place in trust, as much of any part of that property, as would be deemed an ample security for the loan, double its amount if necessary, in such mode and to such person as would be desired. I should of course expect to comply strictly with the rules of the bank by paying interest & renewing the notes at the proper [?] times and having them indorsed by a person residing in the town. I should however wish it to be understood that the latter circumstance, the indorsement, was a mere matter of form, & my property was to be relied on for the debt.

On a just view of what I owe, of the amount due me, of what property I propose & may sell without inconvenience, I am satisfied that with the desired accomodation I can accomplish the objects which I have in view in about three years & perhaps a less time. The accomodation would therefore prove of essential & great service to me. I am persuaded that the bank never advanced money with a surer proof of security, for the payment of the interest, and ultimate reimbursement of the principle than in the present case. How far it is one which claims its attention I will not presume to say.

I shall thank you for information whether the arrangement is practicable. If you think that it is you are at liberty to use this letter (which you will otherwise consider as to yourself only and confidential) for the purpose of opening the subject to the other directors & carrying it into effect. I am dear Sir with great esteem & very sincerely yours

TO COLONEL PICKERING.

RICHMOND April 18th 1808.

SIR,—Your letter of the 4th instant was not presented to me by Col: Carrington until some days after he recd it, owing to his engagements at the time, & since then I have been so pressed by some private concerns that it was impossible to answer it sooner.

Mr Pinkneys & my joint communications to the Secretary of State, before & after the signature of the treaty, give a correct view of what passed between

the British Commissioners & us respecting our powers on the subject of impressment, and other subjects in connection with that particular one. I refer more especially to our letter of Nov^r 11. 1806. & of April 22^d 1807. In the former it is stated that, after our efforts to provide by an article to be introduced into the treaty against impressment had failed, we were confirmed in the resolution to proceed in the negotiation, from a knowledge that we might do it without exposing our gov^t & country to any the slightest inconvenience, as it was known to the British Commissioners that we would do it on our own responsibility. In the last mentioned letter, in which is recited the substance of a communication which we made to M^r Canning in conference, is the following paragraph, "we then communicated to him fully all the circumstances on which the remark was founded (that we had reason to believe that the treaty would not be ratified) particularly the nature of our instructions relative to impressments; the knowledge which the British Commissioners had of them; the entire suspension of the negotiation at a certain period, on the failure with the Cabinet of a project of an article for the regulation of that point; the consideration which induc'd us afterwards to proceed in the negotiation, founded on the note of the British Commissioners of the 8^th of Nov^r, the nature of which we fully explained, & finally the condition on which we did proceed in the business, that is, that our gov^t would not be bound to ratify the treaty if it should not be satisfied with the substitute for such an article offered in that note." In this last letter the facts are

stated in detail, to which we alluded in the preceding one, when we stated that we were confirmed in the resolution to proceed in the negotiation by a knowledge that we might do it without a possibility of compromiting our govt, or injuring our country. In my letter from this place (the motive for writing which is explained in it) of Feby 28th, to the Secretary of State, you will find that the same idea is distinctly preserved.

In reviewing this transaction it has occurred to me that it would have been advisable for Mr Pinkney & I to have presented to the British Commissioners a paper in reply to theirs of Novr 8th, which should have stated to them the extent of our powers rather than to have done it informally as we did. Such an act would have placed us on more satisfactory ground with them, but would not have affected the case between the governments, as between the latter the question always would be, what our powers were, not what we had represented them to be, to the British Commissioners we should doubtless have taken that course had we anticipated circumstances which have ensued, as being likely to happen.

You will observe that I stand in a situation of peculiar delicacy in treating alone on any portion of the transaction alluded to, as it is one which bears relation to many parties. I found it to be indespensibly my duty to make the communication to the Secretary of State of Feby 28th, after my return here, to place the whole transaction in a just light, although in that respect it was a painful task. I have not hesitated however to give you the explanation, from a sincere

desire that you may have a just idea on the point to which it relates. I am with respect & esteem your very obedient servant

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND April 18. 1808.

DEAR SIR,—I had the pleasure to receive some days past your favor of the 11th & that of the 13 to day. Being perfectly satisfied by the explanations & assurances which you had given me in your preceding letters that I had taken an improper idea of yr disposition towards me, the details contained in your last one were not necessary in that view. I receive them however with great interest because in giving them you afford me a new proof of your friendship.

I think I informed you or Mr Madison that the Barings had agreed to wait the term mentioned in your letter, or some such term, for the reimbursement of the money, which they had advanced to genl La Fayette, on being secured in it. Such was the fact, it having been communicated to me by Alexander Baring for yours & Mr Madisons information just before I left London. It seems therefore most advisable to proceed on that idea & give information of it to La Fayette. I will however be happy to write Mr Baring if you deem it necessary after receiving the information. I am just setting out for Loudon to look after my interest there, & that of the son of my late much esteemed relative & friend Mr Jones. Should you think it best to write Mr Baring, & be so good as

to intimate it to me by a line at Fredricksburg it shall be duly attended to. I am dear Sir with great respect very sincerely your friend

TO GEORGE HAY.[1]

LOUDON, April 29. 1808

DEAR SIR,—The death of my late relative and friend M^r^ Jones will detain me here till Monday week when I mean to qualify as an Ex^r^ of my late Uncle's will. I shall then proceed to Albemarle & thence to Richmond so that it will unavoidably be rather more than a fortnight before I can return there. I have written many letters to M^rs^ Monroe to apprize her of what has occurr'd here & trust that she rec^d^ them in time to prevent her setting out on her journey with our family.

I am perfectly satisfied that a total forbearance on the part of my friends to write anything in my favor is the soundest course to be pursued at this time. The idea of any attack of the kind being as impolitick as it is repugnant to our feelings is therefore most strongly supported by every indication w^h^ ought to be respected in a view of this subject. Our friend M^r^ Taylor will I hope not regret my delay in the country. Giles will be very sorry for his sortie, & the wisdom observed in the temperate conduct of our friend, is the surest way to produce that effect & conciliate those of our fellow citizens who mean what is just and right only. Attacks on me will do no harm, & silent contempt is the best answer to them. I am Dear Sir sincerely your friend & servant

[1] From the *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, February, 1900.

TO _____.[1]

BEDFORD COUNTY, July 13. 1808

DEAR SIR,—Having had some time to reflect on the topicks which were under consideration when we were together, I will make some additional remarks on them. My attention was particularly called to them by the gentleman who accompanied me from home. Tho' politically opposed to me, yet I knew him to be personally my friend and deserving in other respects of confidence. He alluded to the injury which it had been reported that I had suffer'd by a cabal, & seemed anxious to obtain correct information of it. He appeared to feel strongly the effect of certain facts which I communicated to him, & asked why I had not published everything as soon as I landed. He was deeply penetrated with a sense of the President's innocence of anything improper, & friendship for me. He doubted the propriety of any attack at this time, & was far from seeing any certainty of its success at any previous period. He intimated that the silence of the committee at Richmond, after promising further communication had done harm, as it authorised an inference that the object was relinquished, which inference would soon have if not checked an extensive range.

I have stated this conversation to remark that it would have been improper to have made the attack at the time alluded to admitting that such an one would be now proper; which however I do not admit. I

[1] From the *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, February, 1900.

think on the contrary that the best course has been pursued, which it was possible to devise under existing circumstances, and that a foundation is thereby now laid for that kind of discussion which can alone produce a just suitable effect. As this may become a question in your conferences with our friends it may not be amiss to explain my view of it, more especially as the explanation may be useful in other respects.

1st An attack at the time of my arrival, would have been improper, because a negotiation was depending between my government & that of G. B. on interests with which I had been charged. An attack then, might have encouraged, or been supposed to encourage the British minister, to insist on higher terms than he might otherwise have done. It might even have called in question the integrity of my own conduct in the negotiation in which I had acted, whereby I might have suffer'd great & irreparable injury. The same objection applied afterwards in the case of the embargo, to a certain extent & for a certain time.

2. Such an attack would have identified me with the minority, which wd have been equally in respect to it & myself as unjust as impoli[ti]ck. I had no connection with its measures & ought not to be suspected of it.

3. An attack of the kind alluded to, which impeached in a certain degree the political rectitude of the admn, would hardly succeed agnst any admn, by whomsoever made, unaided by other facts. It would be less likely to succeed agnst the present one, which is sound in many cardinal points, the name of whose

principal member is connected by a great act with the revolution : when made by me it would be considered as prompted by selfish & improper motives, and thereby most probably do me more harm than it.

4. Because it would for the above reasons have failed.

I had therefore on my arrival & have invariably had since a difficult part to act. Disapproving as I did the conduct of the admⁿ in some important points it became me on principle not to identify myself with it. The admⁿ had by its conduct, in the points alluded to, made a cause not with me alone, but with the public also. It was my duty to let it have its course, so far at least as not to give an improper coloring to it. Had I identified myself with the admⁿ in any form, especially by entering into its service, otherwise than on some great emergency, I shoᵈ have injured the cause. To separate myself from it & not connect myself with the minority, required the utmost degree of care & circumspection. If the separation was characterised by circumstances to constitute an attack, it was sure to fail for the reasons above stated. An issue of that decisive nature being made up between it and me, if it did not destroy the admⁿ, it would destroy me, the publick mind would take its side with one or other party & adhere to it afterwards. Prudence required that the separation should be made in such a manner, as that it might be distinctly seen & understood by the publick, but yet be free from any of those acts of violence, which shoᵈ tend so essentially to compromise the publick, as to

prevent the people from looking into & examining measures & judging of them according to their interest, which should prevent the impolitick measures of the admn, having their one effect on the publick mind. The course which has been pursued has in my opinion plac'd things precisely in that state. The part which I have acted (& acted on principle) by separating myself from the admn, & writing the letter of Feby 28. has preserved and vindicated the cause without making an attack. It remains for those who think that the publick rights & happiness will be advanced by promoting A instead of B. to take advantage of circumstances for that purpose.

In resuming the subject in my opinion it shod be by an address from the Committee, which shod make no imputation agnst the admn, but rest simply on the ground of pretention, founded on a sense of fitness for the station. On that of superior opportunities of information, in all those concerns which are now depending, a knowledge of all the European govts with which we have connection—such as France, Britain, Spain, of the men in power, their views & characters: my good standing in all those countries & with every govt, of experience in the Executive admn as in that of Virg.—a facility in uniting parties & drawing the country together, while principle is preserved. The claim of service in my late missions, that the cession of Louisiana was due to me, & probably would not have been made had another been sent, giving the admn credit for its choice, (the only [thing ?] to which entitled)—That my conduct in Britain before I went to

Sp[n] (as appears by documents published) had kept our commerce from spoliation: that my conduct in Spain was equally proper, & understood to have been highly approved by the adm[n]—that on my return to Britain, it was essentially useful, as it put a stop to seizures &c., as acknowledged by the whole American commerce, & proved by documents: that was equally useful in every step of the negotiation entrusted to me in whole or part—it was so as already said in the life of Pitt—It was so in the life of Fox—and it was equally so after his death, when associated with another; that in the seperate negotiation afterwards entrusted to me with M[r] Canning it was so; that a new trust was a proof in increased confidence, & the result, w[h] produc'd a special mission to the U States placed them in that respect on higher ground than they ever stood before. Reference may also be made to my former mission to France, its success, in preserving peace, protecting our commerce till I became victim to the then ruling party—to my services in the Senate before I went to France, & in the old Congress, in the Virg[n] assembly—in the army, through which long se[r]vices preserved a fame untarnished. I would take a short sketch of these things, pressing the pretention in every point, without imputation in any respect on the adm[n]

Such an address must either be submitted to or it will bring forward an attack. If an attack is made it will be on some or all the following points. 1[st] that the cession of Louisiana was not imputable to me. If that is denied Col: Mercer ought & I doubt not

will address a letter to you or the Chancellor, & transmit him for publication a copy of Talleyrands letter to Livingston & of Livingstons letter to me: stating that he obtained of him of Livingston a copy of the first for me, & has kept copies of each since, & now communicates them to place a great transaction in its just light & make reparation to an injured individual. Such a publication would circulate thro' the whole continent. He should give the President credit for his knowledge of mank^d in making the appointment.

2. That my conduct in Spain was not known to be proper, the documents having never been published. Answer that the documents if published would prove it: that the adm^n is understood to have expressed its approbation without reserve—but that new proofs of confidence prove it, without relying on any other, of w^h there have been many.

3d. That there was nothing remarkable in my conduct in Engl^d after my return from Spain. Answer the whole American commerce acknowledged that I had put a stop to seizures. See, my several letters to Lord Mulgrave especially that of the 21. of Sep^r or some date in Sep^r, where without his aid the whole book of M^r M. is condensed (quere as to alluding to that essay).

4. That an unfavorable treaty was made—a charge of that kind would furnish first, an opportunity to throw the whole responsibility, of what occurd in that transaction on the adm^n, if any thing improper was done. To contrast my conduct while left to myself,

& not interfer'd in by the admⁿ with what followed that interference—to state that the interference existed from the time of the meeting of Congress, covering the whole admⁿ of Fox to the time of his death or rather the conclusion of the treaty, as it was published in the papers here & in England that a special envoy was to be sent—that every one knows that where such a measure is intended & believed (& there appears nothing in Mr Madisons letters to me which have been published to discredit it) that the govt with whom the negotiation is carried on looks to such a mission as that with whom it has to treat. This shod be urged not in a manner to impute anything improper to the admⁿ, but simply to lay at its door the responsibility, & exculpate. As preparatory to this view it may perhaps be better, to deny that the treaty was a bad one. To contrast the condition in which we shod have been had it been ratified. France respectful, as to be inferr'd from her having passed the decree before the treaty was formed & declared thro' Decres, that the decree of Berlin of Novr 21. 1806. did not apply to the U States, after the conclusion of the treaty was known—& again declaring that it did apply after known [sic] that the treaty was rejected—observing that it is admitted that the communication of Decrès Minister of Marine did not bind the govt—surprise that it was asked, or accepted as satisfactory. This part of the subject to be managed with great delicacy & merely by way of vindi[c]ation, tho' by the bye, as much may be said in that way as by charge & with infinitely greater effect.

5. That in the negotiation with Canning about the Chessapeake an improper concession was made by declaring that that great outrage should not be blended with inferior topicks, whereby an advantage was given to those afterwards in his with Mr Madison. Answer the fact is otherwise, no concession was made in that negotiation nor was any allusion intended or capable of being construed by the paper as applicable to the case of impressment, to which Mr Rose applied it in his notes to Mr Madison. By recurring to what passed with Mr Canning just before & immediately after my note referr'd to, it will appear that the inferior topicks attended to were the outrages of Captn Douglass in impressing some men from our merchant vessels, and in the attack of the Impeteux, a French ship driven on shore & burnt there. You will find that I had previously obtained of Mr Canning an interview to lay those cases before him, when neither of us had any knowledge of the affr of the Chessapeake—that I told him in the interview of those cases, & parted, for the purpose of taking up that of the Chessapeake. In drawing my note I had those inferior cases in view & adverted to them for the sole purpose of giving greater importance to the other. It is also to be remarked that I had then nothing to do seperately with the case of impressment, it being committed to Mr Pinkney & myself, & then under a discussion which was revived after the return of Mr Purviance; it would therefore have been absurd to advert to a subject on which I had not power to treat. Mr Madison it is true gave no reply to Mr Rose's argument founded

on a misrepresentation of my note, whereby he in a certain [degree] sanction'd the argument. He could not have altered facts had [he] admitted in express terms the assertion & inference from it.

I do not mean to say that this kind of continued discussion should be carried on by the Committee. I think on the contrary that it would more properly be carried on, as the attack will be, by anonymous essays, in vindication of the Committee. The letter from Col: Mercer if addressed to you as chairman, ought to be published, by the Committee, with concise introduction to it. But the address sho^d^ be the sole work of the Committee, unless particular circumstances sho^d^ make a different conduct necessary. You will observe that in this mode everything that is important to fair investigation, may be brought forward, & supported by documents now before the publick, that could be brought forward by attack while it is altogether free from the weighty objections applicable to the latter mode. Care must however be taken not to presume attacks not made, or to push the defence in a manner to lose the character of the defendant. The publick bias will depend essentially on that circumstance. Care must also be taken in drawing a contrast, sho^d^ such an one be made, between the course which I advised & that which the adm^n^ took, to confine it to evils already felt —such as loss of commercial capital, seamen &c,—not to extend it to the future, as an adjustment sho^d^ such an one take place wo^d^ reject the latter, and such an one is to be hoped.

I would invariably speak handsomely of the

Presid[t] of his disinterestedness in retiring, his unquestionable merit, & certain fame, his attachment to both parties & indifference to the result. I would give him credit where due, & say no more, avoiding any harsh imputation agnst him I would also treat M[r] Madison (if I ever mentioned him w[h] I am not certain will be necessary) with tenderness. Thus the character of the discussion will be completely changed, & assume a form which can produce no bad, & must produce some good effect.

I have written the above, as you will have sufficient reason to conclude in great haste, & without documents. As my mind has long been made up on the topicks, I am satisfied that no reflection w[h] I co[d] give, would change the course herein advised; nor is it probable that I have mistaken any single fact relied on: tho you & my other friends who write, sho[d] be careful to observe that no mistake is made by relying on me, & not on the documents. You are at liberty to shew this & the note which I gave you to my friends the Chancellor, M. Leigh & M[r] McRae.

Judge Fleming has gone on before me. I shall cross the mountain early to-morrow & pursue my journey westward without interruption. You shall hear from me again as soon as I have anything worthy attention to communicate.

I am Dear Sir very sincerely
Your friend & servant

The Chancellor is in possession of Talleyrands letter to Livingston & of his (Livingstons) to me, sho[d] Col:

Mercer not have preserved his copies. The sooner this business is mov'd in, after the arrangement is complete, the better, but publish nothing in haste, as you have those to deal with who will take advantage of any mistake. In the anonymous discussion, if it is thought proper to notice the essays of W. Nicholas & Barrett, it sho^d^ be only by giving them a slap in the face as you wo^d^ do impertinent puppies for thrusting their heads where they ought [not] to be seen. I am told that the former expects to be appointed Secr^y^ of State under this new projected adm^n^.

I shall address this to you in y^r^ professional character.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

ALBEMARLE Sep^r^ 27. 1808.

DEAR SIR,—I have just returned from Richmond & send the enclosed for y^r^ inspection in the hope that you may not have set out to day for Washington, knowing that you have heretofore frequently staid a day longer than that which you had appointed for your departure to arrange more completely your private affairs.

I take the liberty to submit to your perusal a copy of my letters to M^r^ Randolph,[1] being the only letters of any real importance which I wrote him while I was abroad. All that I did write him were in the same sentiment. You will perceive that they were not intended for your view, as there are passages in them

[1] Vol. iv., pp. 460, 480, 485.

which may not be agreeable. You will however perceive that there is nothing in them to sanction what has been by some most ungenerously insinuated.

I submit to your view another document, a letter from Mr Giles,[1] which I shod not do if I did [not] feel it in some degree my duty to shew it to you. I consider myself fully justified, by what he has said of my answer—It is possible that you may have seen my

[1] WASHINGTON March 4th 1807.

DEAR SIR,—I now write you at the instance of Mr Patrick Magruder of the State of Maryland, to beg you to take the trouble of ascertaining whether Mr Philip Barton Key of the same State, is not at this time a pensioner of G. Britain, or at least in the annual receipts of some emolument from the government thereof? if the fact be in the affirmative, the evidence should be duely authenticated; as it is intended to be read in the case of a contested election at the approaching session of Congress. If this evidence can be had, be good enough to put it under cover to Mr Madison, addressed to Mrs George Magruder of George Town. The President of the U. S. was last evening furnished with a copy of the treaty lately concluded between the commissioners of the U. S. & G. Britain, together with the declatory or explanatory note on the part of the British commissioners; The contents I have not seen; but the substance has been informally communicated by the President without reserve; and it would give me great pleasure, to have it in my power to assure you that they were acceptable to the government and people of this country.—But this is not the fact.—The obvious tendency of the explanatory note, and the silence respecting seamen, have excited universal disappointment & astonishment.—The High and unabated confidence in our commissioners, forbids any conclusive opinions upon this subject, until their own inducements for consenting to such a measure shall be known; But without this information, I can assure you, that the views and opinions respecting our foreign relations, are extremely different from those which must have influenced our commissioners.—

The only party here in favor of making a common cause with G. B. or taking any part whatever in the war, until absolutely forced to it, is the mere Anglican party, accompanyed by a few wild, eccentric men, who have no influence whatever, and are considered generally as men of disordered imaginations.—They are totally destitute of influence, & destroy every person or object they endeavor to support.—It is feared that some of the wild effusions of some of these men, have been mistaken by our commissioners for indications of the public sentiment. The French Arrete alone, it is presumed, could not have justified such on the part of the U. S. I have hastily presented to

answer[1]—I hope you have—I make the communication to you in confidence, & may hereafter especially if you desire it add something more on this subject, I am

dear Sir with great respect & esteem your friend & servant

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND Oct$^{r}$ 24$^{th}$ 1808.

DEAR SIR,—Immediately after you left Albemarle, I was forced to go to Loudoun to make some arrangements in the estate with which I am charged there, & having returned by the same route, I did not reach this place till yesterday late at night. I had not therefore the pleasure to receive your kind favors of the 12$^{th}$ & 13. till to-day.

The passages noted in your letters to me shall

you these candid facts in an unreserved way for your consideration. We have had the most harmonious Session in the Senate, that has taken place since the commencement of the government.—Party is nearly at an end in that Body ; & subjects are generally discussed & considered merely in relation to their own intrinsic merits unaccompanyed with any collateral sensibilities—The House of Representives, is occasionally agitated by variable squalls & whirlwinds defying all system & consistency.—This is attributed more to the capricious sensibilities of a few individuals, than to the designs or views of the general mass.—Since you left this country, I have undergone a great variety of Bodily afflictions, and amongst others had the misfortune of fracturing my leg, & injuring my knee to an extreme degree, so much so that I am still reduced to the use of Crutches & am scarcely able to hobble in a miserable manner without them.

I sincerely hope that yourself & family have enjoyed good health and all the other good things of this world.—

Be pleased to Present me respectfully and affectionately to M$^{rs}$ & Miss Monroe, and accept for yourself assurances of my High consideration & unfeigned regard &c. W$^{m}$ B GILES.

[1] See page 4 ante.

most certainly be omitted from the publication which will be made of our correspondence. In truth I had resolved to suppress the publication altogether, in case I should see in the communication which I expected to receive from you here any cause to infer that you had the slightest objection to it. But the unreserved manner in which you have assented to the publication, & the interest you take in it for a reason assigned in your letter of the 12th instant, with the hope and confident belief which I cherish that it will not only be consoling to many of our friends, but produce with others in the way of conciliation, an useful effect, have induced me to proceed in it. With that view I took the liberty to permit an extract from your letter of the 12th to be handed to the publick yesterday through one of the gazettes of this city. I shall peruse again with the utmost attention your letters, & strike from them whatever there may be reason to presume, there can be any objection to the publication of, as I shall attend with the most scrupulous care to every circumstance which can be interesting to your feelings & honor. I am Dear Sir, with great respect very sincerely your friend & servt

TO L. W. TAZEWELL.

RICHMOND Octr 30. 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,—I had left Leesburg before your letter arrived there. It was therefore not till very lately on my return here by Albemarle that I recd it.

The views which you have taken of our affairs past

& present is a very interesting, and in many respects undoubtedly just one, of the tendency of the measures of the present administration, I speak of that portion of them which relates to our foreign concerns, & our domestic also so far as they are connected with them, to overwhelm itself, & bury in its ruins the republican cause, I have long entertained a most painful foreboding. The hope however was while I was abroad, altho' the measures taken, or rather the union preserved with every power was not such as to give all the support that ought to have been given to aid the pending negotiation with either, that by remaining in its service & using my utmost efforts to push its fortune in the mode advanced by it, that it might be possible to save it, & thereby exempt from all possible danger the republican cause. The result was that a treaty in which I had joined, advantageous in the more important points to our country, but which had become less so than it might have been had a different course been pursued, was rejected, its defects imputed to me, by certain intrigants, and thereby an issue made up which many adverse circumstances promoted which involved the sole question of the propriety of my conduct. One of the circumstances to which I allude was the division which had taken place before my return in the republican party, an incident which gave to the administration an artificial support, in the system it had adopted, vast & almost incredible. This was the state in which I found things on my return. The reception given me, was the spontaneous effusion of a generous & virtuous people, who knew that I had

served them thro' life with integrity & zeal, and whose recollection of my publick conduct, in situations the most trying, for a long series of years, forced from them at the moment of my arrival, an unqualified expression of their approbation; notwithstanding the efforts which had been made & were then making by certain *intrigants* to confine their attention & feelings to the point in which it was hoped that I was vulnerable. In expressing their approbation my fellow citizens had [shewn] their feelings, & done what they conceived to be their duty. Afterwards things fell into a regular train. The arrangements to which you allude, had concentrated in favor of a particular object, a great force, within & without the State, which acted in regular concert. The movement of all its parts was harmonious. It knew how to harrow the feelings of the people, when it could not oppose them with effect, & to come forward, when those feelings had subsided, to push the object which it had undertaken to accomplish. This force was a powerful one in itself, but many circumstances not already noticed tended to encrease that power. The haste in which I write this letter renders it impossible for me to go so fully into the subject as I wish to do. I will however endeavor to touch certain other points which have been ably adverted to by you.

The present administration had been much connected with the causes as you justly observe, and in the opinion of many identified with it. You seem to think however that there was a period, a much earlier one than that taken by the Committee here, to separ-

ate the cause from the administration. Let us examine this sentiment.

What were the circumstances which had given to Mr Madison such an artificial support? 1st the rejection of the treaty and an imputation raised by it against me. 2d the attack on the admn by the minority, that minority being favorable to my election.

There was one great evil which it was our duty always to guard against. The identification of the admn with the cause. Of this you seem sufficiently aware. That how & when were they to be separated? I had various doubts of the policy of the attempt at any early period. At that for example of my return home. It seemed difficult if not impossible to make the community in that stage of our affairs, comprehend with sufficient clearness, the impolicy of past measures, nor to induce it to withdraw its confidence from an admn which had possessed it to so great a degree. Those measures were still in *trial*, the experiment was making. A negotiation was depending with the British govt in the person of Mr Rose; the publick expected from it the happiest result, and the same expectation followed the actual result, in the appeal made by the failure of the negotiation to the British govt under the pressure of the embargo & non-importation act which were continued in operation. While there was a well founded prospect of success, from the measures adopted by the govt, it seemed to be impossible to enter on the subject alluded to, with the hope of producing a good effect from it. It would have been urged that the govt had a claim on the patriotism

of the nation, as well as in its interest, to support it in the experiment it was making to accomplish such important national objects. And untill the experiment was made, and the result seen, the admⁿ and the cause were essentially the same. They were to be separated by circumstances only, among which the failure of the measures which had been adopted by the admⁿ, was that only on which any great reliance could be placed. That career being run through, the nation would find itself in a condition to examine its real situation, to trace the causes which produced it, and to provide the means of extricating itself from present embarrassments, and to avert the still greater ones with which it was menaced. In this stage the nation would also be able to take an impartial view of my conduct, in every station I had held, and more especially *that* portion of it which offered an alternative to the course which had been preferred ; to compare the two plans together & to decide which was better calculated to advance the prosperity & vindicate the rights & honor of the country. An early attack on the admⁿ was further objectionable from the division in the republican party, and the attack made on the govᵗ by the minority. The attack on it at any period which shoᵈ precede the operation & effect of the causes above alluded to, would not only fail in the object but give a new artificial support to the admⁿ. We should only have come in as a reinforcement to a routed party, and most probably shared its fate.

I had two dangers to avoid on my return home, which I was equally bound by a regard to truth &

justice to avoid, as by sound policy in respect to my own reputation & the publick interest. The first was not to identify myself with the admⁿ. I had been pushed, as it were, aside, by it. In rejecting the treaty it had by implication censured me: I thought that I had done right in what I had done, and did not think that it comported with what I owed to myself, or the publick, to come in, inlist under its banners [illegible] as a [illegible] in favor of the embargo &c. I answered Mr Madison's objections to the treaty & afterwards remained quiet, giving the admr all the aid which [illegible] where I disapproved could give it, and the unreserved & constant expression of my approbation where I did approve. I never failed to speak where it was proper that I shod of its perfect integrity in foreign & domestick concerns, of its attachment to free govt & zealous desire to support it, of its great care of the publick money, of its attachment to peace, &c. But I would not take any steps which might possibly imply that I had done wrong in the case alluded to, or sanction the censure imposed on me.

It was equally improper to identify myself with the republican minority. I had had nothing to do in the part it acted, & it became me to exculpate myself, after my return, from the suspicion. The fact was that had I been in Congress at the time of that division, I shod have recommended a course which differed equally, from that preferred by the minority, & also that which was adopted by the admⁿ. The former you will recollect was disposed to make an issue with Spain [illegible word] to leave the business to negoti-

ation with Britain : that is to do little or nothing in it, the latter was for exactly the opposite course, making the issue with G. Britain & postponing it with Spain. I had advised the making an issue with both the parties at once in full confidence that it would succeed with both. At that time Bonaparte had just assumed the superior power in Europe, whose interior was discontented, and a war was gathering against him from Austria Russia, &c, & Britain always resting on precarious ground against so great an adversary, not driven by events to rely on herself alone, not instructed by experiment what she had to fear from a controversy with us, indulging much in hope, and desirous of forming friends where she could, the moment for such a pressure on both parties was peculiarly fortunate. I advised it, but my advice was rejected. The minority knew nothing of my advice, which had been given from respect to Spain in private letters from Madrid, until after the business with Spain had been disposed of by Congress, and that with G. Britain entered on. In the documents laid before Congress respecting the latter power, there was a passage (in one of my letters) which, after urging such a course with G. B. asked the question " can we engage in such a controversy or hazard it with Spain & Britain at the same time ?" I answered it in the affirmative. It was on a view of the letter containing it, that M^r^ Randolph complained that my sentiments on that subject had not been before communicated.

By acting the part which I have pursued I endeavored to do justice to the publick cause which had

been created by the conduct of the admⁿ, & in a manner which seemed most likely to succeed, while the utmost regard was paid to the publick interest, as well in depending negotiations, as in concerns of more vital importance. In case of success, it would be gained without exposing us to even the imputation of any improper motive; in case of failure there could be no cause for self reproach, or rather [illegible word], & certainly none for that of our adversaries.

It is to be observed that when an election is made on existing circumstances, that is, is dependant in any degree on [two lines entirely illegible] the success of publick measures, the person whose fortune is connected with the govᵗ, has greatly the advantage of those who may be opposed to him. The people naturally cling to their govᵗ, I speak of the great mass, & often those in office & those who wish to be in office, side with it also. Whether the measures of the admⁿ, such as the rejection of the treaty, & the previous measure of a special mission, were intended to favor a particular object cannot perhaps be satisfactorily determined at this time. You will see in the papers a copy of a correspondence between the President & me, on those two acts of his admⁿ, in which I have acknowledged myself to be satisfied, in respect to his disposition towards me personally. My objections however to the measures remain unmoved. The publication of the correspondence presents substantially to view my objections to those measures, as I presume it does his vindication of them. I have known & esteemed him long; his life has been useful; and

altho' I suffered much from those measures in more than one respect, yet I feel an interest in his future tranquility & happiness.

With New York there is a good understanding. Clinton has said to one of my friends that if I could be elected he would decline in my favor; he urged the propriety some months past to that friend of keeping me in the nomination here & elsewhere with a view to ascertain that point. My standing in the States Eastward of New York is said to be better than his. The reserve in pushing my pretentions heretofore, is I think in some measure imputable, to a feeling of delicacy for him. I am persuaded that he so considers it. The backwardness of the Eastern States to come forward against Mr Madison, I mean of such as are so disposed, is believed by some who possess the means of information, to proceed from an indifference to the election of Clinton. My opinion decidedly is that he who stands the best prospect for success ought to be preferred. That arrangement can only be made after the Electors are chosen.

The result of this election will I presume be finally placed in the hands of the State of Massachusetts, perhaps of the Governor of that State. The majority in both branches of the legislature is federal, & this majority in favor of the election of a federalist. But it is necessary to pass a law for the election of Electors, he [1] will never assent to one which opens the door to a federalist. To me he is personally well disposed, has full confidence in my principles &c.; his

[1] Clinton.

sons were known to me abroad, one, who was of the family of Mr Bowdoin, in my confidence, and on a footing of friendship. From this latter a letter to me, was recd, dated in June, while I was in Kentucky, on the subject of the election, and expressing the most favourable sentiments to me. It was lately only that I was enabled to answer, which I did with caution, but in terms correspondent with the relations subsisting between us. Mr Bowdoin is personally friendly to me, as he certainly was to the object, not only unsolicited but discouraged by me, while abroad. He wrote to me on his return, and expressed his regret to hear, as he said, that my friends supported me for the secondary station only. I replied that they had nominated me for the primary one. I have not heard from him since. If the federalists cannot elect their own man, it is believed that they wod prefer me to Mr Madison, and there seems to me to be little prospect of their success in that respect. Those circumstances afford one of an arrangement between them in my favor. If Massachusetts supports me, the Eastern States generally will probably join her in it. The governor however is liable to be assailed in many ways and by many arguments. The support given me by the federalists will become a potent weapon in the hands of such men as Giles[1] and

[1] Monroe's notes on Mr. Giles's letter to Chancellor Taylor:

"Mr. Giles letter denies the right of the Chancellor to interpose in a case which has reference to a 3d person, & thinks it peculiarly improper in him, as Chancellor.

ansr The inquiry had reference to a publick character, touching his conduct in an important publick concern. It was therefore a publick cause in which every citizen had a right to interfere. Mr Giles's own character & official situation,

Nicholas to attack me with. It will be represented to him that by supporting me he will be throwing himself & the State into the hands of that party : that

gave him a claim to confidence, by means whereof any statement from him of the kind alluded to, could not fail to injure Mr. M. . It was supposed that the official situation of the Chancellor gave a greater security, for promoting justice between the parties. He could have no interest in any other object ; & the application from him afforded Mr. Giles an opportunity of rendering it.

Mr. Giles regrets the divisions relative to the presidential election &c. He has done all he could to moderate them & now acts on that principle &c. ansr. what has the claim to justice of any individual who complains of an injury, to do, with the presidential election ? It was supposed that if he had injured Mr. Monroe, he had not done it to produce an effect on that question, & that in answering the inquiry he wod. look only to the question of justice which is a distinct one from that of the election. Mr. Monroe wod. have had the same claim to justice had the election not been depending, & his friends wod. not have been inattentive to it. Perhaps however in that case Mr. Giles wod. not have injured him.

Mr. Giles says he has only answered charges said to be brought forward against the admn. by the friends of Mr. Monroe.

1. The admn. is charg'd with being in favor of war with G. B. & Mr. M. in favor of peace.

His answer was that they were for peace—& therefore the charge was not to be presumed to be countenanc'd by Mr. M.

2. That they had rejected a treaty said to be both honorable & advantageous to the U. S.

His answer was as far as he knew its contents by a general representation that it was not of that character, & if it was that the British paper which accompanied it wod. have prevented its ratification, as leading to war with one of the parties. He says this opinion is fully confirmed by the papers now disclosed, & by Mr. M's own vindication of the treaty. He has also said that the treaty was made against orders which will not be denied by Mr. Monroe.

3. Mr. Jefferson & Mr. Madison charged with adding Mr. P. to Mr. M. in the negotiation to deprive him &c.

He could hardly believe it possible that Mr. M. could have countenanc'd this charge &c, as guilty of ingratitude &c, as the President against it, & pressed on him by an unanimous vote of the Senate. It is also known that the various appointments conferred on Mr. M. had excited unpleasant feelings in the minds of many against the President &c. The marked preference shewn to him on so many occasions was calculated to produce that effect.—The President has extended his favors to Mr. M. to amount to acts of indiscretion, of which a recent instance (not mentioned) is afforded. Note, it is evident by his own statement that Mr. Giles steps forward to make charges against Mr. Monroe, under the

in case of my election the national government will assume a federal form & take a federal direction: that we shall sacrifice by it not only our personal for-

pretext of answering those which are said to be made by Mr Monroe's friends against the admn.. The part which Mr Giles has taken in this business ought to have prevented his remarks on that of the chancellor.

Mr Giles does not pretend to say that any of the charges against the admn which are imputed to Mr Monroe's friends, are made by him, nor indeed by any friend whose name is given, nor does he denounce Mr M. to the publick, or apprize him of the denunciation made of him, to give him an opportunity to vindicate himself. He circulates his charges in private whereby Mr M. is exposed to the injury which those charges supported by Mr Giles's character can inflict. It is impossible that such a course of conduct shod promote justice. Whereas by the course of conduct pursued by the chancellor it is impossible that injustice shod be done. Everything is above board; he states to Mr Giles what he has heard he shod say, & leaves it to him, to place it in its true character, to deny or justify as the case may be.

Had Mr Giles addressed Mr Monroe & stated what he had heard his friends shod say in his behalf against the admn., he would doubtless have obtained an answer & thus the business wod have been in its regular train. Neither party could have been injured. If Mr Giles had correct knowledge of the treaty, he wod then have been able to do justice to the admn & also to Mr M.—and without such knowledge he ought to say nothing on the subject. As it does not appear that Mr M. has made any charge against the admn., at least Mr Giles does not prove or even affirm it, the subject can only be considered in the light of charges made by him against Mr M., & he (Mr Giles) as alluding to such charges against the admn to justify his attack on Mr Monroe.

The 1st head is too vague to merit discussion. That one party is friendly to peace & the other to war with G. B. is a fact which neither can be interested to prove.

2d Mr Giles charges Mr Monroe next with having made a treaty which was neither honorable or advantageous to the U States, he adds that had it been otherwise, the declaration of the B. comrs which accompanied it wod have prevented its ratification, as it wod have involved us in a war with G. B. or France. On what ground he undertook to make this charge before the publication of the documents, Mr Giles best knows. Now that the documents are seen, the fallacy of the position is evident. The treaty was not of the kind which Mr Giles states it to be, nor was the declaration of the British Comrs of the character imputed to it. To that paper however we do not see the signature of the American Comrs; in consequence they were not a party to it. Why does Mr Giles however speak of the treaty as Mr Monroe's treaty? It was not his treaty more than it was of Mr P.—Mr M. was not the Special Envoy sent from this country.

tunes but the cause. It will require much firmness in those who are profoundly & immovably attached to the cause, not in the way of correct information, and

By sending such an one, the business was in a great measure taken out of his hands. It is hard to take from him as sole agent the power to make a treaty & then impute to him all the blame if there was any in it.

3. Mr Giles next charges Mr Monroe with ingratitude for complaining that Mr P. was added to him in the negotiation at London, for the purposes which he recites. Here it is to be observed again, that Mr Giles, produces no evidence of such a complaint being made by Mr M. He does not however hesitate to impute it to him & to comment on it with the utmost severity.

It was hoped that these kind of topicks would have been kept out of view in this discussion. An enquiry was made simply whether Mr Giles had said certain hard things of Mr Monroe, relative to his conduct in the late negotiation & treaty, in the hope that justice might be done equally to Mr Giles & him. In reply to that enquiry ——

Mr Giles says that in his censures on Mr Monroe's conduct he has only answered charges said to be brought forward against the admn by the friends of Monroe. That the friends of Mr Monroe have charged the admn 1. with being in favor of war with G. B. while Mr M. is in favor of peace. 2. of having rejected a treaty which was honorable & advantageous to the U States. 3. with having added a new minister to Mr Monroe in G. B. with a view to injure him &c

Mr Giles does not say that any charge was actually made by Mr Monroe against the admn., nor indeed does he point out any friend of his who had made one. By the nature of the transaction between the admn & Mr Monroe, which involve the points alluded to by Mr Giles, Mr Monroe is made the defendant. Had Mr M. said what Mr Giles imputes to his friends, & for which he censures him it ought to be considered more in the light of his vindication than charges against the admn. The admn rejected a treaty which Mr Monroe assisted in forming, it sent a minister to join him in forming it. These measures implied censure, especially the former, & if anything was said on them or on the present state of things by him or his friends, it was naturally in his vindication. But it does not appear by Mr Giles letter or by any publick document that Mr Monroe has said anything even in his own vindication, or his friends for him, to criminate the admn It is believed that under such circumstances, attended by high denunciations from Mr Giles & others less was never said by any one.

The affair therefore resolves itself simply into charges made by Mr Giles against Mr Monroe, & it is evident that he steps forward to make them in this letter under the pretext of answering those which are said to be made by Mr Monroe's friends against the admn

Had Mr Giles object been to vindicate the admn "

who have as yet kept in their minds the admn & the cause together, to resist this kind of clamorous appeal. The Governor of Massachusetts is I think a firm and virtuous republican, but facts may be misrepresented & even fabricated (I hope not by the persons above mentioned) for the purpose of deceiving him. How the arts which are sure to be practic'd on this occasion there and elsewhere may be effectually counteracted you & my other friends can best devise.

The danger is that this contest, which on our part, is known to be commenc'd & maintained for the safety of the union, & to have been conducted with unexampled delicacy & propriety, may degenerate into a mere struggle as it approaches a conclusion, between federalists & republicans. The more it gets into that state the better for our adversaries. The majority of Electors will be republican, as we have the fair prospect since the late election in Pennsylvania. Were it otherwise the cause & its votaries would sink; the present admn wod stand to its country & posterity reproachable for the disaster. But as the federalists seem likely to throw themselves into my scale, that circumstance by mere hostility of party feeling, menaces to rally around the opposite party, a force which otherwise might not be seen there.

To demonstrate to the Govr of Massachusetts, and those who are willing in Congress to receive the demonstration, that the election of one party is not only to give a sanction to present measures, but to authorise the pursuit of them, in the limited track already marked out, or rather in that only which is reserved,

& thereby at some more distant period, I fear a short one, involve in one common ruin everything that is dear to us, while the election of the other presents a reasonable and well-founded prospect of a different result, is not a difficult thing. The state of affairs, especially if our negotiations abroad have failed, which there is much reason to fear has been the case, affords unhappily too great a facility to the demonstration. It will also make an awful appeal to the patriotism even of the best friends and firmest supporter of Mr Madison. Those not bound to him by stronger ties than such as connect them with the liberty & happiness of their country, ought to hesitate & most probably will hesitate before they take that step. But those who are free to act as their judgment dictates, who are capable of reviewing with impartiality the existing crisis & its dangers, who are already well informed or willing to receive information, who possess sufficient integrity & firmness, or even a due sense of responsibility to their constituents, will have less difficulty in deciding the course which they ought to pursue.

I have perhaps said more than, circumstanced as I am, I ought to say even to a friend. But the truth is I rely on the part I have heretofore acted to exempt me from the imputation of any improper motive. It is well known to our friends here that I have more than once pressed on them the consideration of the propriety of my withdrawal from the controversy not from any feeling of a personal nature, proceeding from the gloom of the prospect, at those periods,

but from the relation which my support had to the publick interest & themselves. They resolved invariably & unanimously to continue the nomination, on the principle, that by so doing, be the success what it might, the cause of free govt would be advanc'd not injur'd. Since the last decision on that point I have felt myself more at liberty to express my sentiments on the subject to them, as a member rather than a party that had a particular connection with it. You will nevertheless receive this free communication in confidence. I am my dear Sir your friend & servant

TO MADAM ELIZA BONAPARTE.

RICHMOND, Novr 6th 1808.

DEAR MADAM,—I had not the pleasure to receive your letter of the 15th ultº till lately, on my return from the country, or I should have been happy to have given it an earlier answer.

I can readily conceive how much you have been affected by the appeal which has been lately made to you for the surrender of your son to his father, and how very important it is to your future happiness that your decision on it should be such as your judgment and feelings as a mother should always approve. The confidence which you repose in me, by asking my advice on so delicate and interesting a topick, will not be abused. With my family, I have always felt great sensibility to the hard destiny which has attended you, and I should have been happy to have had it in my power to alleviate it. To the present

period your conduct has been distinguished by the utmost degree of prudence & delicacy. Your return to your father's house, under the circumstances which suggested it, was a measure the best calculated to preserve your own honor & reflect credit on your son, that could have been devised. It was in your father's house that your husband became acquainted with you. He led you from it, & it was to that safe & honorable asylum that it became you to fly, as soon as he withdrew his protection from you. I have no doubt that that step encreased the regard which he before entertained for you, as it must have done the respect of his family and of every other person.

But you are now called on to act a new part, & to fix in a certain degree the destiny of your son, and you feel the solicitude which becomes a parent in so great a trial. You are alarmed for his safety, in case you yield him to the demand of his father, & you ask my opinion on that point. I feel the importance of this enquiry, & the delicacy in many views in giving an opinion on it. But I have no hesitation in complying with your request, under the sanction on which it is made. I have no doubt that the motive assigned, is that which induced Jerome to demand his son. I have full confidence also that it has governed his brother in authorising the demand. It is natural that it should be felt by both of them, and I can see no reason of a political nature which should inspire them with any other. The father must be sensible that he owes much to the claims of a child, the offspring of a virtuous mother lawfully married to him:

that he owes much to the mother whom he has injured, and it is impossible that he should be capable of seeking her retreat, for the purpose of aggravating her misfortunes, by any new act of injustice, especially towards their common offspring. The Emperor must also have some sensibility to the hard fortune which he has imposed on the wife of his brother, as well as to the claims of their infant child. He must be aware too that the attention of the world has been drawn to him by his conduct in that transaction, as it would be by the surrender of the child by his mother, to his protection & on his demand. Should any calamity befall the infant, which might, by any circumstance, expose him to the suspicion of unfair conduct, it would fix a stigma on his fame which could never be effaced. It is not therefore from either of them that I should apprehend any danger to the child. If his situation should expose him to any I should expect it from another quarter. The wife of Jerome, or some of her connections might not see this infant received under the protection of his father with pleasure. She may have children, & he might be thought in their way. Such things often happen in courts. Of this Lady I have no knowledge whatever. I speak of what we have seen of others in similar circumstances. Should you consent to part with your son, the possibility of such a danger may be worthy your attention, with a view to guard him against it.

In deciding this highly interesting question you will naturally ask yourself other preliminary ones

which are connected with it. You will consider whether the career to which the surrender of the child leads, supposing it free from other danger, is likely to contribute more to his happiness than an education in the respectable circle of his maternal family, conformable to the principles of his country? You will ask yourself whether you can consent to part with him forever, for such from many causes, may possibly be the consequence? The many friends whom you have around you, will give you the best council on these and other very important points. I have taken the liberty to suggest them only for your consideration. That your decision may be guided by consummate wisdom, & that it may promote your own happiness, & that of your son, is the sincere wish of my family, as it is mine. I beg you my dear Madam to accept the assurance of my respect and esteem.

## TO WILLIAM WIRT.

DEC. 20. 1808.

DEAR SIR,—Your letter of this day has equally surprised & hurt me, by intimating a suspicion that it was my desire and on acc$^{t}$ of the late Presidential contest to separate from such of my old friends as took part against me. I really thought that my conduct had in no instance given the slightest cause for such a suspicion. Let me ask has it done so in regard to you? Did I not consult you on some most important topicks, after I knew that you were not in my favor? and have I ever been in town after my absence

from it without calling on you? Have you ever returned those calls? These circumstances produced no effect on my mind of alienation; I considered the existing state as being equally painful to them & me, & I waited for its transit, to shew what my real feeling & disposition were to those of my old friends alluded to. You will be sensible that while that contest depended, the delicacy of my situation imposed on me the necessity of much retirement, & that by observing it I respected the personal honor & independence of my friends as well as my own.

It is a fact that at the moment I received your letter I was engaged in writing notes to you and several other friends requesting you to dine with me on thursday. This will satisfy you that I shall accept your invitation for that day with pleasure, postponing mine to the next. I need not add that I shall at all times be happy to see & to confer with you on any topick that you may desire. I am dear Sir &c.

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TO NICHOLAS BIDDLE.

RICHMOND, Jany 7th, 1809.

DEAR SIR,—Your letter of Novr 18th[1] gave me great satisfaction & I have no adequate apology to offer for not having made my acknowledgement of it sooner. To find that my conduct, of which you have long been an attentive observer with the best opportunities for correct observation, continues to merit your approba-

[1] Concerning impressions created by the publication of the Jefferson-Monroe Correspondence; effect of the election on England's policy; & the imprisonment of Fulwar Skipwith, "an honest persecuted man."

tion, & that the evidence afforded by a publication of the correspondence alluded to, had removed the doubts & dissipated the prejudices of many, could not fail to be highly gratifying to me. To hold that place in the good opinion of my fellow citizens, w^h^ my conduct fairly entitles me to, is the greatest object of my personal ambition. It is I think the only one. To hold it at the expence of others in the slightest degree, especially those with whom I have so long cooperated in the publick service, is the most painful circumstance of my life. This dilemma if it really exists is not imputable to me, nor has it been possible for me to avoid it. The only excuse w^h^ I have to make for not answering yours sooner, is, that altho' I receive with great interest & sensibility the communications of my friends, on the subject, & consider them as the highest proof of their regard for me, it is nevertheless one on which I have not been able to write without pain.

I most sincerely hope that our late elections will have the effect which many have expected from them. To promote that tendency as well as to avert any injuries that might possibly result from a disappointment, an union among us, seems to be all important. It has been my endeavor, so far as my limited means have extended, to inculcate this doctrine.

I entirely approve y^r^ resolution to pursue systematically your profession, declining for the present the invitation to the more fascinating career, especially to young men, of publick employment. By adhering to this course some time, I hope not a long one, you will

acquire such a standing in the State as will place you at ease in your personal fortune, and enable you to make with great advantage the transition to publick life whenever you may be so disposed.

Our friend M^r^ Skipwith has indeed experienc'd a severe destiny. His perfect integrity, and patriotism have been ably requited. Had he been less honest, he might have been more wealthy, and perhaps enjoyed even a better fame! Hard is the condition of the times when such is the lot of any individual. Strange indeed that such sho^d^ have been his when his real merit & all other circumstances are taken into view.

TO COLONEL JOHN TAYLOR.

RICHMOND, Jany. 9, 1809.

DEAR SIR,— . . . I hardly ever say anything respecting our publick aff^rs^ from the relation they bear to me, & never where my motive can be suspected or misrepresented. With you I may dispense with that reserve. They appear to be involved in great difficulty, and I am sorry to say that I do not perceive any plan presented to us, w^h^ seems likely to extricate them at an early period. The alternative w^h^ the rejected treaty offer'd wo^d^ have placed us on a good footing with one of the powers, the desideratum so much deplored by the Committee of Congress. In reasoning on the general topick the Committee states, that if we stood well with either party, we might oppose with better effect the other; but that it is embarrassing to the most firm to encounter in actual war

both at the same time. It is a little remarkable that in a private letter to a member of the admⁿ, wʰ was sent with the treaty I stated "that it was important to us to stand well with some one power." Had the admⁿ closed with the treaty, they woᵈ have made it as popular as they made it unpopular by rejecting it, & the very profitable commerce wʰ we enjoyed woᵈ have been secured & improved to us. By arranging our difficulties in peace with England her merchants would have calculated on its preservation, & embarked most extensively in trade in our bottoms & in connection with our merchants. The interest in that country for the continuance of peace woᵈ have increased daily, & been too powerful for the present ministry to have disturbed it, especially when the ex: ministry, who would have been interested in its support, and watched every violation of it, would have been ready to fall on their successors in such an event and excited a general clamour throughout the nation. By rejecting the treaty the voice of the ex: ministry is silenc'd & the whole nation in its political parties united against us, at least so far as to render the opposition on this point quite feeble. Had the treaty been accepted our standing with France would have been much improved, for in that case a pressure from her, by tending to involve us in a war on the side of her antagonist would have been against the most obvious maxims of policy. In my opinion the ratification of the treaty would have prevented any explanation of the decree of Berlin, which varied from that given in the first instance, by the minister of the marine to Mʳ Arm-

strong. It is a remarkable fact that that explanation (the enlarging one) was not given by the French govt untill after it was known that our govt had rejected the treaty, as it likewise is that the orders of the British council, were not issued untill after the treaty was set aside as well by the British ministry, as by our government. I never had a doubt that by accepting the treaty, we shod have placed our govt & country on high & triumphant ground; that we shod have raised it to consideration among nations, while we gave credit, strength & stability to free govt at home. By taking the other course we have lost these advantages, so far, nor do I see much prospect of regaining them soon. The coercive experiment which we have made, has not succeeded as yet in its object, and if it fails, it will do us incalculable injury not simply in the effect most sensibly felt at home, but in other and perhaps more important respects. The embargo as a weapon to be used as a menace could not have failed to be a powerful one. But if the experiment proves its inefficacy, by shewing that Sheffield's predictions were true, that the British colonies & G. B. could live without us then it ceases to be an object of terror in future. The interior of our affrs does not present to view a prospect much more favorable than the exterior. The ascendancy wh the Essex Junta has gained in Massachusetts is a very awkward circumstance. Federalism was at one time completely overwhelmed. It seems to revive in that quarter with considerable force. Of the great influence of that State over all the other

States to the Eastward, we have had much experience in past times. Should a collision take place between it & the general govt on the subject of present measures, it is not easy to foresee the consequences. It is to be hoped & presumed that it would terminate in the complete political ruin of that Junto. Even in that case it would have been happier that the incident had not occurred.

In this state of things I have thought that the most decisive support to the govt was the wisest policy. It is not now a question by what means we were brought into this distressing dilemma, but by what means we are to get out of it. We can only get out, in the constitutional mode & by the exertions of the govt, aided by the people. The cause of present embarrassments has become an affr of speculation, for history—but it requires an united effort of all parties to surmount them. These hasty remarks are only for yourself. Having had to acknowledge the rect of yours, I could not well confine myself to the subject of it.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND, Jany. 18th 1809.

DEAR SIR, — An idea has occurr'd to me which I will take the liberty to submit to your consideration. I have thought that you might command my services before you retire from office, in a mode which might prove advantageous to our country & equally honorable to you & myself. Our affairs are evidently at a pause, and the next step to be taken without an unex-

pected change, unless some expedient consistent with the honor of the government & country is adopted to prevent it, seems likely to be the commencement of a war with both France & England. It is all important to avoid such a result if possible, and in case it is not, that we should enter into the war with the greatest union of which our system is capable. It has occurr'd that before that last Step is taken, some signal effort should be made to avert the necessity, and that a Mission to both powers should be resorted to for that purpose. This mission should commence with France a circumstance which ought to be considered as honorable to the Emperor of France, & proceed thence to England, be the result with France what it might. Its powers should be eventual or conditional, & comensurate with the object. They should be confided to one person who should be the sole agent, and have no connection with the Minister on the ground in either country. Some solemnity should be attached to the measure by sending the person appointed in a frigate, or other publick armed vessel, to secure to it the happiest effect at home & abroad. I am willing to undertake this trust & to set out in discharge of it without a moment's delay, leaving my family behind. From my acquaintance with both governments I should undertake it with strong hope of success, and should it fail, I think that the attempt would produce a happy effect in our interior, by uniting all parties in a common effort to meet the crisis, which would be allowed by all to be inevitable.

I trust that my motive in making to you this pro-

position will not be misconceived. I have too much confidence in your justice and magnanimity to indulge in such an apprehension. Should the measure be deemed inexpedient, or incompatible with any existing arrangement, it is my earnest desire that it may be rejected without hesitation. I have no wish on the subject except such as is suggested by the view of the very critical situation of our country at this time. It is proper to add that altho' I have been prompted equally by my judgment & feelings, to make to you this proposition, I would not venture to do it without consulting those of my friends here, with whom the knowledge of it will remain exclusively confined. I set out for Albemarle to morrow morning & expect to be absent a week. I am dear Sir with respect and esteem sincerely your friend & servant.

## TO CHARLES FENTON MERCER.[1]

RICHMOND Feby 1. 1809.

DEAR SIR,—My late absence from town prevented an application in time to Mr Taliaferro, for the endorsement of my notes for the continuance of the accomodation afforded me sometime since by the bank. It is possible that I may receive the return of those which I have forwarded to him to morrow but as it is only possible, & his absence from home or other accident may prevent it, it is necessary to be prepar'd for such a contingency. The credit in the bank is advanc'd by weekly apportionments, w^h^ makes

[1] For this copy, from the original, the editor is indebted to John Boyd Thacher, Esqre.

it necessary that one note sho^d be renewed weekly. The money was paid on that which became due last week, while I was from town by a friend—It is necessary to renew the note for that sum, and for that w^h is renewable this week & perhaps the next. The sum in cash is ab^t 1200. dol^rs—Will you be so good as to give me your name for this object? I send you three notes, with a cancelld note endorsed by M^r Taliaferro to shew the form. You will sign it at the foot & on back as he has done. As soon as time is allowed the business will resume its former state & these notes be destroyed—I am dear Sir your friend.

Return me Mr Taliferro's note[1]—

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND Feby 2. 1809.

DEAR SIR,—I returned from Albemarle on Saturday & had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 28. ulto. on Monday last. I perceive that the idea which I suggested of a new and decisive effort, to avert the dangers interior & exterior of the present crisis, by a special mission to France & England, has not obtained your approbation. As the idea was suggested without illustration you will permit me to explain myself further on it.

I have not the hope which you seem still to entertain that our differences will be accommodated with either power under existing arrangements. The

[1] Indorsed by Mercer: "I indorsed with greater pleasure as it made some return for the favor rendered me in London. C. F. M."

embargo was not likely to accomplish the desired effect, if it did not produce it under the first impression, nor then, unless it was considered as a step leading to war in case it failed. There are powerful interests in England in favor of a war with the U States as a measure of expediency, such as the ship holders, the East and W. India merchants, & the navy; and the publick sentiment is strong for cutting up our commerce with enemys colonies & with the enemy in the produce of its colonies. Whether the interest friendly to peace which is also strong, would have prevailed in case the issue had been pushed home at once is doubtful. But by the course which the affair has taken, the hostile party has apparently gained strength, & the nation accustomed to behold the approach of the crisis, is probably better prepar'd for it. I fear that at the expiration of the term you mention, no change for the better will have taken place in the exterior, while the interior may become considerably more convulsed than it now is.

While the symptoms which appear to the East are seen, neither France or England will be disposed to accommodate with us. Both those powers wish our overthrow or at least that of our free system of government, and while there is any hope of such an event, our attitude cannot be an imposing one with either. To give effect to foreign negotiations our interior must be tranquilized. Without the evidence of strong & firm union at home nothing favorable to us can be expected abroad; and from the symptoms alluded to, there is much cause to fear that tranquility cannot be

secur'd at present, or relied on in future, by an adherence only to the measures which have been heretofore pursued. It seems to me to be necessary to take some decisive step, which shall arrest the publick attention in both hemispheres, & announce that on its result the future relations of the country with the powers to whom it is addressed, of peace or war, shall depend. I think that a special mission is precisely the measure which is most likely to produce that effect, & that the crisis imperiously calls for it: that it would check the tendency to disorganization at home & afford the fairest prospect of success abroad. You will recollect the late mission to France, I speak of that of 1803, rested precisely on the ground of the proposed one, except that in this case the pressure would be on both powers, a circumstance not unfavorable to success: that it suspended on its result every interior movement, tho' the inclination to it in certain quarters was strong, and that by winding up the business at home it became wound up abroad also, to which cause it was in an essential degree owing that the measure succeeded. The late special mission to England did not stand on the same ground with that to France alluded to, or with that which is proposed. Between the meeting of Congress & the adoption of that measure an important change had taken place in England by the death of Mr Pitt & the promotion of Mr Fox, which had of itself changed the relation between the two countries, in feeling and opinion, if not in fact. The issue too was of a different nature. The menace held up on the failure of that mission

was the non-importation law: in this case it would be war, a result which it is sought to avoid by a respectful effort to prevent it. The pressure on France by the proposed measure would be the same as in the former case, for it was then believed that I was instructed to proceed to England in the event of the failure of the negotiation; and the pressure on England if France accomodated would be of a nature scarcely to be resisted.

As a mere measure of respectful consideration a special mission never did and perhaps never will succeed with any power. It must combine other circumstances with it of a strong & imposing nature (and the stronger the better) or it will prove abortive. The evidence of respect which it affords can offer no other inducement than as a colouring or pretext for doing what more imperious circumstances dictate. I am satisfied, whatever the effect might be, that the mission proposed, would be viewed by both powers and our fellow citizens in the light above exhibited, & that it would more especially be considered as a measure of tone, rather than of condescension. The objection of condescension appears to me stronger to a renewal of the proposition in the mode in which it has been already rejected than in that which is advised, while there is much less cause to hope success from it at home or abroad.

There are other advantages in favor of the proposed measure among which are the following. By changing the attitude, the govt would have in a great measure the controul of its future conduct be the result

of the mission what it might. It is hardly possible that some opportunity should not offer, if the trust was managed with common prudence, to extricate us with credit from the present dilemma. It is quite improbable that this advantage would be enjoyed in equal degree, by permitting things to run on in their present course. It is not to be presumed, under such circumstances, that either power would yield to-morrow what it had refused today. The previous objection, where no adequate cause or pretext was afforded for a change, might be a motive for rejecting again: and the new delay adopted expressly to avoid war, shewing with what regret it was approached, might encourage the hope that that appeal would be again postponed, which the strong symptoms of discontent to the East could not fail to encrease. Should the naked question of war be finally propounded, I own to you that without some signal effort to prevent it, such as that alluded to, whose failure would bring together with firm union and hearty zeal every honest friend of his country, there is much cause to dread the consequences likely to result from it. The state of the treasury & probable accumulation of taxes, the exposed & defenceless situation of our towns, the encreased danger of regular force, the little hope of profiting by the war, in relation to its objects, tho' it should be prosecuted for years, are objections which would be urged against it, and would have much weight in that stage. If among the zealous supporters of the measures of the gov[t] there are any, who doubt it, at this time, the policy of declaring war, it is probable that their

number will be encreased when called on to act; & it is much to be apprehended that the majority will not be found long on that side.

You seem to apprehend that in case Bonaparte succeeds in Spain we shall be able to accomplish our object in England, but I do not perceive that a result so favorable to us is likely to proceed from that cause. It is far from being certain that the mere subjugating of Spain would overthrow the British Ministry without which that consequence could not well be expected. The new prospect in Spain was opened to England after our relations with her had assumed their present character. France was omnipotent in Spain anterior to it, and would only recover there what she held before. It seems probable that while England maintains her independence, & the Ministry its ground, there is little cause to expect in the course we are pursuing any important change in our favor, and certainly there is none to hope it from her subjugation by France. It is more probable that a claim on S$^{o}$ America would fix the views of Bonaparte more steadfastly on us. Success rarely moderates the pretentions of a conqueror. He issued his decree when he had not a single ship at sea. That fact shews that, if the U States were not its principal object, their friendship had ceased to be one which was worthy his attention. Connect that fact with his conduct in the Spanish negotiation & the presumption is strengthened that he views us with other eyes: that on the scale of his vast and boundless ambition we occupy a place & are destined to take our turn in the list of

conquered people. This sentiment is not of a very limited range. The best friends of the U States in France such as La Fayette, Volney and others entertain it. No unfriendly feeling excites these remarks. From Bonaparte himself I have rec^d much kindness & attention of which proofs have been afforded by his notice of me to others since I left the country. For the nation I have high consideration & respect & for many friends there the sincerest regard. But these circumstances will not blind me to the dangers, or make me insensible to what I owe my country.

If the proposed measure was adopted & succeeded with both parties, a great boon would be obtained to the country. If it succeeded with either, much good would be done; for if either revoked its decrees, & the other persisted in maintaining them, the issue would be made up with it alone, & we be freed from the other. If England sho^d be the party refusing the country would be prepared to meet the crisis, if France refused, the same would be the public sentiment and spirit. If Bonaparte maintained his decrees after England had agreed to revoke hers, it would prove that nothing short of our becoming a party to the war on his side, would satisfy him, & that he would make war on us, if we were contumacious. War then would be our inevitable destiny & it would remain to be decided, whether we would consent to be drawn into it on his side, on his own terms, subjecting ourselves to incalculable loss while it lasted, by the waste and pillage of our commerce, to which he could give no protection, and to still worse disasters if he

succeeded by the conquest of England; for in that case he would be the sole monarch of Europe. Place him on that high ground, and the liberty of the world is endanger'd, if not gone. Our intermediate forbearance or accomodation with his views would then avail us nothing. His mandate must be obeyed or he would send his marshalls to enforce it. I see no motive of interest to draw us to him on such terms. If England revokes her orders he ought to revoke his, and a mission to him in the first instance which would manifest superior respect, ought to draw him out on that point, or failing to do it, justify and invite the most unfavorable suspicions of his future views towards us. But I indulge great hope that the proposed measure would succeed in its object with both powers. I cannot believe that either would suffer such a mission to withdraw, and take to itself the responsibility & the consequences of refusing conditions fair & honorable to it, when thus pressed.

Permit me to remark that if this reasoning is found to be just, the execution of the plan suggested would in my judgment be deemed an act of magnanimity which would do you honor to the remotest time. It would prove that in a situation of great personal delicacy you looked only to the good of your country, & that the last act of your administration was employed, in a distinguished effort to preserve its peace, liberty & union. I am satisfied that it would secure to you in advancing years the affections of thousands that are now endangered. I need not tell you that as I have felt much interest in tendering to you my ser-

vices on this occasion, the motive which prompted me to it, would not be affected, in case the measure was deemed expedient, if the trust was committed to others. In making to you the proposition I have discharged a duty which I thought I owed to my country, in a crisis of peculiar danger, & have gratified my feelings in regard to yourself. The publick service may be better performed by others. We have been long neighbours & friends & it will be my object to cherish through life those interesting relations.

TO DAVID GELSTON.

RICHMOND Feby. 7, 1809.

DEAR SIR,—I have not written you since my return home from motives of delicacy to yourself. I have been fearful of compromitting you in a case in which I wished not to do it from my friendship for you and your family. But I have never ceased to regard you as one of my oldest and best friends, in whose welfare I take great interest.

It has been my poor fortune to be much harrassed & calumniated let me serve under whom I may. It seems as if I can never get home after the discharge of important trusts abroad, and most faithfully, in peace. My head must be pelted by the storm if ever I expose myself to it. However that is between ourselves. In writing to an old friend these ideas have rushed on my mind & I have ventured to express them. I am on a friendly footing with the admn & shall doubtless continue so. You have seen my correspondence with

M[r] Jefferson & I hope approve my conduct in it.

Is my reputation assailed in any point in a manner to require my attention respecting my conduct abroad? If it is inform me.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.[1]

ALB. Sepr. 4, 09.

DEAR SIR,—It has been intimated to me by unquestionable authority that a visit by you to Col: Walker wo[d] at this time be considered by him an act of great kindness, & be received with much sensibility. You know the wretched condition in which he is, tortured by an incurable disease, which must soon take him from this scene. The idea was suggested to me before I went to Richmond, but it did not appear to rest on such grounds as wo[d] justify, the communication of it to you. The friend who imparted it to me has since led the conversation with delicacy to that topick & ascertained with certainty that such are Col: W's sentiments. I have thought that it wo[d] be agreeable to you to receive this information & hasten to give it. It is proper that you sho[d] also know that Col: W. proposes to make a visit to Phil[a] in the hope of deriving some aid from the [*illegible word*] there & that the day after tomorrow is spoken of as fixed for his de-departure. The necessity I am under of going immediately to Loudoun & the preparation incident to the journey will excuse my not making this communication to you in person.

[1] Endorsed "Not sent."

P. S. It may be satisfactory to you to know that I rec$^{d}$ the above from D$^{r}$ Everett. I mention this fact in confidence.

TO DOCTOR CHARLES D. EVERETT.[1]

ALBEMARLE Sept. 5$^{th}$ 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,—I regret extremely that I had not the pleasure of seeing you the other day at the court. I was twice on my way to your house but taken off by some interruption, till finally I came from town without accomplishing it. I communicated on that day the subject of yours to the character to whom it related, and found him well disposed to the object, but under an impression that the departure of Mr. W. had put it out of his power. He understood that he was to go on that day.

I regret much that I happened to set out for Richmond at the time I did. I resolved to postpone my visit to Loudoun till after our court, & that decision taken, I availed myself of the interval to visit my family, who were desirous of seeing me. I had heard that Mr. Gallatin intended a visit to our neighborhood, & I remained some time at home in the hope of seeing him. His delay has induced a belief that he had declined the trip. Of the visit of the other party I had never heard a suggestion. Perhaps the circumstance may have attracted your attention. I

[1] For the above and other letters to Doctor Everett the editor is indebted to the courtesy of Mr. Joseph W. Everett of Albemarle County. Doctor Everett was Monroe's Secretary during his Presidency and afterwards his family physician.

make the inference from your inquiries of Tom who gave me your letter. I make this communication in confidence for your own satisfaction.

I set out in half an hour for Loudoun, & expect to be back in a fortnight. I am sincerely your friend

TO DOCTOR CHARLES D. EVERETT.

ALBEMARLE, Sept. 28th 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have just returned from Loudoun, where I have been engaged several weeks in the most interesting concerns of a private nature. On Monday evening last, after making arrangements to set out on the next day home, I had the pleasure to receive your very friendly letter, which gave me the first & only intelligence of what was passing here. I had seen with much surprise in the gazette an acct. of the resignation of a certain person from a certain office, and could not omit to remark the coincidence of that event with the time of my departure from the county, a step which I had announced many weeks before in the gazettes. I had heard nothing more on the subject till I received your letter. I did not know that anyone thought of me, and in truth it was far from my desire (in considerations of my private affairs) to be taken from home by being placed in that trust. I wish however to see you immediately (that is to-morrow morning) to have much conversation with you on the subject, of a confidential nature, and hope that you will be able to ride out for the purpose. I would come to town, but am quite

oppressed with fatigue, of the business in which I have been engaged, & the journey home. I shall only add my earnest hope that you will be able to favor me with a visit.

I am sincerely your friend

TO DOCTOR CHARLES D. EVERETT.

ALBEMARLE Jany 13, 1810.

MY DEAR SIR,—I went to Charlotteville yesterday in the hope of seeing you, but you had left it, as I find by yrs. of this day, on your route to Richmond.

I have thought much on the subject, under our consideration when you were last here, & I own that the bias of my mind is in favor of leaving the affair with a certain person in the state in which it now is. His last letter to you, on the main question between you, is a triumph in your favor. It admits in the case to which it principally alluded, the perfect correctness of your conduct, and error in his, in imputing to you *what* you had not mentioned, wh. he says he shd. not have done had he been better acquainted with the facts. And in the other case alluded to by him, your attendance & service in his family during a nervous complaint, in which he speaks in terms of high commendation of your conduct, he affords a testimonial that might be used in your justification in every instance that has occur'd through your whole practice. This letter will render it impossible for him to annoy you in future, for should he attempt it, and you ever hear of it, the exhibition of the letter will confound

him. The stile of his letter, in imputing the captious temper displayed in the former to the distress of a parent afflicted by the sickness & mena'd by the death of a child is such an apology for the former letter, as will be in a certain degree satisfactory to most parents who may read it & to many a complete one. To all such, any new step, formed on what had passed, might & most probably would appear objectionable. I am therefore inclined to think that it will be better, in regard to any arrogant pretentions, to leave the affair where it is at least for the present. With respect to the other question—I mean that which relates to certain misrepresentations of your conduct [for they are entirely distinct from each other] I am also of opinion that I would do nothing at this time, if at all. The late correspondence goes far to refute such misrepresentations, emanating from others and to disavow them on his own part. The suitable moment to issue an advertisement is that of your return to the County when you are both present: When nothing is done, no harm is done; it is always time to take a step which on full consideration appears to be proper. If you chuse to advert to certain calumnies in your advertisement, you may then do it; and I am rather of opinion that it will be better to do it, in that way than by a direct communication with him. Indeed as you have no fact to act on, it seems to be impossible for you to say any thing to him on that point. The doubt is whether you ought to advert to such misrepresentations in an advertisement. I would not positively decide against

such a step at this time; I sho[d] not take it but under a conviction that my reputation suffer'd by misrepresentations, which I could not meet in any other mode. But on this point we shall have an opportunity to confer again on your return, as I perceive with pleasure that you do not contemplate any measure during that period.

I send you two letters, one to the Vice-President,[1] and another to Mr. Forbes of Fluvanna at Richmond. I submit to your judgment whether either ought to be presented. If you think not you will suppress them. In that case you will express to Mr. Forbes verbally the same sentiments. On the propriety of presenting the other you may consult our friend Mr. Brent. It is indeed cautiously written, but still it may be improper for me to write at all. If not

[1] Dr. Everett did not deliver Monroe's letter of introduction to Mr. Clinton. The original remains among the Doctor's papers. It is as follows: "My friend D[r]. Everett being about to visit Washington, I could not permit him to depart without bearing to you some testimonial from me of my great respect for his merit. He is a man of unquestionable integrity, possessing much information on our affairs, especially in what belongs to this State, of a mind strong & discriminating, in principle republican, and superior to all Kind of influence. Your kind attention to him will much oblige me.

"I have not written to you of late because I could communicate nothing that would be interesting. Absorbed in domestick cares, I am however not indifferent to those of a public nature. My heart takes a warm interest in every event which touches the honer or interest of my country. Good wishes for the success of our measures, whatever they may be, which the majority adopt, is all the service which I may render. Could I render more effectual it would not be wanting. But at the present time retirement is, I think, the best act of patriotism, as it most certainly is the most useful one to my family.

"I need not assure you that you hold the same high place in my consideration, which your great services to your country & consistent republican conduct secur'd you at the close of our revolution, or that I entertain for you the same sentiments of regard and friendship which I always professed and felt. Accept my best wishes for your welfare."

presented our friend Mr. B. can render the same effect, the same service. If deliver'd it may be proper to hint to the old gentleman the propriety of caution in mentioning that we correspond, as a Knowledge of the fact might excite jealousy & do harm, in these strange times, especially among republicans. Remember me to all friends. But use yr. own judgment in the cautious manner you do have in speaking of me. My best wishes attend you. Your friend and servant.

Be so good as to address the letter to Mr. Forbes in case you deliver it. I do not know his Christian name.

TO RICHARD BRENT.

ALBEMARLE Feby 25th 1810.

DEAR SIR,—You will be surprised to hear that altho' your letter bears date on the 3rd of Jany, it did not reach Charlottesville, till within a week past. That circumstance will explain the cause of so long an interval in my reply.

I have another excuse for more than three weeks past. Shortly after my return from Loudoun I was seized with a cold which I neglected, being compelled by the great interest which I take in my affairs till at length having exposed myself too much at a very inclement season, I was forced to yield to it. A fever followed which hung on me near a fortnight, & confined me to my room, & most of the time to my bed. I am now so far recovered as to be able to ride out in good weather, & hope to be soon restored.

I do not know what particular fact or circumstance

can have given rise to the apprehension lately intimated to you by our friend which you have been so good as to notice in yours. I will state what has occurred, between the respectable character alluded to, & me, since you were here, to enable you to judge how far there is just foundation for it. The day before I had intended to set out for Loudoun, the 30. of Nov^r, he called on me, and after some conversation of a general nature, he observed how much the death of Merew^h Lewis was to be regretted, by the loss the publick had sustained in so deserving an officer. I reciprocated with earnestness the sentiment. He then reminded me of a proposition he had formerly made to me of accepting one of the gov^ts of Louisiana, and added that while the climate might be a good objection to New Orleans, it did not apply to the upper gov^t which had become vacant by the late lamentable event. That the republicans in general wished to see me employed, and that if I could only make a beginning, I might calculate on remaining in the publick service through life, on honorable conditions. As I had not expected such a proposal, I was somewhat surprised at it, and rather embarrassed how to answer it. The answer given by the King of Prussia to Count Saxe when he offered him the Island of Barbadoes, occurred to me, that he must find another Sancho for his Barataria, but I did not avail myself of it. Respect for my old friend prevented it. I gave him however distinctly to understand, that altho' I sho^d not be backward to serve my country when a suitable occasion required it, it should not be in that line. I

distinguished between a ministerial office, and an appointment which might be conferred by the suffrage of the people, and observed that altho' I might not decline any of the latter kind, some consideration was due to the stations which I had already held, to the opinions and expressions of my friends, and to the interest and comfort of my family in accepting any of the former. He repeated his desire to see me employed, but knew of no station except that alluded to, which the gov[t] could offer me in the civil line, and did not know that a military one would be acceptable to me. I replied that M[r] Madison had had it in his power, when he came into office, to avail himself and the publick of my services, had it been an object, and that in doing so he would have displayed some magnanimity, that there was but one proposition which he could have made me, or I have accepted, which was to have invited me into the Cabinet in the place he had lately held: that in respect to the military line, I was not desirous of obtaining an office in it, intimating that I should be willing to serve in that line, only in case of an emergency. As much had been said in the newspapers about that time, of the removal of Gen[l] Wilkinson, I inferred that he alluded to that idea, in what he said of a military station, and I dropped something founded on it, tending to disclaim a wish to take the command, especially in time of peace, merely as *an office*. My reply was intended simply to meet the idea which I thought he had suggested, not to lead to any conversation on that point in any other sense. I found however, by the sensa-

tion which it evidently produced, that I had misconceived him, and if any military station was offered me it would be one of an inferior kind. Something like the govt in the neighborhood of the Rocky mountains. To that kind of project I gave a very explicit answer. I added however, what I had suggested before, that he must not infer that I was unwilling to serve my country unless I did it in a certain grade, that with my fellow citizens I should make no such condition, but would accept the office of magistrate upon the county bench, if desired by them. He speaking of the injury which I had sustained in my private affrs, by my long absence, & in alluding to ministerial offices, I remarked generally, that I was not solicitous of any, but desirous of remaining at home, to put my affairs in a good train. This is the substance of what passed in this interview. Nothing irritating occurr'd in it. The conversation tho' of a decisive character, was quite a friendly one, and we parted as such.

On the following day Decr 1st, it rained, so that I did not set out until the second. Having business, on account of the estate of the late Judge Jones in Port Royal & Fredbg., I took that route to Loudoun. I heard at Port Royal of the resignation of Col: Nicholas for the first time. I reached Loudoun on the 8 or 9, where I was detained till the 27th which day I set out home. On the 26 I recd a letter from a friend in the district, which informed me that a strong desire had been shown in certain parts of it, to elect me to the Congress, & that it was thought, if I was willing to serve and could be proposed that I

should be elected. This was the first intimation which I rec$^{d}$ on that head, and when I did receive it, the time had too far elapsed for me to act under it, had I been so disposed. On my return I found that M$^{r}$ Randolph was among the first of those who were apprized of Col: Nicholas's resignation, and that he actually declared himself a candidate for the vacancy, at the court, on the 5. of Dec$^{r}$, two days after I had left the county. It is said that my neighbour expressed an opinion that I did not wish to be elected, which, coming from such high authority had weight with others. On my return the election had been made in all the counties except this, & no one appearing authorised to act for me, it was concluded that I did not wish to serve, and in consequence no poll was taken for me anywhere. I attended the election in this county. Many asked me why I had not been willing to serve them. I replied that I did not know that any of them desired it. That in truth it would have been highly inconvenient for me to leave home, at this time, two reasons with which they were well acquainted; but that I sho$^{d}$ not have hesitated to serve, had I been elected. It seemed strange that the resignation of Col: Nicholas which was doubtless known to certain persons before I left the county, sho$^{d}$ not have been communicated to me, or that any opinion sho$^{d}$ have been given of my indisposition to serve without consulting me on it. Many who criticise this affair with vigor connect the resignation itself, with the period of my departure from the county, which had been designated by my advertisement long

before, on business wh could not well be delegated to another. I have not made up an opinion on this point or indeed on the others alluded to, because I am not possessed in an authentic manner of all the facts on which it ought to be founded. I have not endeavour'd to acquire that information, because had the inquiry produc'd a certain result, it would have added another cause of inquietude, to so many which already exist.

The first of the above mentioned occurrences I communicated to a few of my friends in a confidential way, all of whom expressed some regret that such a proposition shod have been made to me. They seemed to be at a loss to what motive to impart it especially as it was known that I had solicited no office, had not complained of neglect, had given no trouble to the govt in any form, and sought only a peaceful retirement. It is probable that some of them may have mentioned it [to] others. For that I am not responsible. Not to communicate important incidents to my friends would be a restraint, which I shall not impose on myself. Of the second occurrence I have said nothing, having been confined by sickness the greater part of the time since my return from Loudoun, & seen few persons. All the facts however whether true or false were in circulation on my return, & and had of course their origin in sources unconnected with me. My neighbour and I did not meet at the court house, the crowd being great. We have had no intercourse since till within a few days, when he called on me on hearing of my indisposition

& when our conversation was of the same friendly character it has heretofore been. Nothing was said on any of these topics.

I have stated to you the above circumstances literally as they have occurred, and shall be happy to receive your free comments on them. I have been aware that neither my own or the publick cause connected with it, in the transactions in which the admn separated from me have ever been fairly before the publick. I was persuaded from the beginning, that the govt had acted with great impolicy in the part which it took; that the course which it pursued would produce immediate injury, and most probably terminate in some heavy calamity. My situation abroad had given me an opportunity to take an enlarged view of our affairs, and so far as my mind was equal to it, I did so, and dispassionately. I acted on that view, and altho conscious of injury, by a series of actions all tending to degrade and oppress me even at that period, I suppressed that sentiment and every feeling it was calculated to excite. I looked to the welfare of my country, to the support of the republican cause, and the preservation of the friendship which had so long subsisted between the admn and me, and which I was extremely desirous of preserving. I knew that our arrangement with England was an advantageous & honorable one, and that we shod prosper under it, if accepted and maintained by the govt; but I also knew that it was an hazardous one for me to sanction, since if the govt rejected it, which it might do, as it was not obligatory, the current of opinion and prejudice

would be turned against me, which could not fail to bury me under it, while the adm$^{n}$ floated in security on the surface. At the time that I sanctioned that arrangement it was impossible for me to gain credit by it, as all the credit, if any, must have gone to the special mission, to which great eclat had been given at my expence. Still I took that step from a perfect conviction that our commercial prosperity, and all the other and higher interests of the nation, such as the confirmation of our union, & the support of republican principles, required it. I did it likewise in a belief that the adm$^{n}$ would view the subject in the same light, and in full confidence if it did not, that it would manage the affair with such caution and propriety, that nothing sho$^{d}$ arise from it, to affect my character with my country. But what follows? I think it was impossible for that act to have done me an injury which has not been heaped on me in the most aggravated form. And in respect to the publick what can be said? Has not every evil which I had anticipated been verified by events? Have we not seen many impolitick measures adopted one after another, & adhered to each, obstinately, till the experience of its folly, had obtained its condemnation from the people, and then abandoned, merely to give place to some equally unwise, futile, and pernicious experiment? I have not pushed an issue with the administration to the extent which facts would have justified, & its conduct invited, having confined myself on my return, to a reply to M$^{r}$ Madison's unfounded strictures on the treaty, & in my corres-

pondence with Mr Jefferson to an intimation, in the mildest form, of the injury which I have received from certain acts of his, while I admitted, on his solemn declaration, that he had not intended it. I was fearful as a negotiation was depending with g. Britain, that by pushing that issue I might injure our interest in that negotiation; I was fearful also as the admn was republican, and the men alluded to confided in as being eminently so, I might injure that cause, and I will repeat, that I felt the highest degree of repugnance at doing it, with these men. This is perhaps a weakness in my character, for I know that many enlightened, upright, & honorable friends, have thought so. I think however that the publick motives alluded to, are of a nature so strong and apparent that they will be found sufficient, at all times to justify the part I have acted. In the contest which my recall, under the admn of Genl Washington, provoked, I met the denunciation with firm nerves, because I contended in favor of principle, which it was possible & even probable, I might aid, while it was certain I could not injure it. In this case an impenetrable darkness hung over the result in that respect; by taking a different course it was possible I might injure the cause, while I could not then perceive the slightest ground on which to rest a hope of aiding it.

I must now request your attention to another subject, which has been lately brought to my view by a paper from Boston, forwarded to me by some unknown friend. In it is what is called a list of balances due to

the U States, certain persons whose names are given, in which I stand charged with 81.500 dol^rs on acc^t of foreign intercourse. By this statement it would be inferr'd that the whole of that sum was chargeable to me for disbursements distinct from my salary and outfit at London, and from the salary of the Sec^ry, and from the allowances to be made me for the missions to Paris and Madrid. One would infer that it was applicable to mere contingent expenditures over which the minister had a discretion, but for which he was really responsible. I do not know precisely the sum which ought to be placed to my debit, in the several missions confided to me while I was abroad, for salary and other necessary expenditures. I well recollect however that I never gave an order in which the object was not distinctly stated, that it might appear in the account of the bankers, so that I did suppose there was not a single item or very few which was not supported by sufficient vouchers already in possession of the gov^t It is certainly known to M^r Duval, of whom I have always entertained a very high opinion, that my salary while abroad, my outfit at London, & the salary of the Sec^ry, are fair credits against any claim of the gov^t on me ; and that on whatever principle the acc^t of my missions to Paris & Madrid is settled the deduction in my favor must be considerable. The truth is that I have no account to settle with the gov^t, except for the 9000 dol^rs advanc'd me by the Sec^ry of State on my appointment to France ; and about the like sum on account of my mission to Spain, in which I was employed more than 9 months, travelled near

three thousand miles in going & returning, & was detained in Paris at great expence near three. For every other disbursement I am persuaded the Controuler might make out the account himself, from the evidence before him, and I own I expected from Mr Duval, in case he made any mention of my name, without communicating with me, such a statement, as would have placed the affr in a just light before the publick. With respect to those two items, I knew that the govt insisted on hard conditions at the time of my appointment, but I always believed when the business shod be settled, if I cod make it appear that I had lost by them, as I expected and can prove, however just or even liberal the scale on which my account is settled, that the subject would be reconsidered & justice rendered me. I believe that an outfit was never refused on a distinct mission such as that to Paris was; and I also believe that for a mission like that to Spain, all the expences attending it were always paid, without affecting the salary at the other station, it going on the support of the Minister's family. Mr Adams, now in Russia, was appointed first to Holland, then to Lisbon, then to Berlin. I shod be glad to know how many outfits he was allow'd. Mr Pinckney was sent from London to Madrid in 1796. What was the rule adopted in his case which was precisely similar to mine, and how much did his mission cost, in which he was employed a shorter term? Everything had become dearer by 50 pr cent at the period of my appointments, than at theirs. On what principle then ought I to be allowed less than them? If I am allowed the same (according to my

information) the settlement of my account will be easy, as I shall not owe to the gov^t^ one cent, tho' even in that case I shall be greatly a loser, as my private account with the bankers will amply prove. May I request you to have the goodness to procure for me information on the above points, and to transmit it to me, and to obtain & transmit to me also a copy of M^r^ Duval's account, distinguishing in it accurately all the items, according to the documents in possession of the government. I wish to know for example whether in this sum for which I stand charged, a credit is to be allowed me for the salary of the sec^ry^, tho' indeed I sho^d^ be glad that M^r^ Duval in stating the acc^t^ would give me credit in all cases where the evidence is satisfactory, and sho^d^ distinctly [state] in what points information and vouchers are wanting. Should my attendance at Washington be deemed necessary, however inconvenient to me, I will repair there immediately, on being so advised, if my health permits, or as soon as it does permit. I am really desirous of settling this account, and will do it without delay. I sho^d^ not have postponed it a moment after my arrival, had I not known that I did not owe the gov^t^ one farthing, if the same rule was extended to me that was applied to others, in similar cases, under more favorable circumstances : or in other words if an example of economy repugnant to precedent and equally so to justice, which will add to the many other losses which I sustained by my absence, and which no scale or principle of adjustment, however liberal, can make good, a heavy pecuniary one, is not adhered to, to my

prejudice. It is an unquestionable fact that the salary is altogether incompetent to the support of our ministers abroad. Is it just then or politick to curtail the allowance below what the law allows, and precedent warrants in the case of outfits? I know that it is an unsound species of economy, highly dangerous to free govt, by the necessity it imposes on them to supply the deficit by such means as fortune may throw in their way. I did not mention the subject when at Washington on account of the relation which subsisted then between the admn and me. The same reason has prevented it since. Knowing that nothing was to be adjusted between us but the points alluded to, I had some delicacy on its and my account, in bringing them into discussion. But that consideration can have no weight at this time, under present circumstances. Let me hear from you as soon as possible.

I am with great regard, Dear Sir, your friend & servant

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

ALBEMARLE March 7. 1810.

DEAR SIR,—A Mr Easterby who reminds me of a conversation with him in London some years past, has requested me to make known to you a project of his for converting our tobo & corn stalks, to a purpose of great publick utility, as well as private emolument, and likewise to introduce to you Mr Burroughs his agent. I have thought that I could not better promote his object than by enclosing his letter to me, to

you, by Mr Burroughs. I have made an experiment under his auspices to day on a small scale, tho' as the weather was unfavorable, I could not attend the process to a conclusion, I cannot as yet pronounce either on the profit to be expected from it. The process however is so simple, and so easily managed, that I am induc'd to believe that it will be found to be, a discovery of real advantage to our country. Mr Easterby, was I think made known to me, by some person of credit, as one deserving of attention for his information & moral character; tho' my recollection is too indistinct on this point, to allow me to be very explicit on it. I am, etc.

TO COLONEL JOHN TAYLOR.

ALBEMARLE, Sept 10. 1810.

DEAR SIR,—It often happens, when we contemplate writing a long letter, that we fail altogether, and write none. This has been the case with me since the receipt of your last favor. Having just heard that your son would be in Charlottesville last night, and expecting him here to day, I avail myself of the interval to make you, at least, an acknowledgement of it.

It is indeed important that those friends of free govt who have differed in any respect from the administration should have some plan for their future conduct. Hitherto they have had none. Their accord has been seen in a disapprobation of certain measures of the government, expressed without concert, according to the impulse of the individual. It

has also been seen in their denunciation, if not by the government, at least by its most active supporters, who have sought, in that mode, to signalize their zeal. These causes have attached to the persons alluded to the character of a party, without their seeking, or wishing, or indeed deserving it; for the principles of free government are completely lost sight of when things get to that state that a man cannot express his opinion freely of public men, and measures, without exposing himself to such consequences.

The early stages of Mr Jefferson's administration were attended with as great and brilliant success as ever occurred to any government. The latter period was undoubtedly unfortunate in some important points. I concur with an opinion expressed in one of your papers, that the rejection of the British treaty, and adoption of the embargo, were among his principal errors. Those led to others, and produced also various abortive projects, some of them of a nature with those that were resorted to by the preceding administrations. Whether Mr Jefferson gave his sanction to the latter schemes, or *they* were the projects of others only, I know not, but I have rather supposed the latter was the case. I have believed that he, impelled by preceding success, and the ardor of the public feeling, confided too much in measures, which were, at best, of doubtful policy; and that the persons alluded to, more adventurous, and perhaps less scrupulous, finding that those measures had not succeeded, were disposed, for consistency's sake, to bolster them up by the obnoxious acts complained of, and to which he

gave no sanction. I cannot think that Mr Jefferson would consent to any measure which violated the principles of free government, or weakened its foundations. I think also that Mr Jefferson is sincerely attached to those principles.

At the conclusion of the negotiation with Spain in May 1805, believing as I then did, and now do, that France instigated Spain to reject our just claims to boundary, and to an indemnity for spoliations, and that both powers acted in confidence that we would submit patiently to the injury; and believing also, if we gave ground in that instance, that there would be no limit to their pretensions; that they would advance on our retreating steps; violate our rights and interests, and insult our government whenever it suited them; or rather that France would, for I considered Spain as a mere instrument in the business, Mr Pinckney and I advised the administration, in a private letter, to make its stand there, by taking such an attitude as would force them into an accommodation. The attitude which we recommended was, that the U. States should take possession of both the Floridas, and of the country westward of the Mississippi, to the Rio Bravo, removing the Spanish troops from within those limits, and thus menacing Mexico, to negotiate on that ground. This advice was afterwards modified, in a letter which I wrote from Paris, in such a manner, as that the measures recommended should assume a character more conciliatory towards France in the commencement, but preserve in all other respects their full tone. The Rio Bravo was

our first western limit, under the cession of Louisiana, by which West-Florida also belonged to us; and East-Florida was no more than a moderate recompense for spoliations. We gave it as our opinion, that if the administration would make such a stand, it would be sure to succeed, without war. As a reason for that opinion we urged the conduct of France in that very negotiation, in which, altho' she supported Spain in pretensions that were inconsistent with our just rights, and equally so to her own faith as pledged at the time of the cession of Louisiana, she acted, in other respects, with such caution, as to convince us that she did not mean to hazard a war with the U. States, at that time, for the objects in contestation.—It is a remarkable fact that France supported Spain against the U. States, on the Eastern side of the Mississippi, in her claim to West-Florida, and the U. States against Spain on the Western side, in respect to the limits of Louisiana next Mexico, seeking thereby, as we supposed, to keep the means of coercing both parties in her own hands, for her own purposes. I was persuaded that France sought to make money of both by a compromise, the conditions of which she wished to controul, and that she expected to succeed best by sustaining the claim of each against the other, in the quarter where it was most vulnerable. The U. States for example could not fail to be more sensibly affected by the interposition of France in favor of Spain in regard to Florida than to territory lying 200 leagues Westward of the Mississippi; nor could Spain have the same interest in retaining territory lying Eastward

of the Mississippi, within our acknowledged limits, and which must finally belong to us, that she would to that adjoining Mexico. Entertaining this opinion of the views and policy of France, we thought that it was advisable for the U. States to oppose them with decision, at once, in a firm belief that we should succeed, while there did not seem to be a probability of losing by it. In great emergencies a nation must support its character. An over cautious policy often risks more than a bold one. In taking part with Spain against the U. States France could have but one of two objects, either to make a job of the controversy by compromise, or to nurse the quarrel between the parties as the foundation of one between her and the United States, when she should be better prepared for it. If the first was the object, she would of course manage it in character, and relinquish it when she found that she could make nothing by it; if the second, it followed that the reason which induced her to wish delay ought to be decisive with us to push the affair to a conclusion. It could not be our interest to give her time to prepare for a rupture with us. Bonaparte was not then established in his new dignities. Russia menaced, and Austria and Prussia were ready to fall on him. After he should accomplish all his great schemes of ambition, we should oppose his views with less prospect of success than while the result was uncertain; and if he failed, as our decision would have insured our success, we should have found in it only the greater cause to approve our conduct. We urged it also as an additional

reason for pushing the business with Spain that success there would be sure to facilitate the adjustment of our differences with other powers, in all points in which they were unsettled. We alluded in this remark more particularly to England, with whom a negotiation, which had been committed to me before my visit to Spain, though suspended, was depending, and intended to be revived on my return to London. A private letter containing these sentiments accompanied these dispatches from Madrid, of the date above stated. They were communicated in a private letter from motives of delicacy and sincere friendship to the administration, because we feared if we included them in a public dispatch we might embarrass the government, if it should differ with us in opinion as to the course to be pursued, instead of aiding it as we earnestly wished to do, in the critical conjuncture which had occurred.

On my return to England, in July 1805, I found that the British government, after renewing the coalition with Austria, had recommenced the practice of the preceding war, in seizing our vessels, and doing us other injuries, for till then, two years after the commencement of the present one, it had abstained from it. My resistance to those measures which had pushed the controversy to the edge of war, and left it there, is well known to you and to my country. In a public dispatch, which communicated the result of my correspondence with the British ministry, I took the liberty to give my advice as to the part which we ought likewise to take with England. I

asked the question, "shall we make an issue with Britain and Spain (meaning France) at the same time?" and answered it in the affirmative by saying that I would press our claims with each as if with it alone any controversy existed. I insisted that the cases did not interfere with each other; that we should not succeed with either power if we did not act with great decision against both; that the moment was favorable to us, and unfavorable to them; that success with either could not fail to secure it with the other. These sentiments were included in a public dispatch, rather by accident than by design. So far as I had any motive in it, it was to aid the government; for, finding that our difficulties increased, I thought that it would be unkind to urge on the government a particular course of measures, and not participate with it in the responsibility of them. My idea of the course to be pursued with England, which was suggested, as well as I recollect, in a private letter, for it was not in a public one, was either to impose an embargo on her vessels, or for the Congress to take the subject of neutral rights under its consideration, and to declare its sentiments on it in detail, pledging its support to the government in asserting and maintaining those rights, and for the government, without further compromitment, to have opened a negotiation with Russia, and the other Northern powers on that subject. I rather inclined to the latter idea, as a strong tone would be assumed in that mode, one likely to be sensibly felt by England, while it would not compromit the government

in the slightest degree. I likewise gave it as my opinion that our naval force ought to be increased. I knew that some attention to that important branch of national police, would be sensibly felt by all the belligerents, and likewise by the neutral Northern powers, commanding of the former greater respect, and inspiring the latter with the hope of greater support. In advancing this idea I urged that the naval force of the U. States ought not to be regulated by reference to the navies of the great powers, but to the strength of the squadrons which they usually stationed in time of war on our coast, at the mouths of our great rivers, and in our harbours. I thought that such a force, incorporated permanently into our system, would give weight at all times to our negotiations with foreign powers, and by means thereof prevent wars and save money; that it would tend to secure to our government the confidence of that class of our citizens who were most interested in commerce, shipping and the fisheries, which was numerous especially to the Eastward: that it would lessen the necessity for a standing army, the most dangerous engine in the hands of government to a free people. To the present period I wrote letters on these topicks to no one out of the administration, having carefully abstained from it least I might express opinions of the policy to be pursued different from that which the government might adopt.

When the Congress met, the government laid before it the papers relative to the negotiation with Spain in the first instance. The result, as you know

was an arrangement for the removal of the negotiation with her at Paris, by Messieurs Armstrong and Bowdoin, to give effect to which 2,000,000. of dollars were voted. To this project the Republican minority made opposition, being inclined to stronger measures. After the business with Spain, or rather France, was disposed of, the administration laid before Congress the papers relating to England, and among them the letter above alluded to. The administration wished that some stand should be made against England, and was favorable to the non-importation law, which was adopted. To that the same minority was opposed, preferring, as it is understood, more moderate measures. It was on that occasion that Mr. Randolph stated that if my letter had been laid before the Congress at an earlier period, alluding, as I presume to *that* when the business with Spain was under consideration, it would have had much influence in the decision on that question. In making that remark he shewed that he knew nothing of my sentiments of the measures which ought to be taken with either power. It was the decision which then took place in the Republican party which gave birth to the Republican minority.

The negotiation with Spain failed as it was easy to anticipate; for when it was known that she expected to make from 12 to 14 millions of dollars by it, it was natural to presume that she would be much mortified and disgusted at the offer of 2 millions only. By renewing the negotiation in the way of barter, after the failure of the other, by which our national honor had

been much outraged, all fear of future resentment, war, or other serious opposition, was done away. France inferred from that step, that she might harass us with impunity in every line in which it was in her power to affect us. It is certain that from that day she ceased to regard us as a power, or to make any calculation on our maintaining our rank as such, with any nation. The failure of our business with Spain, and the knowledge of the removal of the negotiation, and the manner of it, the details of which were known to every one, were sensibly felt in our concerns with England. She was not willing to yield any portion of what she called her maritime rights, under the light pressure of the non-importation law, to a power which had no maritime force, not even sufficient to protect any one of its ports against a small squadron, and which had so recently submitted to great injuries and indignities from powers that had not a ship at sea. Under such circumstances it seemed to me to be highly for the interest of our country, and to the credit of our government, to get out of the general scrape on the best terms we could, and with that view to accommodate our differences with the great maritime power on what might be called fair and reasonable conditions, if such could be obtained. I had been slighted, as I thought, by the administration, in getting no answers to my letters for an unusual term, and in being subjected to a special mission, notwithstanding my remonstrance against it on a thorough conviction of its inutility, and by other acts which I could not but feel; yet, believing that my service in

England would be useful there, and by means thereof give aid to the administration, and to the republican cause at home, I resolved to stay, and did stay for those purposes. The treaty was an honorable and advantageous adjustment with England; I adopted it in a firm belief that it was so, and nothing has occurred since to change that opinion. On the contrary all the events which followed have tended to confirm me in it. Had Mr Jefferson accepted that treaty he would, in my opinion, have afforded ample protection to our commerce, and seamen, against England, who has such vast means of annoying them. He would also have secured us against the unfriendly policy of France, who would have seen in such an adjustment, at that period, something to reject, and something to fear. France would have expected, had she pressed us afterwards, that our good understanding with England would have increased with our resistance to the pressure, which she would have anticipated. Had Mr Jefferson closed on that ground he would have carried home with him more content than has I fear fallen to his lot, and as illustrious a fame as the Chief Magistrate of any country ever retired with. As it is, we must all recollect that in a long and active life, and in conjunctures of great difficulty, and even danger, he has been firm and incorruptible in support of the rights of his country, and of the people, and in paying him the tribute of respect justly due for those important services, look with indulgence on his errors, from which none, even the most perfect, are free.

The consequences which followed the rejection of the British treaty need not be recited to you. The high tone assumed by it, threw out of sight the moderate one which had been taken in the business with Spain, and gained to the administration a flow of popularity which was extremely strong. Its friends, consisting of the republican majority, condemned the treaty and its makers, without seeing it, and applauded the administration for its firmness in rejecting an act which was deemed so unworthy of, and degrading to the nation. It cast a cloud over my character which did me great injury. Some doubted my integrity; many thought I had been too long from home, and had lost in Britain some part of those sound principles for which they had once given me credit, as Mr Adams was said to have done before me. If any of the republican minority complained of the mode of proceeding, I was classed with it. If the federalists censured it, I was deemed a federalist. This was surely a generous reward for my services and for the support which I had given to the administration, in every country where I had represented it, especially in England after the special mission where I hazarded much and could gain nothing by remaining there. The treaty was received in March, after the adjournment of Congress, and rejected. In the December following it was noticed officially in the message to that body, in terms of great reprehension, but the conduct of the Ministers who formed it approved. The treaty itself was not communicated till the March following, so that neither had the Congress nor the publick any oppor-

tunity till then of judging of its merits by a view of the instrument itself. That view however was deemed unnecessary; they had already condemned it, and acted in part on that condemnation, so that in regard to the course to be pursued it seemed to be of little importance what the contents of the treaty were. It is just to remark that the recent attack on the Chesapeake, and the new negotiation to which it gave birth, had drawn the public attention to other objects.

On my return to the U. States I found myself reduced to the dilemma of being forced either to join in and sanction all that the administration had done, or to denounce the impolicy of its measures in explicit terms, or to take the course which I have pursued, or some such course. Had I joined in and given my full sanction to what had passed, approved the conduct of the administration in our foreign concerns in all cases, approved of course its neglect of me, and condemnation of what I had done, so far as it had condemned it, and accepted as an act of favor the grade in the public opinion which I might thus hold, I have no doubt that I might have enjoyed some consideration under it. It was however impossible for me to take that course. The question therefore simply was between the two latter, and I had no great difficulty in deciding to which to give the preference. However erroneously the government might have acted, or unkindly, toward me, I was satisfied that I should injure my country, and the republican cause, by making such an attack. A negotiation was still depending with all the powers with whom we had been treating, which

might be affected by it. *That* with England I had managed, and brought to the stage in which it then was, being at the precise moment when having closed it in England, a special envoy was daily expected at Washington to resume it there. I could not make such an attack on my own government, however strongly I might censure the conduct of England, without affording her some support against my country. Such a controversy was like to create trouble at home, and impair the confidence of the people in free government. This was the first republican administration which had been formed; it had done much good, and ought not to be so attacked, especially by me, in an exertion to obtain the best possible terms of a foreign power, altho' it might err in its judgment as to the means, or be led from the true course by prejudice, passion, or any other frailty. These were general considerations which had great weight against such a measure; there were others of a personal nature which never ceased to oppose it. Although I thought that I had been treated unkindly by our old friends, I had an insurmountable objection to such an attack on them. I knew very well that they had got complete possession of the ground, and could not be dislodged from it but by force; I knew also that I had in my hands ample means wherewith to put my own conduct in an unquestionable light, and thereby to annoy them, but still I could not use those means for those purposes. I had pursued that course on a former occasion, as you well know, and it was one which was most consistent with my natural disposition and

general views of policy, but then I had to contend in favor of free government against a system of oppression, and the contest was maintained, not with my old friends, but with such men as Adams, Hamilton, and Pickering, for I could not consider Washington a party to it. I might add, as a motive which had no inconsiderable weight in the decision, that in truth I had no personal object to carry. Had I been at home, and the Republicans been willing to place the government in the hands of Mr Madison, I would have been among the first to promote it. In consideration of his more advanced years, longer services, and just claims, and of the friendship which had so long subsisted between us, I should not have consented to be put in opposition to him. But our affairs had taken such a direction in my absence, so little had an appeal been made with me to generous motives, so completely in truth was I put into a state of duress, that there seemed to be left me no alternative than that of an unworthy submission, or some course which shewed an independence of mind, and a consciousness of integrity. Abandoning then for these reasons, of a public and private nature, the idea of such an attack, and with it all pretension to the government, even the most remote, it remained to settle what kind of attitude I should take. Mr Madison had criticised the treaty with Great Britain in terms which I thought it did not deserve. Had his criticism operated on her government only it would have been a matter of indifference to me what he said of it. But after the sanction which he had given to that act, though nothing more than a

project in respect to our government, it was impossible to excite a public prejudice against it without imparting some portion of its effect to the character of the Ministers who formed it. Here then was a fair ground on which to rest: one which I thought it my duty to occupy. It was one which appeared to me to be free from all the objections that were applicable to the other, and of a nature sufficiently distinct from the administration to shew any independence of it. It has not I presume escaped your attention that my letter from Richmond in reply to that of Mr Madison alluded to, was written with a view to all these objects. In the then pending election I never took any part. I knew that I should not be elected, and in all probability should have been withdrawn had it not been believed that such a step would be viewed in the light of a compromise, or concession, which would have been construed in some form or other unfavorable to my character, or to that of those who supported me. The correspondence with Mr Jefferson I published at the close of the scene, to shew that the relation of friendship which had so long subsisted was preserved between us. As that relation imposed on me an obligation of a certain character, I wished that the nature and extent of it should be known to the public.

With the political course of the republican minority I never had any connexion. You have seen by the above statement that Mr Randolph knew nothing of my sentiments respecting the measures to be taken with Spain or Britain, before his rupture with the administration. The remark is equally applicable to

what occurred after that event. The fact is that neither did the administration or the republican minority take the attitude which I had advised with those powers. Neither seemed willing to make an issue with both at once. The administration made one with England, while it put that with Spain to nurse. The republican minority seemed to differ with it only in respect to the power with whom the issue should be made. It was disposed to assume the same tone but to make a different application of it. To bid the defiance to Spain while it looked, for the time, with a milder regard on England. It is just to add that in forming its opinion the republican minority had not all the advantages that were enjoyed by the administration. The latter possessed exclusively the whole correspondence with both powers and all the information which I could add to it in private letters. The former knew nothing but what it gained from the messages to Congress; and as the administration adopted the mode of laying the substance before that body in detached form, submitting in the first instance the business with Spain, and with Britain in the next, after that with Spain was disposed of, it followed that its light was commensurate only with the subject before it. The imputation of such connexion was dishonorable to me because it implied a want of candour and fair dealing with the administration under which I served, and for whom I possessed a friendship; an imputation to which no act of my life gave the least sanction. If I had formed a just estimate of M[r] Randolph's character, and of that of the members who

voted with him, as I think I have, I am satisfied that I should have lost the place which I held in their good opinion, had I been capable of such a conduct.

Since my return to the United States I have had little communication with the government on public affairs. I was called to Washington last Spring, reluctantly, as you know, to settle my account with the government. The reception given me by the President and officers under him was kind and friendly, and I experienced from them a just and fair conduct to the object which carried me there. But no confidential communication took place between us. Having no resentment for the past, I shewed none. And finding that much interest was taken in what concerned me, I was not insensible to it.

The administration has now got back to the ground which it held before the rejection of the British treaty, but with a very considerable loss of property, and with that an inferior one in point of character. It rejected the treaty because it contained no provision against impressment, and for other imputed defects of so metaphysical a nature that it was impossible, as you have justly observed, even to remember them for any length of time. What has been the consequence? Disdaining the attitude of conciliation, and the motives usually appealed to in amicable negotiations, of making mutual concessions for mutual equivalents, of giving something for something in return, of which each party is the judge, it assumed an hostile attitude and relied on hostile measures for success, laid an embargo, non-intercourse law &c., and finally without

obtaining anything of G. Britain, has been forced under the pressure of public discontent to repeal all those laws, and to open our ports to that commerce which foreign powers, in their great mercy, will permit us to enjoy. Our seamen too are authorized to resume their occupation, and return to the ocean, not only unprotected, but with an acknowledgement by the government that it cannot protect them.—Nor is anything gained of France in this unfortunate career. Altho' our batteries were principally levelled at her adversary, that circumstance has had no effect upon her. Believing us to be a commercial and sordid people, who sought gain and it only, who were destitute of every sentiment of honor, she gave us no credit for our opposition to Britain. Instead of offering to open her ports to us, as an inducement to grapple with her enemy, by which she could have lost, if she gained, nothing, she shut her ports against us: instead of inviting us to enter into a new treaty for the security of maritime rights, on the principles of the armed neutrality of 1780, which we ought to have expected, not solely as an inducement to embark in the war against England, but to protect us against improper pretensions on her own part, in the event of success, by which the dominion of the sea would be transferred to the same person who ruled by land all Europe, if not the whole of the Eastern hemisphere, she violated by her conduct all those principles. She also seized and sequestered, if she has not confiscated, property that had been carried into her ports in the fair course of trade, on the faith of an existing treaty. She has

in fact held a scourge over us from the commencement, occasionally inflicting its sting, and menacing us with still more exemplary punishment, if we failed to fulfil the expectation which we had in some degree excited. This is a just picture of the career which we have lately run, than which it is not easy to conceive anything more mortifying or humiliating as a nation.

We have now reached a stage from which, enlightened by experience, we may look back on past events and judge impartially of them. Shall a review be taken of these measures for the purpose of correcting errors in the public opinion, and placing the parties to them in a more just light? I think not—Such a step would be considered an attack upon the administration, to which I have the same objection that I had on a former occasion. I have no personal object in view, and would obtain none at that expence. This is however not the sole objection to the measure. There are others of great weight of a public nature, which merit the most attentive and dispassionate consideration.

It seems to me that a systematic republican opposition to a republican administration, from the nature of our government, and other causes, is more apt to give it an artificial and unmerited strength than to weaken it; but should such opposition finally succeed in the overthrow of the administration, there would be great danger of involving in the same ruin the whole republican party, if not the cause itself. If the opposition does not carry with it the majority in the first attack it cannot fail to strengthen the admin-

istration, be the merits of the question between the parties what they may. The majority in the Congress which sides with it in such a crisis, supposing the conflict to be carried there, will adhere to it afterwards from personal motives, if it had none other, and the mass of the republican party among the people would naturally follow their representatives. Thus the minority would daily lose ground in the public opinion, and its advocates proportionately diminish. While hostilities are carried to a great height the minority can never become the majority. The repetition of the attack would be more apt to make it still more unpopular, and to confirm the majority in error, than to produce a suitable change of measures. In fact there are but two ways by which majorities can be made to change their policy, one by force, the other by consent. Of the first I have seen examples in France which were accomplished by the aid of the people, who were called in by the minorities, and who fell on the legislative body, and cut off many of its members, by means of which the revolution was finally overset and monarchy restored. The second alone merits consideration. If consent is relied on, it must be voluntary, the result of reflection, and conciliation, only. The understanding must be convinced, and to convince it the passions must be kept in such a state that reason may have her undisturbed dominion. For minorities to become majorities, even where they are in the right, the character of a distinct party in each must cease, and that change may be essentially promoted by the moderation and forbearance of the

minority. It is in this mode only that the minority may become the majority. The whole party must be brought together again, in which state the members of the minority will be seen voting in the majority, for the collision being at an end, good sense will prevail.

If in the conflict alluded to any great impression should be made to the prejudice of the majority, if for example, it should be beat down, and turned out, it seems probable that the rival, or federal, party alone would profit by it. It is hardly possible that the minority should advance itself to power on the ruin of the majority, for, by the means of free election, how could that take place? By the course which affairs are supposed to have taken such a party could not exist in the country, but if it did it must be small, and could not expect the suffrage of its enemies, whose hostility would encrease with the violence of the conflict. A change therefore which worked the ruin of the majority would be likely to produce that of the whole party, for by its own strength the minority could not come into power, and it could count on no other resource. The federalists would watch the windings of the controversy, and labour in their own cause only. They would not be willing instruments to the advancement of republican principles, or republican men; I speak of their leaders, for the people in both parties are republican. If the people should become wearied of the contention they might seek repose in an effort to rid themselves of it by opening the door to the federalists.

But I do not think that a change of measures, sup-

posing the republican party to survive the conflict, necessarily involves a change of men, or that it would break the republican majority, or add essentially to the consideration or power of the minority. It is far from being impossible, it is indeed probable, that the majority adhering together might, under the pressure of circumstances, turn completely round, and even adopt the measures of the minority without affecting materially the strength or credit of either party. So long as the administration is supported by a majority of the republican party, which must consist of a majority of the people to keep it in power, the misfortunes attending its measures will attach no sentiment of any kind to it alone. They will be felt as a national concern. The people, conscious of no offence, will exculpate themselves, and of course the administration. In a change of measures the whole majority will go together. To the minority they will indulge no friendly feeling. They will allow it no credit, either for the wisdom of its councils, or the purity of its motives. On the contrary they will charge to it the failure of their measures, and endeavour to fix on it the odium incident to the public misfortunes and dishonor.

In England an opposition to the government is almost in all cases popular, while it can hardly ever be so under our constitution. The reason of this anomaly is obvious. Between the King and the People there always is a difference of interests, or at least a jealousy in the latter of the designs of the former. Hence any person, however devoted he may have

been previously to the views of the Crown, and disliked on that account by the people, becomes a favorite as soon as he changes sides, and throws his weight into their scale. But under our constitution that difference of interest between the People and their Chief Magistrate either does not, or is believed not, to exist. Every branch of the government is elective. The President owes his appointment as much to the suffrage of his fellow-citizens as a representative in Congress, or a member of the State Assembly. But the election of the Chief Magistrate is the more important act because it draws after it more important consequences. It is the great act which, in a peculiar manner, designates that the sovereignty is in the People. It is that act in the exercise of which the strongest appeal is made to them by the contending interests in society, and which produces the greatest, and most general, excitement. When it is performed everything seems to be done. The character of the administration, and the tone of public measures, are believed to be settled by it. The election of the Representative follows as an incident to the greater cause. If he derives his appointment from the same source it is conferred in the expectation that harmony will prevail between them, or, in other words, that the Representative will support the Chief Magistrate, except in extraordinary cases, and under extraordinary circumstances. Hence an opposition to a Republican President by a Republican Representative can scarcely ever be popular. In general it is considered by their constituents as a species of insubordination,

or disobedience to themselves, the propriety of which they cannot perceive, and which they are of course disposed to censure.

The existence of a rival party founded in anti-republican principles has contributed greatly to encrease the ascendancy of a republican Chief Magistrate over the members of the party in the Congress, and among the people. The jealousy entertained by the republicans of the federal party keeps them alive to every contestation which takes place between them in the general and state governments, and throughout the Union. On the deliberations and measures of Congress their attention is fixed with peculiar solicitude because it is there that the ascendancy of either party is more sensibly felt. From certain causes, which it is not necessary to dwell on here, the enquiry most commonly made by the people is whether the administration is supported, and what part their own Representative more especially acts in that respect? If the administration is republican, and a representative of the same party attacks its measures, the constituent who voted for both will find it difficult to reconcile his conduct with republican principles. Seeing that the federalists never fail to attack the administration, and that his representative often votes with the federalists, he will not be able easily to distinguish between them.

Shall then the Representative become the tool and instrument of the President, take orders from him, and obey them, with servile submission? That is not my idea, nor would it be my practice. It is

necessary however, if we wish to be useful, to see things in their true light, to have such a knowledge of, and pay such respect to them, as may be requisite to the faithful and successful discharge of the duties confided to us. In most public bodies there is much management. I would have none; but still I would endeavour to guard myself against its ill effects from others. I would never vote for any measure against my judgment and conscience to gratify any administration; yet I would be careful to act in such a manner, in performing my duty according to my own sense of it, as to give the adminstration no hold of me. Divided as we are into parties, a Representative should keep within the limit of his party. I mean in the great outline of his conduct. The party should constitute the nation to him, except under particular circumstances only. If he fixes himself permanently out of that limit, he destroys the means which he might otherwise have of being useful. If he is a man of great ability, acts with prudence, and enjoys the confidence of his party, he will rarely find himself reduced to the necessity of seperating from it, or from the administration, and when those instances occur ample excuses will be made for him. A Representative holding that ground could not fail to keep the Chief Magistrate in check, provided he should wish to carry improper measures, while he would secure his own independence, with a wide range of actions, and all the means of being useful which his station afforded, and a great and generous mind could desire.

If this reasoning is just it follows that any attack on the adminstration in relation to past measures, in whatever form it may be made, would only serve to perpetuate the division which has already taken place in the republican party, and to confirm the majority in its further support on party principles. It is not the administration alone that would feel the attack. It would be felt by all who have supported it, and the more sensibly because they must now be conscious that they had mistaken the true interests of their country. Experience has enlightened them as to their errors, but it has not raised them above the condition of men. There can be but two permanent parties among us, one of which is friendly to free government, the other to monarchy, in which latter I never did include many persons. Every other division should cease with the cause which produced it. Hitherto those who disapproved any of the late measures of the government have done it in the discharge of their duty in their several stations, or by expressing their opinions of them as free men in private life, while they were under consideration. So far therefore a division seemed to be inevitable. But by the repeal of the acts alluded to, which has restored us essentially to the ground we held before the rejection of the British treaty, the policy of the government may be said to have changed. Be that however as it may, the causes which produced the division being removed there can be no reason for continuing it. Our fellow citizens must now see that they had injured us by imputing to our conduct motives it did not

deserve, and the whole of the republican party be disposed to do us justice, if we do not prevent it by some act of our own. The sovereignty is in the People,—and they should be permitted to judge of the past without interruption, freely and independently. We ought not to endeavour to forestall their opinion, or to seize it by force. All the important facts are before them, and there can be no doubt that they will form a just and impartial judgment on every question which they involve. If we act with becoming dignity at this time the effect will be what it ought to be with our fellow citizens, and the retrospect will always be gratifying to us, as individuals, and do us honor with the nation. True magnanimity consists in abstaining from the pride and boast of triumph after victory is fairly obtained. In this case, however, there has been no victory, or just cause of triumph. As Americans we can take no pleasure in the misfortunes of our country, or the failure of its measures.

With respect to myself, if it is worth while, or even proper, to say anything on so unimportant a subject, you may be assured that I mingle no personal motive in the opinions which I now express. I have no desire of a closer connection with the administration than now exists. It is not probable that any ever will take place between us. I do not see the ground on which it can, for should the invitation be given, which is highly improbable, I most certainly would not accept it otherwise than on conditions the most honorable to myself, among which the approbation

of those friends who lately supported me in my claims, not to office but to character, would be held an indispensable one. After the hard rubs which I have received under two administrations, the last of which touched me most sensibly, believe me I have no hankering after public employment. My hankering is for peace, which is to be found in retirement only, which my circumstances imperiously require. Of what concerns the general cause I shall, with you, never cease to be watchful. With you also I prefer to become a centinel, not in situations which expose us to unmerited suspicion and abuse, but in private life, where, although we may be slandered, we cannot be injured.

I intended to make to you in this communication some remarks on another very interesting subject, but my engagements, which are very pressing, render it impossible. It remains to be examined what ought to be done in the present conjuncture in regard to our controversies with foreign powers which unfortunately are still unsettled? Shall they be left in their present state, or some new attitude be assumed? The enquiry is a very important one, much connected, in its various relations, with the independence of our country, the preservation of its union, and of our free and happy system of government. Should I be able soon to command sufficient leisure I will likewise submit to your consideration my sentiments on this highly important subject.

I am, dear Sir, very sincerely your friend and servant.

TO COLONEL JOHN TAYLOR.

ALBEMARLE, Novr. 19. 1810.

DEAR SIR,—I had the pleasure to receive yours of the 26. ultº[1] by the last mail & read its contents with great interest. In an inquiry after truth nothing should be withheld, especially on such important subjects, and the more freely and explicitly we convey our ideas the better the effect will be. Your communication was the more satisfactory, as it enables me to explain certain parts of my letter, which I find require it.

In your former letter you suggested it as a subject for consideration, whether an adherence to the supine policy I had hitherto pursued, or the adoption of a more active one, would contribute most to my own reputation, as well as to the public welfare. I inferred from the inquiry that you alluded principally to the transactions in which I had been engaged under the govt. My letter was in reply to that inquiry, and my remarks were confined to the limit which seemed to be prescribed. To put my view of the subject more fully before you I gave a sketch of the part which I had acted in those affairs, and in others since my return home. In illustrating my ideas I was compelled to notice the state of our

[1] Colonel Taylor's letter of October 26th acknowledging Monroe's of September 10th and October 25th. Expresses his opposition to a fleet; concurs in opinion in relation to Jefferson and Madison; differs with Monroe about parties; Jefferson's policy a compromise with Hamilton's; dangerous to place a President at head of a dominant party; desires from minority a manly avowal of principle; Monroe should adopt the course he took in 1797; the true motive for guidance is to take office if good can be done thereby.

affairs to shew how far that consideration had already had weight with me, and ought to be respected in future. In speaking of a systematick republican opposition to a republican admⁿ, I alluded to it as maintained in the Congress, or by me who had acted under the admⁿ, and in relation to the past and not the future. My remarks it is true were of a general nature, but yet it was far from my intention to imply that a free and manly investigation of all the measures of the govᵗ, both past and future, and equally as to their policy and principle, should not be made in the publick papers, by members of the republican party. My opinion is decidedly otherwise. I think that such an investigation is not only proper but absolutely necessary. It ought, however, even by those in private life, to be conducted with great prudence, and moderation, or it will fail in its object. It should move within the republican limit, fix soundly and deeply its principles, and trace aberrations from them in a tone of regret. Its chidings should be those of a friend to a friend, who sought his reformation, not his ruin. The subject should be so managed as to enlighten the whole republican party, without irritating any portion of it. If that is done the independence of the whole party of the Executive will be promoted, and the people in their character of Sovereign be better enabled to perform the functions belonging to that character. Discussions so managed will keep the power in the hands of the people, and them in the disposition and ability to judge of the Executive impartially and wisely,

and to reward it according to its merit. But if they are carried further, and pushed with violence, especially in the Congress, or by those who have acted under the government, they drive the members in the Congress, and the people at large, into the necessity of clinging to and supporting the ch: Magistrate for the purpose of supporting themselves; that is, of saving the party from ruin. Thus the misconduct of the admⁿ, which under another mode of investigation and exposure would produce its removal, might become by a violent one the cause of increasing its strength and ascendancy over the party, so long at least as the party lasted. I own with pleasure that I have seen nothing from your pen of this latter kind, or that was calculated to produce other than a good effect.

Of the existence of parties in our country, and of the dangerous designs of one of them, no person is better acquainted than you. You remember well the time when we were happy to get any aid, however small, to the cause which we supported, and you remember also the necessity that we were under, to keep the party together, to humour occasionally the weaknesses of our friends. The sacrifices which we made in that way were not made to gain anything to ourselves, for we neither wished or expected anything, but to the cause of free govt, which we thought in danger, and which actually was in danger. I did hope when the admⁿ changed, and Mr Jefferson came into power, that all distinction of parties would have been firmly levelled by the wisdom and success

of his admⁿ; that we should all (with a few incurable exceptions only) have become republicans. He too was penetrated with the great idea, as appeared by his inaugural speech, but he soon relinquished the hope of realizing it, as appeared by his reply to the remonstrance from Connecticut on the removal of Griswold. I think that he err'd in that stage of his admⁿ. In making this remark I do not allude to that act, or to any particular act of removal. I apply it to the principle which seemed to be adopted then, and which was preserved afterwards, thro' his admⁿ, of extending removals in many cases to the inferior offices of govᵗ, instead of confining them strictly to the higher ones, such as the heads of departments and foreign missions. Had he removed only the leading members of the federal party, who were suspected of entertaining principles unfriendly to free govᵗ, as some of them undoubtedly did, and retained in office all the others, he would have separated the head from the body, and the separation would have been eternal.

But by extending his removals to the latter he kept the party united. He gave the federal leaders ground to stand on, and, by removing one at a time he kept it, under continual excitement, disposed and prepared to seize the govᵗ when the first favorable opportunity should present itself. Had the first mission to France, on the suppression of the deposit at N. Orleans, failed, I do not know what would have been the consequence. It succeeded, and the success gave to his admⁿ an almost unexampled popularity.

It overwhelmed the federalists, but it did not annihilate them. We have seen that party, on a late occasion, that of the embargo, appear again in force, and in such a menacing form, as to endanger the overthrow of the whole republican party. It required all the energies of that party, and of the govt itself, exerted I admit in support of the laws, to save it from ruin. And even that effort was not deemed sufficient for the purpose. The govt was forced to give ground, or I verily do believe that the party would have been ruined. It is a fact which must have struck your attention as well as mine, that at the time when the party was in the greatest danger, the power of the Executive over its members was most formidable. For venturing to differ from it on some points, you as well as I had some cause to know the truth of this remark.

It seems to me to be a question which ought to be first settled, whether the interest of free govt requires that the republican party shod be preserved or not. If it is safe and wise to break the party up, all reasoning about it is at an end. Every man will be at liberty to take his own course without reference to that object. But if the safety of free govt requires that the party shod be kept together, then the subject presents itself to view in a different light altogether. How shall that be done? What sacrifices must individuals make for the purpose, especially those who are known by their past conduct to have the cause most at heart, and who are looked to, in some degree, for an useful and honorable example? I

own that I am one of those who think that the safety of free govt depends on the existence and exertions of the republican party. If it is broken whither shall we be driven, and where shall we terminate our course? Will not the federal party come again into power? And in the present state of the world, not another republick in it, how long would our unprotected system last? It would have moral truth on its side, but what is moral truth against a strong encroaching govt, supported by powerful armies foreign and domestick? Free government always had moral truth on its side, but how little way has it made in the world with its aid? How much ground has it not lost of late in France when it had the powerful influence of the govt on its side?

From my own observation, and all the information wh I have recd, there never was greater reason (one gloomy period excepted) for the preservation of the republican party, than at this time. Our interior is not settled. The struggle between the parties to the Eastward, produced by the late embargo, was of a more serious nature than is generally believed. It was in truth, on the part of the republicans, a contest for life. There is little doubt had the federal party gained the complete ascendancy there, and had the government persevered in its policy, that its leaders wod have pushed their fortune to its greatest extremity. The severance of the Union would have been its first effect, but that would have drawn after it every other species of national calamity. From what I hear there is much interest working in that quarter of an

unfavorable tendency. The movement given to our system by late measures has not ceased. Altho' the republicans strenuously supported the embargo, they did not all approve it. The Eastern people in a body think that embargoes, non-intercourse laws, &c., are not the kind of protection which the Union owes to commerce. They have not found either that their shipping, their fisheries, or their trade, have thriven, nor do they believe that they will ever thrive by systems of privation. I have long feared that if the policy which was adopted at an early period by our best and wisest republicans to the south, was persevered in, it would prove fatal to the cause. I was one of those who concurred at that time in that policy, but my experience since in the affairs of the Union, in a station which unfolded to me more fully and in greater detail, the interests of all its parts, as it did the means by which alone they were to be promoted, has satisfied me that a reasonable moderate departure from it is necessary, and would produce the happiest result in favor of the republican cause. It is the only maxim of policy which was adopted at that period that I have seen cause to doubt. Experience has confirmed me in principles, and I have only been disposed to relax the vigor of that maxim for the preservation of those principles.

If the federal party did not exist, or its leaders, at least some of them, did not entertain principles unfriendly to liberty, there would be no necessity to keep the republican party in existence. Happy indeed would it be if that state of things had arrived, for then

would our government rest on its true principles ; then would the ch: Magistrate cease to be the head of a party, an event which, with you, I anxiously wish to see ; then might all his acts be scrutinized and criticised without reference to an ulterior and greater cause. Towards the late and present incumbents I have much tenderness for many reasons, most of which are felt as strongly by you. But that applies, so far as the question of an attack is involved, to the transactions which occurred between them and me personally, and to none others. In believing that it is necessary to preserve in existence the republican party, I do not look to them, but to the cause. It is true that in sparing them I gratify my feelings, but that is a minor consideration. Far is it from my desire, or even thought, to countenance any violation of the constitution, or principle, from tenderness to the characters alluded to. They have no such claim on me, nor has any one on earth. I feel indeed, in inclining to this union of policy as my judgment does, that I give some proof of disinterestedness, for among those who have made the most constant and persevering exertions in support of the republican cause, and have suffered most in consequence of them from the persecutions of the opposite party, there are I believe few who have suffered as much as I have done of late, from the persecutions of his own. This disinterestedness I am aware is not yet fully proved. The proof must depend on what is to happen hereafter.

In speaking of the first division with which I was acquainted in the republican party I alluded to that

which took place in our publick councils in relation to foreign transactions. I did not mean to imply that all the previous measures of the admⁿ. had corresponded with principle, or obtained the approbation of all those who had contributed most to bring it into power. I well know that much that was expected from the change was not done. But in consequence of my absence from the U. States, I have less information on this latter part of the subject, and on every other which relates to our internal concerns, than I should have possessed had I remained at home.

I have written you rather in haste to give some explanation of certain parts of my last letter, which it appeared to require, before I left home. I shall be in Richmond at the meeting of the assembly, and happy to hear from you there, as I shall be to communicate freely and frequently with you during the session. Most sincerely do I wish that you were likewise a member of that body. I am very truly your friend.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

ALBEMARLE, Decr 24, 1810.

DEAR SIR,—I arrived here last night indisposed, and must return in the stage to-morrow or should have the pleasure to call on you. It was necessary that I should be present at the transfer of my property from one overseer to another, for which purpose I obtained leave of absence for a few days.

Mr. Ritchie informed Mr. Coles that an anonymous communication had been sent him, stating that you

had had a correspondence with the Com^rs^ or Trustees for opening the river near Milton, throwing light on the subject of inland navigation, and that application had been made to them for a copy of it, with a view to lay it before the publick, which had been refused. He consulted me on the subject. I suggested the propriety of withholding the publication for the present, and writing to the Com^rs^ for a copy, on the idea that in that mode the object might be obtained without the possibility of putting you in collision with any of your neighbours. The hint was adopted, as I was informed by Ritchie in a conversation I had with him the day before I left town. A knowledge of the occurrence may possibly be of some use to you.

We have so far advanced in the business of the Assembly with much harmony, and there does not appear at this moment to be in any one a disposition to interrupt it. In my judgment the true course is to let the legislature pass thro' the session, without being called on to interfere with the national concerns. I think that such a course would tend essentially to conciliate the members of the republican party towards each other, and to draw them more closely together than has been done of late. My earnest object is to promote that end, and if I am not driven by propositions bearing unfavorably on transactions to which I was a party in self defence to place my conduct in a just light, it is possible that I may contribute to it. Propositions of this kind, from what I can discern, are not likely to come from any but

such as profess to be the friends of the admn but who have other objects than its welfare, and will be pleased at a collision between it and me from motives very distinct from those that are connected with the publick good. I am, dear Sir, very sincerely your friend & servant.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND Jany. 21. 1811.

DEAR SIR,—I have the pleasure to return you your correspondence with the directors of the Rivanna Company which I lately recd from you. I had submitted it to the perusal of a few friends only, in confidence, and had determin'd for the present, at least, not to publish it, from a fear that the publication might lead to some unpleasant discussion.

You will have seen by the news papers that I have been placed in a situation of which I had no anticipation when I left home, nor indeed desire. I was induc'd to accede to it only, by the manifestation of a general sentiment among the republicans, that I should do so, and the hope that it may be useful in uniting the party more closely together for general purposes, and more especially for the support of the cause. I am aware that my private affairs will suffer by it, as the salary is insufficient, and I shall not be able to pay due attention to those at home. It is my intention to return immediately after the rising of the Assembly, when I shall have the pleasure to see you. In the meantime I beg you to command me in

all things in which I may be useful, being with great respect, etc.

TO COLONEL JOHN TAYLOR.

RICHMOND Jany. 23d 1811.

DEAR SIR,—I have intended for some time past to write you, but the many very interesting and pressing duties which devolved on me in my legislative character prevented it. In entering on these duties I found myself quite ignorant of forms, and equally a stranger to the more difficult task of publick discussion. I did not however shrink from them in any instance, but performed them as well as I could, calculating on reasonable allowance for deficiencies by their being imputed to the proper cause.

By a vote of the Genl Assembly I have been placed in a new situation, as you will probably hear before you receive this. I had been pressed to allow myself to be nominated for the Senate, to which I gave an explicit dissent. My attention having been called to that object before the meeting of the Assembly, by several communications, I had made up my mind on it, which could not be altered. In fact I thought that the acceptance of such a trust would be ruinous to me, and therefore declined the nomination. The vacancy in the govt of the State occurring, and being pressed on me with still greater earnestness, I consented to be brought forward. Among those who urged me to this measure were some who had been much opposed to me on a late occasion, and who expressed a desire

to avail themselves of the opportunity to give such a proof of their confidence. I replied that if the whole republican party would unite & place me where they had done 10 or 12 years ago, that I wo$^{d}$ accept the trust, & with much satisfaction: a satisfaction which I sho$^{d}$ not feel if such an union did not take place, altho' I might be elevated, as my election co$^{d}$ not be productive, in certain respects, of the useful effects which I might hope from it, I mean in the way of conciliation. Thus the affair commenced. These friends asked information on certain points which had been topics of misrepresentation & popular clamour against me on other occasions. I professed my willingness to give it on the principle that the enquiry was a reasonable one, the constituent having a right to know, on great questions especially, the sentiments of the person he was about to vote for. I was the more willing to give it because it was asked by those friends, not to remove doubts of their own, but to enable them to do me justice against the misrepresentations of others. The questions in which most interest was taken related to the disposition which I might entertain towards the adm$^{n}$, and the republican minority that was opposed to it. It was represented by some that I sho$^{d}$ carry into the government a disposition unfriendly to the adm$^{n}$, & a desire to embarrass its measures. These persons were favorable to the election of Mr. Barbour, to promote which they were desirous of reviving the animosities of the late presidential controversy, & to turn them to his account. At one time I had reason to think that it was contem-

plated to bring into the legislature resolutions approving the conduct of the gov^t in all its measures, & of course in which I had differed from it, & censuring the minority in those in w^h I had agreed with it. I gave it to be understood that I wo^d be at my post and do my duty: that if such resolutions were presented I wo^d open the whole subject, so as to place my own conduct in a just light, shewing wherein I had agreed or disagreed with each party, and contrasting, of course, the system of policy w^h I had advised, with that which had been pursued. I afterwards heard that such resolutions wo^d not be introduced, but that the same effect wo^d be attempted in the nomination to be made which would necessarily happen in my absence. Impelled by the motive above stated, & by the necessity of enabling my friends to do me justice in any case of attack, I thought it proper to give them full information on those subjects. For this purpose I recurred to certain documents which I had brought with me (it having been hinted to me before I left home that I sh^d be put to the test while here) and I also took the liberty to read, to those friends, my letters to you. As those letters contained a distinct analysis, and comprehensive view of all the circumstances relating to those transactions, it was easier to impart the information which I wished to give by reading them than in any other mode. You are not at all compromitted in those letters. They only refer to questions stated by you without the expression of your opinion in either of them. Your letters to me have not been shown to any [redacted]rson whatever, tho'

there is nothing in them to give offence to any one. I hope therefore that you will see no impropriety in my having read my letters to you to a few friends, under the circumstances stated.

You will have seen in the newspapers a communication between Mr. Chapman Johnson & myself on the topics alluded to, the object of which on his part is explained in his letter. I the more readily consented to answer it, to prevent misrepresentations of what might pass in private conversations. The correspondence will be regarded, as it is intended to be, an exposition of all that did pass. His object was quite a friendly one. I think you will find that I have conceded nothing, in my answer, from the ground on which I have heretofore stood.[1] I

[1] Johnson to Monroe: "RICHMOND, January 12th, 1811.

DEAR SIR,—You have been informed that it is the wish of many of your old friends and of the friends of the Administration, that you should fill the vacancy, in the Office of Governor of this Commonwealth, which is anticipated, from the appointment of Mr. Tyler, to the bench of the Federal Court. You already know that it would give me great satisfaction to promote your election. You are assured, too, I hope, that I feel the greatest confidence in your political principles, and in the sincerity of your disposition to promote the interests of the Republican cause. This confidence will be my justification, to the Republicans for using my exertions to effect a general concert amongst the friends of the Administration in your favor. But I find that there are amongst them, gentlemen who hesitate in giving you their support, and hesitate only from an apprehension, that in doing so they will afford the public reason to believe that they distrust the Administration in which they have confidence, and countenance an opposition which they disapprove. Though these are not my fears, yet I have no hesitation in thinking, that they are honestly the fear of others, and that in acting under their influence, they feel that they are obeying an impulse of duty to their Cause and Country. It is for the purpose of being enabled to remove these fears, that I trouble you with this letter.

If your own sense of propriety will permit, I should be pleased, that you would authorize me to say, whether, if elected, you would carry into the Gov-

am no enemy of the admn, nor am I disposed to embarrass its measures. On the contrary I wish

ernment, a disposition to cooperate with the Administration and to encourage union and harmony, for the purpose of ensuring success to their measures.

RICHMOND, Jany. 14th, 1811.

Monroe's Reply: DEAR SIR,—Your letter of the 12th instant has afforded me great satisfaction, because it manifests a spirit of amity and conciliation which ought always to characterise the conduct of those who are attached to the same principles, and engaged in support of the same great cause. It is evidently your object to correct errors in the minds of others, not to impose conditions on me.

My support of the republican cause has been the result of feeling, and of my own best judgment. It commenced at a very early period, and has been continued in every situation in which I have been placed. The same principle will animate and guide me thro' life.

I cannot conceive on what ground an idea is entertained that I should carry into the government of this Commonwealth a disposition unfriendly to the administration, and a desire to embarrass its measures. Such a suspicion is entirely destitute of foundation. Whatever difference of opinion there may have been on certain points of policy, respecting our foreign relations, I never failed when apprized of the views of my govt, to use my best efforts to carry them into effect. A difference of opinion on a point of policy wod never excite in me a disposition to oppose or counteract any measure of the government, or to impeach its claims to the respect and confidence of the people—

As I believe the Executive to be attached to free government, the natural bias of my mind and feelings is in its favor. I wish the administration success, because its success will promote that of the republican cause, and the general prosperity of my country. I add with pleasure that there is nothing of a personal nature, in the relation which subsists between the chief magistrate and myself, that can possibly impair the force of this sentiment.

I cannot presume that any one of the gentlemen who entertain the apprehensions to which you allude, feel disposed to approve without examination and conviction every measure of any administration. Such a disposition cannot be indulged and acted on, without a surrender of the first principles of free government: those principles which our constitution was instituted to preserve, and which the administration must and no doubt does revere. All that any administration can desire of a free and independent people, is a rational and manly support of its conduct when it bears the test of impartial investigation by the standard of the constitution, and by its tendency to promote the publick welfare. In any situation in which I may be placed, I shall expect the support of my fellow citizens on no other condition. On the same condition I shall not fail to afford it to the government of the U. States.

them success for reasons stated in my answer. I have shewn, I think, perfect delicacy towards the minority, against whom the invitation was given to express a censure. In asserting my own independence, in the passage which relates to that point, I assert it equally in favor of every other person.

I have felt that I acted with the utmost delicacy towards the minority. As the question relating to it, was that alone, about which any solicitude was felt, it would have been more satisfactory to the parties feeling it, that I should have settled the relation which I had always borne to it only, without saying anything of that which I had borne to the adm$^{n}$. But I would not state my relation to the minority, without stating at the same time my relation to the administration. I would not permit those with whom I communicated to say that in any point I had differed from the minority, without making it their duty to say at the same time that the adm$^{n}$ and I had also differed on important points of policy. My object has been to do strict justice to both parties, as well as to myself. I have stood on distinct ground from each, and I have wished to shew in what that difference consisted.

It would be strange if we who have been at home, who have never been consulted on any important question; who knew not how any party would act till we were apprized of it by the newspapers, sho$^{d}$ be considered as belonging to either party. This would deprive us of the independence, in point of principle as well as of character, which it is highly important to preserve.

The truth is that on points of policy there has been great difference of opinion between the admⁿ. & me. My letters to you shew that fact. This applies to the rejection of the treaty, and to the measures that have resulted from it. There can be no doubt that if I had had any weight in the publick councils our course would have been a different one.[1] My views of policy have not altered, nor has anything escaped me to countenance such an idea. There is certainly nothing in my letters to you to countenance it. They, on the contrary, have presented in a more distinct light than I had done before, even to you, what my views were. I am persuaded that the admⁿ. would not be much gratified by the view of past transactions which those letters give. With respect to the future I am under no pledge other than you are. My opinion however of the course which ought to be pursued,

[1] Monroe's letter to Tazewell, dated February 6, is practically the same as this to Colonel Taylor, with the following in addition coming in at this point: "* * * * * * It is however my decided opinion that so long as it is found necessary to preserve the republican party in existence and to me it appears indispensable so long as there is any danger to republican government, it will be wise and proper in case of a difference of opinion among its members to manage in such a manner as to avoid any permanent division in the party. The nature of parties ought to be considered & respected in this as in other cases. In all parties occasional sacrifices of opinion have been found necessary and made with a view to a greater good by the most upright, independent, and honorable men. The party must in a certain degree constitute the nation to the Individual, because by means of it only can he hope to be instrumental to the national prosperity & happiness. He must not put himself without that limit for any length of time or by a systematick movement or he deprives himself of the power to render useful service. I do not mean by this to imply that all those in the opposite or federal party are unfriendly to free government. I know the contrary to be true. Indeed I always thought that there were but few in that party who merited that imputation and in the trusts which I have held from my country I have acted on that principle. Nor do I mean to imply that the republicans have in all instances, since they came into power fully acquitted

in the case of a difference of opinion in the republican party, has not altered since I wrote you, nor is it probable that it ever will, as it was not lately formed, nor on light consideration.

It happened that Mr. Randolph arrived here while this business was depending, and hearing, as I presume he did, statements of what had passed in the part which related to the minority, and, from the excitement existing at the moment, most probably, with great exaggeration, he felt, as I understood, much hurt at it. I was astonished and hurt to find that this was the case. From my knowledge of Mr. Randolph I had always believed that he would have seized with pleasure any favorable opportunity to do me justice against the charge alluded to which had been alledged against me, as it impeached my charac-

themselves to the just expectation of their country. I think otherwise. My opinion of the propriety of moderation in those who have differed in certain respects from the administration is founded on the altered state of things, and a dispassionate view of the dangers with which our country & cause are at this time menaced. I am satisfied that the safety of free government depends on the preservation of the republican party, and that to make the object secure, the energies of that party ought to be united. The period is perhaps approaching, and not far distant when those apprehensions will appear better founded, than at this moment. I fear if the system of policy which has been so long persevered in, after so many proofs of its dangerous tendency, is still adhered to, that a crisis will arrive, the dangers of which, it will require all the virtue, firmness & talents of our country to avert & that it will be persevered in seems too probable, while the present men remain in power. If any change is to be produced by their agency, it can only be hoped from the moderation of the republican minority. Repeated & violent attacks confirm the majority in error, & protect them from the publick censure by presenting to view an object which is thought to have a better claim to it. If those now in power are ever to change their policy, it will be when the minority ceases to attack them. And if the blame of improvident and injudicious measures is ever to attach to them, among the people, it must be by leaving to the authors of those measures the entire responsibility belonging to them.

ter in the most delicate points, as far especially as it related to my conduct while abroad, the period at which his difference with the admⁿ commenced. In doing me that justice, and placing me on independent & honorable ground, he would not impair his own standing with the publick. He would on the contrary essentially improve it. I am persuaded that Mr. Randolph's impression was momentary. I expect also from his justice, such a representation of my conduct, whenever it may be necessary to my character, as is strictly due to it.

I have wished to communicate to you everything that has passed here in the late occurrence, or that was any way connected with it. I wish also to receive your unreserved sentiments on the whole subject.

TO JOHN RANDOLPH.

RICHMOND, Feby. 13, 1811.

DEAR SIR,—As I have believed that the communications[1] which you made to me when here were the effect of excitement, produced by misrepresentation, I shall write to you in the same spirit as if they had not been made. In doing so I assure you that I gratify my feelings.

Having deemed it proper to state to Col: Taylor all the circumstances attending the late occurrence, I cannot better convey to you the same information, than by transmitting to you a copy of my letter to him. My motive for it is increased by the consideration

[1] Adams' "Randolph," p. 243.

that I took the liberty to mention you in that letter. You will be so good as to return it to me, at your leisure, after perusing it.

My previous letters to Col: Taylor, which were submitted to your view when here, were intended when written for his inspection, and for that of a few others, friends only, among whom you were included. Having had occasion to write to him on some of the topics treated in these letters, I was led by the interest which the subject naturally excited, and by the connection of its parts, to enter more fully into it than I had at first intended. I was the more readily induced to do so by a personal consideration which had much weight on my mind. The incidents of my late mission to Europe, tho' not involving an official answer on me, had affected sensibly my character among my fellow citizens. Under another adm$^{n}$, and under other circumstances, I sho$^{d}$ have vindicated my conduct before the publick, but I declined it in this instance for reasons which appeared to me to be conclusive. I was however anxious to prepare and possess a document which might serve to vindicate my character hereafter against the many imputations that had been raised against it, should it ever stand in need of such a vindication. This then was one of my objects in making so full a communication to an old friend. It was the effect of accident only that I read these letters to any person without the circle described. They were however read to no one whose mind was not already made up to support me; nor do I think they wo$^{d}$ have produced that disposition in

any of the bigotted friends of the admⁿ; or in others who were not independent and able to speak & act for themselves. My motive for reading them at all is fully explained in the inclosed paper.

The facts stated in these letters are, I presume, in every circumstance correct. It was far from being my intention to make them otherwise, and if it shoᵈ appear that any error had been committed, I would most willingly correct it. As to the policy of the measures to which I have objected, my mind has experienced no change in that respect. It has on the contrary been confirmed by events in the opinions which I had formed by anticipation. And as to the propriety of conciliation (by which I do not mean a sacrifice of principle or even of opinion) in the members of the republican party who differ on certain measures of policy from the admⁿ, and from the majority, I am equally confident of the solidity of the opinion expressed in these letters, whether the object be to promote success in the special questions depending, or in those of a more general nature. Emergencies may arise in which the preservation of the cause itself may depend on the united efforts of the whole party. Conciliation may contribute by its salutary effect in many ways to prevent those emergencies, as union may do, if they occur, to save the country & the cause. I have acted on this principle, on considerations which are fully explained in these letters, in every step I took thro' the whole period alluded to. I very much fear that a crisis is approaching which will enforce, by the circumstances likely to attend it,

the justice of the reasoning contained in these letters on this topic. Should it unfortunately arrive it is much to be desired that the sentiments of those in the republican party who have differed from the admⁿ in the course which has been pursued shoᵈ have the weight, with the majority, and with the publick, which they may merit.

I have thought that I owed it to the friendship which has subsisted between us, & to the opinion which I have entertained of your talents and worth, to make this communication to you. Whatever may be our future relation, which must depend on you, my best wishes for your welfare will always attend you.

An indisposition for more than a week past has in a great measure disqualified me for the ordinary duties of the station I hold. It is owing to that cause that I have not written to you sooner.

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TO L. W. TAZEWELL.

RICHMOND, Feby. 25, 1811.

DEAR SIR,—I have read with great interest and satisfaction your letter of the 13. instant, and am happy to find that the part which I acted in the late election obtains your approbation.[1] It was not pre-

[1] Tazewell had written "* * * The view which you have therein [Monroe's letter of the 6th] given of your conduct on a late occasion and of its motives is highly satisfactory: Now the thing is over and I am permitted to judge more correctly of the means by their effect, I entirely approve both of the cause and manner of your acting. But I will candidly acknowledge to you, that with my feelings and impressions I should never have decided upon such a course, from any reasoning *a priori*." Concerning Monroe's course towards

meditated, or planned by anticipation, but grew out of circumstances which were not foreseen. When it was first proposed to bring me into the Executive it was supposed by those who proposed it, some of whom were among my former opponents, that there wo^d be no opposition to me. The opposition was an experimental one. It was managed with some address, and abandoned only when it was seen that it could not succeed. The precaution which I took to enable my friends to vindicate me against certain misrepresentations in the house & elsewhere, sho^d they be made in my absence, was suggested by the nature of the attack. You are mistaken in the idea that any of those who now supported me, who were among my former opponents, were prompted by the leaders of that opposition. They acted independently, without the knowledge of those leaders, and against the wishes of such of their friends who were present in the legislature, or resided, or happened to be here at the time. The discovery of the change of these persons in my favor astonished such of their former associates in whom a similar disposition did not exist & who

the anti-administration minority in Congress, he wrote: "The course which you have pursued in relation to the minority in Congress meets my entire approbation, and would have done so even if I had been consulted before the effect of the late transaction was known. The truth is, public opinion had long listed you as one of this minority, and your supposed associates hung as a mill stone upon your neck. I have long ardently desired that some fair occasion could be presented to you of undeceiving your fellow citizens upon this subject, & thus of shaking off this heavy incumbrance. I should have gone out of my way even to have done so had I been in your situation, but luckily this fair occasion has been presented to you without your seeking it & in embracing it you have acted towards the minority with all the delicacy which their *motives* merit, and more than their acts required at your hands."

were resolved to oppose me. You have mistaken another fact, anterior in date, which is equally proper that you shod have a just idea of. My opponents in Albemarle on a former occasion were not my friends in the election which took place last Spring. It was by the sentiment of the county that I was brought into the Assembly. It is not improbable, had it been understood that my election might have been prevented, that these persons would have been active against me. They took no part in the election, and voted for me after it was evident that my election was secure. The principal character[1] was in Bedford at the time attending to his private concerns. I mention these things to satisfy you that the movement in both instances was independent: that it was neither prompted by a particular interest, nor made in concert with it, and that the ground gained has been gained, as far as an estimate may be formed, from circumstances of a strong character against that interest.

Had resolutions been brought forward to approve the measures of the admn in the rejection of the British treaty, embargo, &c., and censure the minority in those cases, I wod have opposed them, & shewn distinctly what my conduct had been in our foreign transactions, what the policy was which I had advised with every power, and how far that policy merited consideration in a comparison with that which was pursued, enlightened as we now are by events. This was understood at the time by those unfriendly to me.

[1] Jefferson, in his letter of January 25, congratulating Monroe on his election, wrote: "I am just on the wing to Bedford to which place my affairs call me suddenly."

In the informal communications which I made to some friends the same view was taken of the whole subject. They already saw wherein I had agreed or disagreed with the admn or the minority.

That nothing has been gained, or thought to be gained, against me in favor of the measures in which the admn and I differed is shewn by the silence of all the ministerial prints on the subject of the late election. None of them boast of it as an event propitious to the system of national policy which has been pursued, nor do they think that their strength as a party is increased by it. The contrary is undoubtedly the fact, and nothing can prevent [it] being universal, unless it is counteracted by the improper sensibilities and indiscretion of some of our friends in the minority.

To the latter part of your letter it is not in my power to give a full answer in this.[1] I intended to have written to you on the subject treated in it, in reply to your former letter, when I came here last year, but was prevented by your indisposition. On

[1] "In such a state of things, when the present majority shall fall under the odium of public opinion against their measures, what becomes of the Republican *cause?* Experience tells us, that the people altho' slow to act, are impetuous when once roused, and that they always burst from one extreme to another, & turn from the authors of their calamities to the avowed opponents of these authors. We may fairly calculate therefore that Federalism will again rise triumphant upon the ruin of the present Republican party & that the cause will be lost in the downfall of its quondam advocates unless something can be done to prevent this, unless some other alternative can be offered to popular selection —And the only alternative which I can find is in the creation of some intermediate sect, who possessing the same principles which the present Republican party profess to hold dear, shall oppose *before the people*, the disastrous course in which this party so obstinately persists."

my return home I received a communication from Col: Taylor involving considerations of a similar nature to which I prepared a reply, which I retained in my hands sometime for the purpose of shewing it to you. I had indulged the hope of seeing you in Albemarle after your recovery, which was strengthened by a letter from W^ms^burg from a friend who had heard that such was your intention. I shall send you by a private hand a copy of this paper, on which I shall be happy to receive the result of your examination and reflection. You will find that I have discussed the subject at some length in it, and particularly that portion which relates to parties. I do not think that there is any difference between us except on one point, & am inclined to think that on that it is not irreconcilable. You wish to see a third party distinctly formed & announced to the country. In this, to the extent to which your idea seems to lead, I do not concur, & I am persuaded that there never can be more than two efficient parties in the country. The measure of this opinion is fully explained in the paper alluded to. There may be, & there are, at this moment, men, who belonging to the republican party, differ from the majority of that party as to certain important measures of policy. Men of this description constitute in reality a party, capable, while they remain in all great constitutional topics connected with the present majority, of affording every benefit w^h^ could be expected from the establishment of another party, distinctly announced as such, without doing any injury to the cause which they, as well as the majority, profess

that they mean to support. I have supposed too that the discrimination in policy between the admn and these men was already sufficiently marked to enable the publick to determine between them & that as the destiny of free govt must finally depend, in an eminent degree at least, on the efforts of the republican party, nothing should be done by the minority which may tend, when the crisis comes on, to prevent the majority from joining the minority. In other words, that nothing shod be done which shod in that stage prevent the union and cooperation of the whole party, supported, as it probably would be when its councils took a new course, by the great body of the federalists, who I am satisfied are good republicans. As I shall expect to hear from you very soon after you have read the paper alluded to I shall say nothing more to you on this subject at present.

I have made an arrangement by which the amount which I owe you will be remitted to you by Mr. Hay by the 4th of March. For your great kindness, continued under circumstances which exposed you to much trouble, I need not repeat to you my very sincere acknowledgement.

I expect to leave this for Albemarle to-morrow, to be absent about a fortnight. You will not write me sooner than the 10th of next month, unless it be by a private conveyance, addressed to the care of Mr. Hay. With my best respects to Col: Nevison, & your family, I am, dear Sir, sincerely your friend.

TO RICHARD BRENT.[1]

RICHMOND, March 18, 1811.

DEAR SIR,—When your letter reached this place I was in Albemarle, so that I had not the pleasure to receive it until after my return on the 14th instant. Its contents gave me much concern, which has not been removed by the reflection which I have been able since to bestow on the subject. I have great sensibility to the proposition which seems to be made to me thro' you, as a mutual friend, to come into the Department of State, and many strong motives prompt me to accede to it, but the appointment which I now hold presents a most serious obstacle. I feel that I owe to this State the utmost gratitude for this recent and strong proof of its confidence, and I fear that I should be thought to fail in that delicate and important duty if I relinquished the station in which it has placed me. I shall be glad to receive your further

[1] The above was covered by the following note: "I inclose you a letter which I intend as an answer to you. You have not told me by whom you were consulted, yet I have concluded that it was by the President or Mr. Gallatin, and if by the latter, with the knowledge of the former. I am willing that you shod communicate my answer to them. You will I think see the impropriety of my leaving this office if I could not justify it to the legislature at its next meeting. I hope that the hands of the govt are free on all points, & that I shall be informed, that we may deliberate on all things connected with the publick welfare. I would readily go to Washington for the purpose of a more full explanation, tho' I presume if it is an object to bring me into the govt the President will write me such a letter, which I may read to the council & communicate to the legislature, as will justify the step. My account with the government, if a previous visit to Washington is desired, might be the ostensible motive, I shod however much prefer that the removal of the person in office shod have no connection with me."—Brent communicated Monroe's reflections to Gallatin, March 22d. Adams' *Gallatin*, i., 496. *Idem. History of the United States*, v., 366.

sentiments on this subject. Do you think it possible for me to withdraw from the Executive of this State without exposing myself to this painful imputation, and even lessening the weight which I might otherwise bring into the government?

You intimate that the situation of our country is such as to leave me no alternative. I am aware that our publick affairs are far from being in a tranquil & secure state, I may add that there is much reason to fear that a crisis is approaching of a very dangerous tendency, one which menaces the overthrow of the whole republican party. Is the administration impressed with this sentiment & prepared to act on it? Are things in such a state as to allow the adm^n^ to take the whole subject into consideration, and to provide for the safety of the country & of free government, by such measures as circumstances may require, and a comprehensive view of them suggest? Or are we pledged by what is already done to remain spectators of the interior movement, in the expectation of some change abroad as the ground on which we are to act? I have no doubt from my knowledge of the President & Mr. Gallatin, with the former of whom I have been long and intimately connected in friendship, and for both of whom, in great & leading points of character, I have the highest consideration and respect, that if I come into the government the utmost cordiality would subsist between us, and that any opinions which I might entertain and express respecting our publick affairs would receive, so far as circumstances would permit, all the attention to which they might be

entitled, but if our course is fixed, and the destiny of our country is dependant on arrangements already made, on measures already taken, I do not perceive how it would be possible for me to render any service, at this time, in the general government. My impression is that no consideration would justify my withdrawing from the Executive of this State unless it had sufficient force to make it a matter of duty, the obligation of which would not be felt by myself alone, but be distinctly understood by the publick. Having however never failed to accept a trust to which my duty called me, I should not hesitate to accept that proposed if I perceived that the obligation to do so was paramount to that which I owe to the State under my present appointment. Should there be any objection to communicate with me in this mode on these topics, and a personal interview be preferred, I would with pleasure attend at Washington for the purpose on receiving such an intimation.

I am very sincerely your friend & servant.[1]

[1] The following is the text of Senator Brent's letter to Monroe, asking if he would accept of the appointment of Secretary of State:

"MY DEAR SIR,—Your last letters have been unanswered in consequence of the badness of my health and it is with difficulty that I now hold a pen. You must therefore excuse my present brevity. I shall write you in full so soon as my health will permit. In the mean time I have to inform you that your business has not been neglected by me. I wish you immediately on the receipt of this, to write me that I [am] authorised to say that you will accept the appointment of Secretary of State. I am not expressly authorised to say that this appointment will be offered to you but I have no doubt but it will in a few days after you shall have authorised me to say that you will accept the appointment. When consulted whether, in the event of such a proposition being made, it was my opinion you would act, I have expressed a belief that the thing was not to be doubted of. I express this confidence, from a conviction of what ought to be your line of conduct on this occasion. My dear Sir, the

TO JAMES MADISON.

RICHMOND, March 23d 1811.

DEAR SIR,—Your letter of the 20th instant reached me yesterday morning. The subject which it presents to my view is highly interesting, and has received all the consideration which so short a time has enabled me to bestow on it.[1] My wish to give you an early answer, in compliance with your request, has induced me to use all the despatch which the delicacy and importance of the subject would permit.

The proof of your confidence which the proposition communicated by your letter affords is very gratifying

situation of the Country is such, as to make your services, on this occasion indispensable. I, therefore, will not permit myself to entertain one moments doubt as to the line of conduct you will, on this occasion pursue. Write to me immediately and direct to Dumfries. With great sincerity and affection, I am my dear Sir your friend & ob. servt "

[1] "*Private & confidential.*

WASHINGTON Mar. 20. 1811

DEAR SIR,—I may perhaps consult too much my own wishes public & personal, and too little a proper estimate of yours, in intimating the near approach of a vacancy in the Department of State, which will present to your comparison, as far as lies with me, that sphere for your patriotic services, with the one in which they are now rendered. Should such a transfer of them be inadmissible or ineligible, on whatever considerations, this communication will I am sure be viewed in the light, to which its motives entitle it, and may rest in confidence between us. In a contrary result, be so good as to let me have your agreeable determination as soon as possible. Permit me to add that even in this result, it will be best for reasons reserved for personal explanation, that the precise time of the communication, may be confidential.

I am the more anxious to hear from you as soon as possible, since besides the more obvious calls for it, the business of that Dept is rendered by the present conjuncture, peculiarly urgent as well as important. It would be of the greatest advantage, if it could be in the hands which are to dispose of it, in about two weeks from this date, and receive a close attention for a short period thence ensuing. It is probable that an interval of relaxation would thereby be rendered consistent with the public interest. Accept assurances of my great esteem and sincere friendship."—JAMES MADISON.

to me, and will always be remembered with great satisfaction.

I have no hesitation in saying that I have every disposition to accept your invitation to enter into the Department of State. But in deciding this question, on your part as well as on mine, some considerations occur which claim attention from us both, and which candour requires to be brought into view, and weighed at this time.

My views of policy towards the European powers are not unknown. They were adopted on great consideration, and are founded in the utmost devotion to the publick welfare. I was sincerely of opinion, after the failure of the negotiation with Spain, or rather France, that it was for the interest of our country, to make an accommodation with England, the great maritime power, even on moderate terms, rather than hazard war, or any other alternative. On that opinion I acted afterwards, while I remained in office, and I own that I have since seen no cause to doubt its soundness. Circumstances have in some respects changed, but still my general views of policy are the same.

If I come into the government my object will be to render to my country, and to you, all the service in my power, according to the light, such as it is, of my knowledge and experience, faithfully, and without reserve. It would not become me to accept a station, and to act a part in it, which my judgment and conscience did not approve, and which I did not believe would promote the publick welfare & happiness. I could not do this, nor would you wish me to do it.

If you are disposed to accept my services under these circumstances, and with this explanation, I shall be ready to render them, whenever it may suit you to require them. In that event a circumstance of importance & delicacy will require attention from you as well as from me. It relates to the office which I now hold. I feel much difficulty in withdrawing from it, nor could I do so, but on considerations which it is fair to presume would be satisfactory to my constituents. I am persuaded that my fellow citizens would have no objection to my leaving this station to go into the general government at a crisis so important to the publick welfare, and to the republican cause, from an opinion, as the security of these great interests depends in the present conjunction more on the councils and measures of the general than of the State government, that I might be able to render more service there than here. They would I am satisfied be reconciled to the act, if I received an invitation from you, suggesting a motive for it arising out of the present state of publick affairs, which I might lay before the Council when I communicated to it my acceptance of an appointment under the general government.

TO JAMES MADISON.

RICHMOND, March 29, 1811.

DEAR SIR,—I have received your letter of the 26. instant. Its contents are very satisfactory to me. The just principles on which you have invited me into the department of State have removed every difficulty

which had occurred to me to the measure, they afford also a strong ground for hope that the joint counsels & labours of those who are thus associated in the government will promote the best interests of our country. To succeed in that most desirable object my utmost exertions will be made. I add with pleasure that I shall carry into the government, a sincere desire to harmonize in the measures necessary to that end on the fair and liberal principles expressed in your letter.

I shall be prepared to set out for Washington on Tuesday next, provided I receive your letter, & the commission which is to accompany it, on or before Sunday. One day's detention here after Sunday, for the purpose of taking my leave of the Council, in case these documents are previously received, is all that I shall require. Every preparatory arrangement of a publick and private nature will be by that time compleated.

I am with great respect and esteem your friend & servant

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

RICHMOND, April 3. 1811.

DEAR SIR,—An unexpected change has taken place in my situation since I had last the pleasure to see you. An invitation from the President to enter into the department of state will take me to Washington. Having accepted the office, I set out tomorrow in the stage to commence its duties.[1] This appointment sub-

[1] Monroe arrived in Washington on Friday, April 5th, and the next day entered on the duties of his office.

jected me, in the first intimation, to great concern, from a doubt of the propriety of resigning that so lately conferr'd on me by the Gen! Assembly. But all those friends with whom I had an opportunity to confer, having concurr'd in favor of it, I have been taught to believe that that difficulty had not the weight, which I had supposed. I accept the office in part hope that some good effect will result from it, in promoting harmony at least in the republican party. The manner in which the proposition was made to me, was liberal and manly, so that every other difficulty was immediately at an end. I shall always be happy to hear from you and to receive your opinions on publick measures. I am, etc.

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TO DR. CHARLES EVERETT.

WASHINGTON April 23. 1811.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have received yours of the 15$^{th}$ & been much gratified by the interesting details which it communicates. I intimated to you from Richmond that the letter of invitation from the President into the office w$^{h}$ I now hold was address'd on such fair & liberal principles, proposing a co-operation of our labours & efforts to promote the publick welfare by such means as our experience & judgments might suggest, as to remove all possible difficulty, in the view alluded to in yours, on my part. I had to surmount only an objection of another kind, that which applied to a resignation of the office so recently conferr'd on me by the Gen! Assembly. I felt a strong

repugnance to any measure which might in the opinion of any one expose me to the imputation of ingratitude to a State to which I owe so much; but the concurring opinion of all the friends whom I had an opportunity to consult, which I am happy to find is confirm'd by yours, on reflection, that I ought not to decline the invitation, determined me to accept it. I knew that the interests of the State were more involved in the concerns of the general than of the State govt at this time, and was persuaded that in coming here I followed the views & wishes of all those who contributed to place me in the State govt The conduct of the P. since my arrival has corresponded with my previous anticipation; it is perfectly friendly, and corresponding with our antient relation, which I am happy to have restor'd. On publick affairs we confer without reserve, each party expressing his own sentiments, and viewing dispassionately the existing state, animated by a sincere desire to promote the public welfare. I have full confidence that this relation will be always preserved in future.

That my appointment should have excited some surprise in certain quarters it was reasonable to expect. The near connections of my predecessor wod naturally feel some sensibility to it, & wod be apt to indulge some portion of resentment to me, tho' the measure was decided on before I knew anything of it, and I had only to say whether I wod accept a trust which had become vacant. Time and reflection will probably produce more correct & liberal sentiments on this, and other subjects of a similar kind, than I

have witnessed in the breasts of those persons since my return to the UStates. Without having given any cause I have found them among my most persevering & unfeeling opponents in every circumstance which involved my political standing with my country, or which brought into view those pretentions which were founded on long & faithful, if not useful services. I have endeavour'd on my part to evince my independence of them only, having in truth no feeling of resentment to gratify, or any wish unfriendly to them.

Intelligence of importance is expected by the Essex from France & England. Mr. Pinkney returns in her with his family, & Mr. Foster will probably arrive about the same time. It is understood that he comes out with power to resume the negotiation. Most happy indeed will it be if our differences can be adjusted on reasonable & satisfactory ground. Certain it is that any proposition to that effect will be met here with the best disposition to restore commerce & friendship to both countries. Till the Essex arrives everything will be in a great measure at a stand.

I am much gratified to hear that Mr. Alexander will pay some attention to my affairs in my absence. I should be glad to make him some reasonable allowance for it. It wo$^{d}$ be very useful to me if he only went once a fortnight, or even once a month, to form plans for the overseers, and look somewhat to their execution. To see that the plantation utensils were of good kinds, that the culture was proper, especially the ploughing ; the creatures, such as horses, mules,

cattle, pigs, &c. were attended to, the clover taken care of. I enclose you a letter to him which you may either deliver or not as you think best. You intimated that he wo.d probably take somewhere ab.t 100. dol.rs for such a service. You will observe that if the business is taken up as an act of neighbourly kindness, a reasonable allowance, such as 20. 30. shillings a visit, not exceeding in the whole £30., or at most £40., would be sufficient; but if taken up on a different idea, that of stewardship &c., the estimate wo.d be a very different one, exceeding altogether my means. I leave it to you to arrange it as you think best, and either by conversation alone, or aided by this letter. Should you make this arrangement by conversation you will be so good as to communicate to him verbally the substance of the 2.d paragraph in mine to him.

I am very thankful to you for the interest you take in my brother's welfare. I think with you that a good prospect is open to him in his profession, and that with industry and prudence he may acquire greater independence, and a more respectable standing in society than he ever enjoyed. I fear that the difficulties of his situation, in emerging from the troubles which oppressed him below, still hang heavy on him, and produce a despondence. The sickness of the mind is more afflicting than that of the body. It is even probable that light pecuniary embarrassments, destitute as he is of all pecuniary resources, other than an unprofitable profession, surrounded as he is by his worthy children, may distress & prey on him. When Mrs. Monroe comes up, as she soon will

do, her attentions to his family may be consoling, and limited as my means are, considering the manifold calls on them, I shall write him and endeavour to dissipate unnecessary care on that head. I wish him to be free to make exertion, because I think if he does he will succeed. Augustine is with his father in Londoun, living perfectly retir'd, and as I hear from a gentleman in the neighbourhood, pursuing slowly his studies. Tell Col: Lindsay he sees that I followed the advice he gave me in the conversation we had when we were last together in Richmond. Remember me to him, to Mr. Divers, & to our friends in Charlottesville & the county. I am always, my dear Sir, very sincerely yours.

## TO JOHN ADAMS.[1]

3 June 1811.

SIR,—I have had the honor to receive yr. letter of the 25 ulto in which you are so good as to express a wish for my success in the discharge of the duties of the important & difficult office to which I have been lately appointed by the President. For the obliging communication, I beg you to accept my sincere acknowledgement.

Permit me to reciprocate this friendly sentiment & to assure you that I most earnestly hope, that you may enjoy the residue of your days, all the satisfaction and happiness of which our nature is susceptible. I have the honor to be &c.

[1] From Monroe's retained draft.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON June 6th 1811.

DEAR SIR,—Mr. Porter mentioned in your favor of the 23d ult.o was furnished with a passport, and a packet of news papers was sent to the Collector at New York to be forwarded by him, which it is presumed he will receive. It happened that there was no dispatch prepar'd at the time for our Chargé des affr.s at Paris, or it would have been committed to his care. Important communications are expected by the Essex, and untill her arrival, little can be done or said in our concerns with either France or G. Britain.

Boucher's *institutions commerciales* was thought to belong to you. The President was under an impression that he had borrowed it from you, & it was forwarded to you as the owner. If you find that it belongs to this departm.t as it must do, if it is not yours, you will be so good as to return it by the same conveyance.

The delay of the Essex subjects me to much embarrassment & concern. I hoped when I came here, to have got back to my family & my affr.s in a few weeks. After the arrival of that vessel the presumption is, that I may soon be spar'd to make such a visit. Abundant rains here have given a good face to the growing crop. I hope they have afforded us an opportunity to make a commencement in that of our tob.o. Very sincerely, etc.

TO LORD AUCKLAND ?

[NOTE.—This letter is endorsed as follows: "Written in the fall of 1811, and addressed to some person high in influence in England."]

DEAR SIR,—I was much gratified by your letter of July 15 last, by the new proof which it afforded of your regard for me personally, and of the interest which you take in the preservation of friendship between our countries, an object which I well know you will cherish with great sincerity and zeal. The opportunity which my service in England presented me of becoming acquainted with, & acquiring the esteem of Mr. Fox, yourself, and many others, is considered & felt by me as one of the very interesting incidents of my life.

I came into the office which I now hold with the best disposition to promote, as far as depended on me, an accommodation of all differences between our countries, & such has been unquestionably the wish of the President, but under the instructions of your minister here, it has been utterly impossible to succeed in that most desirable result. Mr. Foster has demanded of the U States, not that they should protest their neutral rights against France in a commerce with G. Britain and her dominions, but that they should open the continent to British manufactures, and not succeeding in that, insisted that, G. Britain maintaining her orders in council, the U States should repeal their non-importation act. A demand so entirely inconsistent with the rights of the U States, and degrading to them as an independent nation, has been viewed in no other light than that of an evidence

of a determined hostility in your government against this country, and a decision to push things to the worst. This government has not however as yet resorted to war. It has been content to prepare for it, in the hope that such a change of policy has taken place in G. Britain as may prevent it. To recede from the ground taken by the non-importation acts is impossible. To rest there, while war is carried on on the other side, is equally unworthy the character, and inconsistent with the true interests of the U States. War, dreadful as the alternative is, could not do us more injury than the present state of things, and it would certainly be more honorable to the nation, and gratifying to the publick feelings.

This result, I repeat, is approached with reluctance. If our affairs take this crisis it is easy to perceive what injury we may do to each other. That you could do as much is not denied, but the pressure from G. Britain, and even the injuries she might do us, would produce results not less injurious to her, without taking into the estimation those injuries of a positive kind which she would receive in return. War would give activity to our infant manufactories, which would soon be able to shut the door on British industry. By reviving the feelings of the revolutionary war, which too many evil acts since have not suffered to expire, a systematic, permanent hostility would take place between our countries which would be deeply felt hereafter, in many ways, by G. Britain. Your government has never estimated correctly the means which this country possesses, in case of actual

war, of annoying G. Britain. The activity, boldness, and enterprise of this free & injured people wo^d be felt in your commerce and resources in every quarter of the world. Reflect that the U States are, as it were, in your rear, and that while your face is turned towards your enemy on the Continent, & every nerve exerted, it may exceed your utmost means to repel an attack made from this quarter on your commerce in the East, the West Indies, & with South America.

You wish to shake the continental system, & to make use of the U States against their will, because against principle, & against the will of France, in accomplishing that object. Shift the ground, shew respect for our rights, repeal your orders, institute & maintain lawful blockade only, & what may not this lead to? Friendship with America; free trade with this whole Western hemisphere; security to your trade, from us, in the Eastern hemisphere; good wishes to your general commerce with the Continent, & good offices in promoting it in all lawful ways; a profit in the industry and the enterprise of the American people; in the productions of their soil, & in their general commerce with the Continent. Is there cause to hesitate which course ought to be preferred? I see none.

I most earnestly hope that the friends of both countries, who are the friends of peace and human rights, will be able to avert the dangers which impend over them at this time. Instead of the insults & injuries which are so constantly offered to the U States, & to their government, by your gov^t, & those acting

under its authority, treat us as a nation having rights, possessing power, and much sensibility to national honor, & the result could not fail to be satisfactory. A great opportunity is presented to the P. Regent, who stands as yet uncompromitted as to the measures of the British government, to render the most important services to his own country & even to the civilized world.

[NOTE.—Several lines following are so blurred as to be undecipherable.]

TO JOSEPH J. MONROE.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 6th 1811.

DEAR JOSEPH,—My publick duties have borne so heavily on me of late that I have not been able to communicate with my friends. You have perhaps heard of an opposition in the Senate, by Mr. Giles as the leader, to my nomination to this office, founded on a supposed favoritism in the settlement of my account in my late mission to Europe. On this suggestion, and on his motion, the nomination was referr'd to a committee of which he was chairman, & Mr. Crawford of Georgia, & Mr. Bibb of Kentucky, the other members. As soon as I heard of the opposition, thro' Mr. Brent, I requested that every item of the acct might be re'examined with the utmost rigor, which was done. The account, vouchers, & settlement, were obtained from the accounting office of the govt, the auditor called before the committee, & examined, & research made into the settlements with other persons employed in like missions, the result of

which was, to disarm those opposed to me, of all grounds of opposition. The vote therefore was unanimous in my favor. I am told that after thorough investigation was made by the committee Mr. Crawford & Mr. Bibb asked Mr. Giles if he was satisfied that my account afforded no ground on which to oppose my nomination, & that he replied that he was. They then requested him to draw the report to that effect, which he did. When the report was made & acted on in the Senate some member hesitated as to the propriety of the outfit to Paris, tho' in a similar mission one had been allowed to Mr. Gerry, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Ellsworth, & all others who had ever been sent there; on which Mr. Crawford stated that the report had been drawn by the chairman, on whom he called to say whether he was satisfied or not, & who rose and stated that he was. Mr. Crawford remarked that had the report been drawn by Mr. Bibb & him it would have been couched in different terms, implying as to expressions in my favor. Had I been vulnerable in this way I believed that I should have received deep wounds, but I am not afraid of my enemies in any way. I only ask that their attacks be open, & not covert.

I really have been without money since I came here, so great has been the expense of my establishment; in addition to which so many calls have been made on me by those to whom I am indebted. If I can command any money I will send you a few dollrs (to help in case you require aid to support your family) in the course of next week. I think you had

better come here as soon as you return from your courts, or indeed immediately if your courts in the upper counties form no important object with you at this time. You will lodge with us, & be at no expence except on the road. I will help you in procuring suitable cloaths after your arrival. By being here you will have an opportunity to become acquainted with all the members from the west & south, & to judge for yourself, after full communication with them, which place you ought to prefer. I will enclose you money to bear your expences on hearing that you are disposed to come on. Before you come I wish you to ride over my plantation & see how everything goes on.

The govt is resolved, if G. Britain does not revoke her orders in council, in a short time, to act offensively towards her. In fact not to remain inactive and at peace, while she wages war. I have sent to several friends copies of the correspondence, as well as to yourself & Dr. Everett. I have sent them to Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Divers, Col. Lindsey, Mr. Watson at Milton, & now send on to Colonel Yancey, whose name I think is Charles, but if not, correct it in the office. If you think it material that I should send a copy or two more inform me, & to whom. Inclosed you will receive one for the use of Mr. Shelby, & other friends in Charlottesville. Yr friend

TO DR. CHARLES EVERETT.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7, 1811.

DEAR SIR,—I have just recd a letter from you dated the 1st of Octr, wh ought to have borne date, as I pre-

sume, the 1st of this month, consulting me on the propriety of your suffering yourself to be nominated to a seat in the council. I have no hesitation to advise it, and shall write some friends at Richmond on the subject. I hope you will succeed.

I sent you lately a copy of the printed documents which you have recd before this.

You will have heard of the opposition to my nomination, the ground of it, & its fate. If this finds you at Charlottesville Joseph will read you the details, which I should give you in this letter had I time before the mail closes.

The govt you will find is not disposed to rest on its present ground, but in case suitable accommodation continues to be withheld, for any length of time, to act offensively against G. Britain.

Sincerely I am your friend.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, Jany. 6, 1812.

DEAR SIR,—A circumstance has occurr'd with which it may be useful for you to be made acquainted, merely to put you on your guard. You have doubtless seen a letter, publish'd in the Gazette which is imputed to Genl Wilkinson & said to be written from this place in 1803—to Mr Morris at N. Orleans, requesting him to use the Genl's influence with the Spn authority there to prevent the restoration of the deposit. It is understood that the authenticity of the latter is admitted, & the explanation given of the measure,

which I have recently & carefully heard, is the circumstance with which I wish you to be acquainted. It is this that the letter was written with yours & Gen! Dearborne's knowledge & approbation, & that a copy of it was at that time deposited in the War Office. Knowing of this explanation, you will be prepar'd, by reflection, for the answer which ought to be given to any application that may be made to you on the subject. You need not answer this. I wrote in haste for the mail. Very respectfully, etc.

TO JOEL BARLOW.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
February 24, 1812.[1]

SIR,—No intelligence is yet received of a change of policy in England, nor is there any certainty of such a change, even after the Prince Regent is invested with the full power of the Crown, although it be by the demise of his father. It is to be presumed therefore that our affairs will go forward in an uniform direction, to the result to which they point, and to which they are invited by accumulated injuries. Great exertions will be made to bring into activity the force provided for by law with the least possible delay. Some months, however, must elapse before it can be raised. In the interval the door is open to propositions of accommodation from Great Britain and it is

[1] The official records of Monroe's communications and instructions on matters of foreign policy begin with his Instructions to Joel Barlow of July 26, 1811 (*State Papers*, III., 517). Those records, excepting such as are printed in this edition, are fully set forth in *State Papers*, and are very voluminous.

hoped that a more just and enlightened view of her interests, and of our rights, will be taken by her Government before it is too late.

The French Government must not suppose that the attitude now taken by the United States towards Great Britain has changed their sentiments or their expectation of redress, for the various injuries received from French Decrees enumerated in your instructions. The impulse which this Nation has received proceeds from a strong sense of injury from both the Belligerants. A fair discrimination has been made in favor of France in the particular circumstances in which her conduct has merited it. But on every other ground of complaint the sensibility and opinion of this Government are the same. Nor will the pressure on France be diminished by any change which may take place in our relations with England to whatever extent it may be carried.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1812.

DEAR SIR,—The President will communicate to-day to the Congress, the discovery which has been lately made to the government, of an attempt of the British gov^t^ thro' the gov^r^ gen^l^ of Canada or at least by him, with the subsequent approbation of that gov^t^ to promote division & dissension, in the year 1809–, the period of difficulty under the embargo, by means of a secret mission to Boston, the object of which was to intrigue with the disaffected. The agent a Captain

John King, formerly an officer of the U States, of the Corps of Artillery, appointed in 1798. & having served till 1802. has made the discovery himself, & delivered up all the original documents. He had been promised reward & honor for his service in that affair,—and been disappointed, and revenge for the injury, is among the strong motives, to the measure on his part. The compromitment of the British govt is complete to the extent stated; and the compromitment of some leaders of the federal party, by designation & strong circumstances, tho' without naming them, equally clear. He insisted that the people with whom he communicated had not broken their faith with him, as the British govt had, & that therefore, he could not give them up. The documents carry with them the complete evidence of authenticity. It is not probable that they will be contested. Many will shrink from the tendency they will have, with those acquainted with the events of that period, in the Eastern states, to draw attention to them. I will send you a copy of the documents as soon as they are published, which will be forthwith.

The intimation which I gave you of the vindication said to have been set up by Genl Wilkinson of himself against a certain charge, was taken from a member of Congress, who had recd it from Dr Kent, a particular friend of the General. As it was not relied on in the trial, it is probable that it was merely the suggestion of a friend, who hasarded it, to meet a document which was making an unfavorable impression against him. I hope that you continue to enjoy good

health. It would give me great pleasure to be able to make a visit to my farm for a few days & to have an opportunity of seeing you & other friends. I am, etc.

TO DR. CHARLES EVERETT.

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1812.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure to receive yours of the 12th. It has given me great concern that the pressure of affairs has been such as to render it impossible for me to acquit myself to the just claims of my friends. I have really not been able to discharge to my own satisfaction my duties to the publick, & in consequence thereof have been forced to fail to my friends.

The reference for recommendation, to supply officers for the force to be raised, to the representatives in Congress, wh became necessary by the number to be appointed, & the haste with which the nominations were to be made, put it out of my power to be as useful to many for whom I took an interest as I might otherwise have been. As soon however as I recd a letter from Col. Yancey in favor of Capt Robertson, wh I did some weeks past, I said everything in his favor that I had been requested. I shall at your instance repeat the same to-day, tho' I do not think, in the state in which the business is, that it will be effectual. Each district has a company, to which the officers are appointed. Seven other companies are to be raised, & the officers are to be chosen thro' the whole State, and these from what the Secretary at War states, long since decided on.

In the case of Brand I give you full authority to adjust it as you think fit. I want no money. The just sentiment expressed by a respectable jury, wh altho' they united in no sum, was decided against such an act, affords me great satisfaction. The God who made us, made the black people, & they ought not to be treated with barbarity. Settle it as you think proper & I will be quite contented.

I fear that affrs must grow worse before we can hope a change. There is no prospect of a revocation of the British orders in council. Your friends here have done everything in their power to bring you into an useful and honorable station, but I can say nothing of the result.

Sincerely your friend

TO THE HONORABLE ADAM SEYBERT.[1]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
June 10, 1812.

SIR,—I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 25th. ulto., and regret that other duties of the office, particularly connected with the present State of Publick affairs, should have pressed so heavily on me as to have rendered it impossible to give it an earlier attention.

Your enquiries point to two principal objects, first the organization of the Patent establishment. . . .

On the first head, the organization of the Patent

[1] Dr. Seybert was Chairman of a Committee of Congress to whom were referred the Affairs of the Patent Office. His enquiries related to the organization of the Patent Office, the conduct of the officers employed in it, and in respect to their fees.

Office, you wish me to state whether in my opinion some essential change in it might not be made with advantage and particularly whether it ought not to be separated from the Department of State.

In meeting this enquiry I am naturally led to examine another question: Whether the Patent Office ought to be independent of any department of the Government and amenable to the President only. If this is believed to be the case, its separation from the Department of State necessarily results from it.

I have always thought that every institution, of whatsoever nature it might be, ought to be comprised within some one of the departments of Government, the Chief of which only should be responsible to the Chief Executive Magistrate of the Nation. The establishment of inferior independent departments, the heads of which are not, and ought not to be members of the Administration, appears to me to be liable to many serious objections, which will doubtless occur to you. I will mention the following only. First, that the concerns of such inferior departments cannot be investigated and discussed with the same advantage in the meetings and deliberations of the administration as they might be if the person charged with them was present. The second is, that to remedy this inconvenience the President would necessarily become the head of that department himself, and thus be drawn into much investigation in detail that would take his attention from more general and important concerns, to the prejudice of the public interest.

Supposing the general organization of the departments of Government to remain as they are. I am not aware, that the Patent Office could with more propriety be attached to either of the other departments than to the Department of State. I must however observe that I am conscious that I have not been able since I have had the honor of being employed in this Department to pay to the Patent Office all the attention which it is at all times my desire to bestow on every portion of the public duties confided to me. The foreign concerns of our Country constitute in themselves a sufficient trust for the person at the head of this department. They are very extensive, complicated and important and are becoming more so daily. The growth and rising importance of the United States necessarily produce that effect. . . .

If the Patent Office remains attached to this Department or is placed under either of the other departments, I think that the person employed at its head, ought to have the power of franking letters. It would save to the Secretary of the Department much time in receiving and forwarding letters to that office and franking letters from it. The business of the Patent Office would also be much facilitated thereby.

These remarks you will readily perceive are written in too much haste to give the aid on the subject that I should be happy to afford.

TO COL. JOHN TAYLOR.

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1812.

DEAR SIR,—I have been afraid to write you for some time past because I knew that you expected better things from me than I have been able to perform. You thought that I might contribute to promote a compromise with Great Britain, and thereby prevent a war between that country and the United States: that we might also get rid of our restrictive system. I own to you that I had some hope, tho' less than some of my friends entertained, that I might aid in promoting that desirable result. This hope has been disappointed. It is most certain however that I did everything in my power to promote it, consistent with the rights and interests of this country. My communications were conciliatory; on the ground of blockade nearly of accord; and no other interest was pressed to increase the difficulty of adjusting that respecting the orders in Council. Everything too was said, in an informal way, which could be said, with propriety, to bring about an accommodation. Nothing would satisfy the present Ministry of England short of unconditional submission, which it was impossible to make. This fact being completely ascertained the only remaining alternative was to get ready for fighting, and to begin as soon as we were ready.[1] This was the plan of the administration when Congress met in December last; the President's message announced it; and every step taken by the administra-

[1] War was declared by Act of Congress June 18th, and the same proclaimed by the President June 19th.

tion since has led to it. The delay, it was hoped, would give to Great Britain an opportunity to reflect further on the subject, and to change her policy. But the misfortune is that we have been so long dealing in the small way of embargoes, non-intercourse, and non-importation, with menaces of war, &c., that the British government has not believed us. Thus the argument of war, with its consequences, has not had its due weight with that government. We must actually get to war before the intention to make it will be credited either here or abroad. The habitual opponents of the government, and some who have lately become so by particular causes, more violent than the old federalists, expected when the Congress met, that the administration would recommend the bolstering up the non-importation act as the sure means of bringing the British government to reason: that it would propose some new and more efficient plan for preventing smuggling, and catching smugglers. They came here, as there is good cause to believe, prepared to treat with vast asperity and contempt such an inefficient expedient. When they found that they had misconceived the views of the adminstration they were rather at a loss how to proceed. To oppose war would be inconsistent with their past conduct, I mean the malcontents; to join in with the views of the administration very inconsistent with their present plan. It required time to digest a system of conduct suited to present emergencies. The committees of foreign relations in the two Houses, and of war, apparently united, and sincerely so, as most of the members were, in resisting the foreign aggressions, consulted

the administration as to the force that would be necessary for the purpose. The object of the administration was not to starve the cause. In case of war it might be necessary to invade Canada, not as an object of the war but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. The estimate of the force had relation to that measure. In raising a force equal to it, it was sought not to go beyond it for two reasons, that the standing army should not be greater than was absolutely necessary, and secondly that no taxes ought to be imposed which could be avoided. The administration thought that 20,000 men (regulars) with volunteers and militia would be adequate to every object. The old establishment was 10,000, which it was proposed to complete, to be enlisted for five years; the other 10,000 to be enlisted for a shorter term. As soon as this estimate was known the persons alluded to separated themselves immediately from the government, taking what was called strong ground, and introducing a bill for 25,000 additional troops, making in the whole 35,000, all for five years. By this they attempted to gain credit, as being great advocates for war, and to throw discredit on the administration by implying on account of the moderation of its views that it was not in earnest, and really did not contemplate war. By enlisting the whole for *five years*, a difficult thing in this country, the means of making war were put at a distance; and by the volunteer plan (which was not intended to be by the administration the revival of M$^{r}$ Adams measure, but a regular body, under a popular name, for short enlistment) by keeping the appointment of the officers out of the hands

of the President, that force was rendered nugatory. And as it seemed to be substituted to the militia, on the idea that the latter could not be marched without the limit of the United States, the arms of the government were in fact tied up till the regular force for five years should be raised, or as many of it as would be necessary for efficient measures. The system of revenue by internal taxation, of course, as that on trade was impaired by the restrictive regulations, was to be adopted to this great establishment of 25,000 men. The latter seemed to be a necessary incident to the former, indeed grew out of it; and satisfied I am that the report of these taxes from the Treasury was forced on that Department to shew how the war was to be maintained, which it had proposed (on a very different scale however) rather as the means of defeating the measures of the government, and breaking it down, than to give effect to that war.

The government has gone on and made its preparations, in which it has succeeded better than was expected; and finally, after proposing an embargo, which was prolonged to connect it in character with the former one, has brought distinctly the subject of war before the legislature as the only possible means of giving effect to the just claims of the country on foreign powers. This proposition passed rapidly through the House of Representatives, but has hung in the Senate.

Mark the conduct of certain individuals in the latter body where every pestilent scheme has been contrived and managed since the commencement of the

session. It is here, and not so much by the federalists as by men heretofore the strong advocates of war, who promoted embargoes &c., that the plan of 25,000 men was set on foot. These men have unceasingly circulated the report that the Executive did not intend to make war, and thereby deceived the people, and deceived the British government, depriving our country of the effect which that argument might have had in the British Cabinet. These men being now brought to the issue, by the proposition for war, are those who create all the embarrassments in the way of it. They ask a statement of the military force, expecting that their dilatory measures would have had less success than has actually attended them, how many troops (regular) are in all our towns, and along our coast, our frontiers, &c., as a motive for delay. The government has met these calls by fair statements, and is willing to take great responsibility on itself in every thing that it recommends. I have no doubt that the measure will finally pass, and perhaps by the votes of those very men, who, finding that their inconsistency and improper views are seen thro', and perhaps that they cannot defeat it, will join in to mask their real conduct & views from the public eye.

In the commencement of this European war the United States had the alternative either to leave our commerce to itself, or to yield it all the protection in their power. I am convinced if the former plan had been adopted that the republican party would have been overset long since, if the Union itself had not

been dissolved. The Eastern people would have complained that their rights and interests were sacrificed by those in power, who were planters & negro holders, who cared for the sale of their wheat, corn, and tob$^{o}$ only. The other plan was preferred, of yielding to it what protection we could. In pursuing this plan I have always thought that a fair and reasonable arrangement with the great maritime power was the true interest of this country. On this principle I signed the treaty with England, which was rejected, & its rejection has been followed with the restrictive system of embargo, non-intercourse, &c., which failed in their object. In coming here I found my country in the same controversy with the same powers, & at issue particularly with G. Britain, & the question after the failure of the negotiation with Mr. Foster, if it may be so called, whether we shall submit, or maintain our rights against that power; on that point I could have no doubt. My letter from Richmond did not propose a surrender of those rights. It explained the treaty which had been rejected according to our understanding of it. It did not even say that it ought to have been adopted. It expressed a confidence in the patriotism and wisdom of the adm$^{n}$, & a wish to aid it in asserting our rights under the restrictive system, aided, no doubt, by other causes, particularly a desire in those out of power to get into power, a desire in many to change our system of gov$^{t}$, in others to separate the Union. A strange revolution has been produced, considering the interests of the different parts of the U States as to the supporters

& opponents of present measures. It is strange to see Southern people supporting neutral & maritime rights, who have comparatively so small an interest in their support, against Eastern people, whose prosperity depends on the support of those rights. The truth is the restrictive system contributed much to produce this effect. The government had it in its power to make a compromise in this point with its opponents by retiring from the contest with G. Britain, repeating the non-importation act, & leaving our commerce to be regulated by her govt. The opponents of the govt, federalists & others, invited this course, & had it been taken their opposition must have ceased. But where would it have left the U States? & what effect would it have had on the character & destiny of our republican system of govt? My idea was that such a step would have put it in great danger, if it had not subverted it eventually. The govt thought it important to the best interests of our country to go forward, & push the controversy with decision, since it could not be avoided.

My candid opinion is that we shall succeed in obtaining what it is important to obtain, and that we shall experience little annoyance or embarrassment in the effort. I have great hope that decision here will at an early day rid the British nation of its present ministry, and that an accommodation will soon follow the change. Should the war however be prolonged I do not apprehend either invasion, the desolation of our coast, the battering our towns, or even any greater injury to our commerce than has existed since 1807,

the period of the first embargo. I am persuaded, on the contrary, that it would be more flourishing in war than it has been since 1807, taking the whole term of five years together. Spain & Portugal must have provisions; Britain herself wants, & must have them, as do her Islands. If war does not procure immediate accommodation her govt will afford vast facilities to our trade. It will find its way to hungry mouths.

Nor do I apprehend any dismemberment of the Union, or opposition to the govt. These are idle fears. They serve to excite alarm, to aid the cause of opposition, but if we open our ports & *trade* & *fight*, & *fight* & *trade*, & let all the embarrassments proceed from the enemy, & none from our own govt, I think we shall soon have much internal quiet.

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TO JONATHAN RUSSELL.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
June 26, 1812.[1]

SIR,— . . . It will, it is presumed, occur that a prosecution of the War for one Year, or even a few months, if not for a shorter term, will present very serious obstacles on the part of the United States to an accommodation, which do not now exist. I will advert to one only. Should our troops enter Canada you will perceive the effect which that measure cannot fail to have, by the compromitment it might make of the United States to the inhabitants of the British Provinces, and the effect which success (which could

[1] Cf. *State Papers*, III., 585.

not fail to attend it) might have on the public mind here, making it difficult to relinquish Territory which had been conquered.

It is proper to observe to you that the United States are under no engagement of any kind to the French Government. With that Government our affairs are as yet in many important circumstances unsettled. It is not wished to connect ourselves with France, nor shall we if to be avoided. Nothing but the prosecution of the war against us by England, attended with much calamity, would produce that effect. This therefore in every view that can be taken of the subject is the most favorable moment for an accommodation with England.

## REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRST MERIDIAN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
July 1, 1812.

The Secretary of State to whom was referred during the last session of Congress the Memorial of William Lambert with sundry papers and astronomical calculations relating to the establishment of a first meridian for the United States of America, at the permanent seat of their Government which accompanied the same, has examined the said memorial and papers and thereupon respectfully reports.

That it is with diffidence he undertakes to give an opinion on any part of the subject submitted to him, and that he does it only from a sense of duty, in conformity with the reference of the House of Representatives.

That the principal object of the submission of these papers to the Department of State, seems to have been, to obtain from it a report as to the policy, in a national point of view, of establishing a first meridian in the United States at the seat of their Government, and not as to the accuracy of the observations and calcula-

tions already made respecting such a meridian. To do justice to the latter, or scientific part of the subject would require a profound knowledge of astronomy and mathematics in the higher branches, to which the Secretary does not pretend. The House will be aware that a knowledge so comprehensive cannot be acquired without much labour in a long course of study, uninterrupted by other duties. These advantages the Secretary has not enjoyed. Had, however, his past studies qualified him for this part of the subject, his duties since he came into this Department have rendered it impossible for him to bestow that attention on it, which, under any circumstances, would have been necessary.

In examining the papers submitted, it appears that the subject has already engaged the attention of a Select Committee of Congress to whom they were originally referred, and who have in a learned report bearing date the 28th. of March 1810 unequivocally expressed their opinion in favor of the proposed measure in the following terms "That situated as we are in this western hemisphere more than three thousand miles distant from any fixed or known meridian, it would be proper in a national point of view to establish a first meridian for ourselves; and that measures should be taken for the eventual establishment of such a meridian in the United States" and also "that no place is more proper than the seat of government."

The Secretary of State has no hesitation to declare his accord with the Committee, in their opinion, in favor of the establishment of a first meridian for the United States, and that it should be at the City of Washington, the seat of their Government.

The advantage of a first meridian is known even to those who know least of the science on which it depends. To doubt it would be to doubt the advantage of Longitude which regulates every movement on the ocean, and the divisions and subdivisions; in short the correct admeasurement of every part of our globe. All nations have agreed in the propriety of establishing a first meridian. Every Mariner at Sea, from the time he leaves port, begins to calculate his distance by reference to some fixed meridian, and every astronomical observer on land, in making his calculations obeys the same rule.

Scientific men agree that it would be of advantage to science,

if all nations would adopt the same first meridian and before the discovery of the new-world, this was the case. It appears that the antient Geographers had adapted for their first meridian a line passing through the most distant of the Fortunate or Canary Islands, because it was the most western land then known. It appears also, that the changes which the antients made in their first meridian, of which there were several, were made in consequence of the discovery of the neighboring Islands, which were still more to the westward, and on the principle of passing it through the most western point with which they were acquainted. But after the discovery of America which banished the idea of the most western limit, that of a general meridian gradually lost ground; and latterly it has been completely abandoned. The great maritime and commercial nations of Europe have respectively established first meridians of their own: England, hers at Greenwich; France, hers at the observatory Paris; and several other nations at some fixed point within their respective limits since the period alluded to, the establishment of a first meridian,—for themselves, has become by the usage of nations, an appendage, if not an attribute of sovereignty.

The United States have considered the regulation of their coin, and of their weights and measures, attributes of sovereignty. The first has been regulated by law, and the second has occasionally engaged their attention. The establishment of a first meridian appears, in a like view, to be not less deserving of it, at least until by common consent, some particular meridian should be made a standard.

In admitting the propriety of establishing a first meridian within the United States, it follows that it ought to be done with the *greatest* mathematical precision. It is known that the best mode yet discovered for establishing the meridian of a place, is, by observations made on the heavenly bodies; and that to produce the greatest accuracy in the result, such observations should be often repeated at suitable opportunities, through a series of years by means of the best instruments. For this purpose an observatory would be of essential utility. It is only in such an institution, to be founded by the public, that all the necessary implements are likely to be collected together; that systematic

observations can be made for any great length of time and that the public can be made secure of the result of the labours of scientific men. In favor of such an institution, it is sufficient to remark, that every nation which has established a first meridian within its own limits, has established also an observatory. We know that there is one at Greenwich, at Paris, Cadiz and elsewhere.

With respect to the accuracy of the observations and calculations referred to this Department the Secretary of State is too conscious of the incompetency of his knowledge to venture to give an opinion. He is satisfied from that cause that the most favorable one would be of no advantage to the memorialist. The Committee have borne testimony in favor of his industry and talents. The Secretary of State takes the liberty to remark only that Mr. Lambert is bestowing great attention on the subject, as he evidently has done, and in submitting it to the consideration of Congress has given a proof of his patriotism.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

ALBEMARLE, Aug$^{t}$. 9, 1812.

DEAR SIR,—It was our intention to have passed a day with you & your family, while I was in the country, but many interesting concerns and duties which require my constant attention will unavoidably prevent it. The arrangements which I have to make with my brother's family who arrived yesterday, will also take some portion of the short term allotted to my private affairs while here. As soon as our grand child recovers her health Mr$^{s}$ Monroe will have the pleasure to wait on Mrs. Randolph; and on my return here, we shall I hope have leisure to be more together. Should you have any commands for Washington at this time or hereafter, or for Europe, in which I may serve you, I beg you always to afford me that sincere satisfaction.

TO HENRY CLAY.[1]

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1812.

MY DEAR SIR,—Yours of the 29th ultimo and 12th instant have been received. The former should have been answered sooner, had I not been absent in Virginia, where I had gone to take my family for the advantage of the mountain air.

We have just heard with equal astonishment and concern, that General Hull has surrendered, by capitulation, the army under his command at Detroit, to the British force opposed to him. The circumstances attending this most mortifying and humiliating event are not known; but so far as we are informed on the subject, there appears to be no justification of it. I cannot suspect his integrity; I rather suppose that a panic had seized the whole force, and that he and they became victims of his want of energy, promptitude of decision, and those resources, the characteristics of great minds in difficult emergencies. We understand that, after passing the river, he suffered his communication to be cut off with the States of Ohio and Kentucky, and without making any active movement in front to strike terror into the enemy, he remained tranquil, thereby evincing a want of confidence in his own means, and giving time to collect his forces together. No intelligence justifies the belief that he gave battle in a single instance. It appears that he surrendered on a summons from Fort Sandwich, on the opposite side of the river, after firing of some cannon or mortars, which did no great mischief.

[1] From the *Correspondence of Henry Clay.*

Before this disastrous event was known, the force now, I presume, on its march, was ordered from Kentucky, and the appointment of brigadier had been conferred on Governor Harrison. Your letters had produced all the effect on those subjects, which their solidity justly merited.

I most sincerely wish that the President could dispose of me at this juncture, in the military line. If circumstances would permit, and it should be thought that I could render any service, I would, in a very few days, join our forces assembling beyond the Ohio, and endeavor to recover the ground which we have lost. He left this to-day for Virginia, as did Mr. Gallatin for New York, but expresses being sent for them, they will probably both return to-morrow.

TO GENERAL DEARBORN.[1]

WASHINGTON, Aug$^{t}$ 28, 1812.

DEAR SIR.—We have just rec$^{d}$ an account of the surrender of Gen$^{l}$ Hull, with the forces under his command, to the British general in that quarter. I cannot express to you the astonishment, and mortification which this most extraordinary event has produc'd here, and indeed everywhere; the severest imputations are levelled against him, but for my part, I do not entertain a doubt of his integrity. I think that he wanted a mind equal to the difficulties of his situation and that he sunk under them. He does not appear, from what has reached us, to have made a single effort, of that high character that was expected

[1] From a copy courteously contributed by Mrs. Fogg.

from him, to save himself & his army. He suffer'd the communication between him & the state of Ohio, to be cut off, and without making any effort in front, retired to Detroit, where it is said he surrender'd, on a summons from fort Sandwich. No official dispatch is rec$^{d}$ from him, but a copy of his capitulation is rec$^{d}$ from the state of Ohio, from Judge Pease and others. The intelligence seems to be too well authenticated to admit any reasonable doubt of its truth. The whole western frontier of the U States is in commotion. I wish most sincerely that the President could find employment for me, in so interesting a crisis, in the military line. I do not know that I could render any service, but I well know that neither in the disposition or zeal, should I be deficient.

It was owing to my absence from this place, on a visit to my plantation in Virg$^{a}$ that an earlier answer was not given to your favor of the 30 ult$^{o}$ I write you in haste to give you most distressing intelligence. The President left town this morning for Virg$^{a}$ as did Mr. Gallatin for New York, but expresses are sent to acquaint both of them of this disaster, so that it is probable that both will return.

I am, dear Sir, with great regard, Sincerely yours.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, Aug$^{t}$ 31$^{st}$ 1812.

DEAR SIR,—We have heard with great astonishment and concern that Gen$^{l}$ Hull has surrendered the Army under his command to the British force

opposed to him in upper Canada. No letter has been yet rec$^{d}$ from him, but communications from the gov$^{r}$ of Ohio, & others in that State leaves no doubt of the fact. Till his report is made, it is impossible to form a just opinion of his conduct; but from every thing that is known, it appears to have been beyond example, weak, indecisive, and pusilanimous. When he passed the river he had 3 or 4 times the force of the enemy; yet he remained inactive, by reasons which if good at all, were equally good against passing the river, by which, he gave the enemy time, to collect its force, recover its spirits, and assume the offensive; in which time too, the hesitating mind of the Indians and Canadians became fixed, that of the former to cling to their antient ally, and of the latter to risk nothing on an event so precarious. After pausing a long time without doing any thing, he retired to Detroit, where he surrendered on a summons from the other side of the river, after a short cannonade. It is possible that in this shape it might have been impossible to maintain his ground at Detroit, but why he did not retreat I cannot imagine; nor can it be conceived why, he suffer'd his communication to have been previously cut off, with the forces of Ohio & Kentucky. For if he was not in a situation to attack Malden, he surely had the means of securing the country opposite to it.

This most disgraceful event may produce good. It will rouse the nation. We must efface the stain before we make peace, & that may give us Canada. Very sincerely.

TO HENRY CLAY.[1]

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1812.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure to receive several letters from you in relation to our affairs to the westward, and I hope that one which I wrote you on the receipt of the first, has long since reached its destination. Every effort has been made by the government to remedy the shameful and disastrous loss of the army and fort at Detroit, and I hope the best effect will result from them. In aid of the force which has so generously volunteered its service from Kentucky and Ohio, fifteen hundred are ordered from Pennsylvania, and a like number from Virginia, so that I think you will have on the borders of Lake Erie, early in the next month, eight thousand or ten thousand men, well equipped, prepared to march on to recover the ground lost, and resume the conquest of Upper Canada. I have the utmost confidence in the success of the expedition which is set on foot, because the spirit of the people appears to be roused to that state which is best adapted to manly and heroic achievements. I am willing to trust to their sense of honor and to their patriotism, to efface the stigma which has been fixed on our national character. I hope they will exhibit a noble contrast to that degenerate spirit which has of late and continues to exhibit itself to the eastward, in the dominant party there. The command of this force is committed to Governor Harrison, who, it is believed, will justify the favorable expectation entertained of him by those who are best

[1] From the *Correspondence of Henry Clay.*

acquainted with his merit. You and our other friends in Kentucky will find that the utmost attention has been paid to your opinions and wishes on all these subjects.

A large park of heavy artillery is sent on to Pittsburg, to be forwarded thence toward Cleveland, for the use of the army, whose duty it will be to retake Detroit, and expel the British from Malden and Upper Canada. In short, every arrangement is made to give effect to our operations in that quarter that has appeared to be necessary.

On the intelligence of the surrender of Detroit, the President expressed a desire to avail himself of my services in that quarter, and had partly decided so to do. He proposed that I should go in the character of a volunteer, with the rank of major general, to take command of the forces. I expressed my willingness to obey the summons, although it was sudden and unexpected, as indeed the event which suggested the idea was. On mature reflection, however, he concluded that it would not be proper for me to leave my present station at the present juncture. I had no opinion on the subject, but was prepared to act in any situation in which it might be thought I might be most useful.

From the northern army we have nothing which inspires a confident hope of any brilliant success. The disaffection in that quarter has paralyzed every effort of the government, and rendered inoperative every law of Congress; I speak comparatively with what might have been expected. On the public

mind, however, a salutary effect is produced even there, by the events which have occurred. Misfortune and success have alike diminished the influence of foreign attachments and party animosities, and contributed to draw the people closer together. The surrender of our army excited a general grief, and the naval victory a general joy. Inveterate Toryism itself was compelled, in both instances, to disguise its character and hide its feelings, by appearing to sympathize with those of the Nation. If Great Britain does not come forward soon and propose honorable conditions, I am convinced that the war will become a national one, and will terminate in the expulsion of her force and power from the continent.

Should you see my old and venerable friend, General Scott, I beg you to present my best regards to him.

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TO GENERAL DEARBORN.[1]

WASHINGTON, Sep^r. 17, 1812.

DEAR SIR,—The surrender of the post and army at Detroit, has put us in a certain degree on the defensive in that quarter, and indeed in every other. But every possible effort has been made to repair the injury. The public spirit too has favor'd the object, for the greatest zeal & enthusiasm prevailed throughout the whole of the western country. It is expected that from Kentuckey, Ohio, Penn^a & Virg^a there will be on the borders of lake Erie, early next month, about 10,000 troops, militia & volunteers, with a few

[1] From the copy contributed by Mrs. Fogg.

hundred regulars, moving towards Detroit, to recover the ground lost, & pursue the conquest of Upper Canada. A park of heavy artillery is already on its way from this place to Fort Pitt, to be carried thence to Chastaud, for Detroit; every supply is order'd and provided for, so that I hope our operations will soon take an active & imposing character there, and be felt at Niagara & below it. Gov^r Harrison is appointed to command these troops & will, I trust, do well, as he appears to be popular with the western people, especially those of Kentuckey.

On the first intelligence of the surrender of Detroit, the President expressed a desire of giving my services a direction to that quarter, & had in part so decided. He proposed that I sho^d act as a volunteer & with the com^n of Major Gen^l take the command of the expedition. I assur'd him that I was ready to obey his call, tho' it was sudden, as the event was which suggested the idea. On mature reflection he concluded that it would be improper at the present juncture for me to leave my present station. I had no opinion on the subject, and I may add, no wish, being willing to serve in any station where it might be thought I might be most useful.

I feel great anxiety for the fate of our aff^rs in your quarter. The disaffection which has prevailed in the Eastern States has paralized every mov'ment, & it has checked the recruiting business, prevented volunteers from tendering their service, & injured the loan. Still I have hoped that, with the aid of what you drew from the middle states, you would get together

a strong force, so as to make an impression on lower Canada. The great object seems to me to be a pressure on all the posts at the same time, as it will keep their force divided. If Niagara is under no apprehension of attack, & you approach St. John's & Montreal, the force will be drawn from that quarter to meet you. The same remark is applicable to the other posts. The force will be drawn from the posts not pressed or menac'd to those which are, and having command of the water, its mov'ment will be rapid. Whereas the force which we might bear on Niagara or Kingston, being militia, could not well be carried elsewhere, and if moved, would move slowly. These are reasons for pressing all the points at once and with the greatest force that could be collected.

In general I would make no attack which had not great probability of success, for we had better remain inactive than be repulsed. If, however, our force was strong, so as that we might lose men & have them replac'd soon; a thing which the enemy could not do; for the loss of every man of the regular corps would be in that degree an annihilation of their power, there would [be] less reason for so much caution. I would call into service from Vermont, & wherever I could get them, an overwhelming force, for in our main attack we must if possible succeed, & that we cannot expect to do, unless the force is greatly superior to theirs. I mean there will be no certainty of it. I think that in moving towards Lake Champlain, or taking post within striking distance of the enemy, I wo^d^ do it with a force sufficient to main-

tain the ground; otherwise you will invite attack before you are prepared to receive it.

Before you receive this you will have seen Col. Cass's statement of the causes which produced the surrender of the army under Gen! Hull, or rather the circumstances attending it. I cannot see on what grounds he can attempt to palliate, much less justify his conduct.

You have seen Mr. Gallatin & conferred fully with him on the state of our affairs, with you, as well as elsewhere. I hope your interview will prove useful to the public. It would give me great pleasure to be able to visit you, but it is not now in my power. Your interview with Mr. Gallatin will make it of less importance. I set out for Virg.ª to morrow to bring Mrs. Monroe back here, which I expect to do in ten or 12 days. I am dear Sir with great respect & esteem sincerely yours.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, Nov.r 11th 1812.

DEAR SIR,—M.r Russell has arrived at New York & is expected here in a day or two. He made the second proposition to the British gov.t authorized by his instructions, which you have seen published, which was also rejected, & in terms rather acrimonious, imparting to it a character which it did not merit. This gov.t has been sincerely desirous of an accommodation but it appears that the British gov.t will not even treat on the subject of impressment, as a condition of, or connected with measures leading to, peace. Put down our arms, and they will receive our communi-

cations on that subject, & pay to them the same favorable attention that they have heretofore done.

The Massach: elections are terminating unfavorably, as will probably those of N. Hampshire.

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TO WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD.

December 3. 1812.

DEAR SIR,—I wish to confer with you and Mr [mutilated] early in the morning, before 10., if in your power, on an interesting subject, and to avoid attention should prefer meeting you rather here than at the office, or at your lodgings. Mr Eustis (I mention it in confidence) sent his resignation to the President to-day, & it is not improbable that the place will be offered to me. I wish to converse with you both on all the circumstances connected with this event, not as it may relate to me, but the public also. This is the time when the arrangements that are to insure success to the republican party & to free government for our country, are to be made, or which will lay the foundation of their overthrow.

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EXPLANATORY OBSERVATIONS.[1]

To make this war effectual as to its first objects so much of the physical force of the Country must be brought into activity as

[1] These observations on the means to effect a prompt and successful movement against the enemy were sent under cover of the following letter to Honorable George W. Campbell Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, Dec. 23d 1812.

SIR,—I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 21st instant requesting such information as this Department may possess respecting the defects in

will be adequate. The force exists in an abundant degree, and it is only necessary to call it forth, and make a proper use of it. This force must be employed alike in defensive and offensive operations. The exposed parts of our own country claim a primary attention, after providing for their defence, all the remaining force may be employed in offensive operations. I will begin with that part which requires protection.

DEFENSE OF THE COAST.

The whole coast from our northern limits to St. Mary's should be divided into military districts.

Boston, including New Hampshire and Massachusetts, to constitute one.

New Port, including Rhode Island and Connecticut, another.—New York, including the State of New York and Jersey, a third.—Philadelphia, including Pennsylvania and Delaware, a fourth.—Norfolk, including Maryland and Virginia, a fifth.—Charleston, including North & South Carolina and Georgia, a sixth.

At Boston, and at each of the other posts, let a Company of Artillery, or more than one according to circumstances, of the Regular Army, and a small portion of its Infantry, be stationed. Let them be placed under the command of a Brigadier in the following manner, and let him have attached to him an Engineer. This force will constitute the nucleus of a little army, to be formed, in case of an invasion, of the Militia, Volunteers, or such other local force as may be specially organized for the purpose. This ap-

the organization of the general staff of the Army, and in the laws relating to Volunteers—& requesting also the opinion of this Dep$^{t}$ as to the propriety of augmenting the present military force, and in case of augmentation, of what description of troops it ought to consist.

The Committee of each house of Congress having called on the Department of War for information on the same points, I shall have the honor to make to each Committee the same report. The inclosed remarks go to several of the enquirers suggested in your letter, & contain the views of the Department on the several subjects to which they relate. The pressure of business has forced me to give them a shape rather informal. A copy of them I have sent to-day to the Committee of the House of Representatives, & hasten to forward a like copy to you.

portionment is intended to give an idea. It would be carried into detail by the Executive.

| | |
|---|---|
| At Boston, including a suitable proportion of Artillery, and at Eastport, and other posts eastwards . . | 600 |
| At Newport, with a Company of Artillery . . . | 350 |
| At New York, with a suitable proportion of Artillery . | 1,000 |
| At Philadelphia, with a Company of Artillery . . . | 200 |
| Norfolk, with a Company of Artillery at Annapolis . . | 300 |
| North Carolina, one Company of Artillery . . . | 100 |
| Charleston, with a Company of Artillery . . . | 300 |

By placing a general officer of the Regular Army of some experience in command at each of these stations, charged with the protection of the country to his right and left, to a certain extent suitable provision will be made for the whole. The country will have confidence, and by degrees a system of defence, suited to any emergency, may be prepared for the whole coast. This may be done by the local force with economy, and, what is also of great importance, without drawing at any time for greater aid on the regular force of the nation, which may be employed in offensive operations elsewhere. There should be some flying Artillery at each station, ready mounted, and prepared to move in any direction which may be necessary. An Engineer will be useful to plan and execute any works which may appear proper for the defense of the principal station, or any other within each military district.

It may be said that it is not probable that the enemy will attempt an invasion of any part of the coast described with a view to retain it, and less so for the purpose of desolation. It is nevertheless possible, and being so provision ought to be made against the danger. An unprotected coast may invite attacks which would not otherwise be thought of. It is believed that the arrangement proposed will be adequate, and that none can be devised to be so which would prove more economical.

For Savannah and East Florida special provision must be made, whether East Florida is left in possession of Spain, or taken immediate possession of by the United States. In either case it menaces the United States with danger to their vital interests.

While it is held by Spain it will be used as a British province for annoying us in every mode which may be made instrumental to that end. The ascendancy which the British government has over the Spanish Regency secures to Great Britain that advantage while the war lasts. We find that at present the Creek Indians are excited against us, and an asylum afforded to the Southern slaves who seek it there. To guard the United States against the attempts of the British government in that vulnerable quarter, the province remaining in the hands of the Spanish authorities, a force of about two thousand regular troops will be requisite. It will require no more to hold it should possession be taken by the United States.

For New Orleans and Natchitoches, including the Mobile and West Florida, about two thousand five hundred men will be necessary. A local force may be organized in that quarter in aid of it, which it is believed will be adequate to any emergency.

The next object is Detroit and Malden, including the protection of the whole of our Western frontier. For these it is believed that two thousand regular troops, with such aids as may be drawn from the States of Kentucky and Ohio will be amply sufficient.

The following then is the regular force requisite for the defence of those places.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boston . . . . . | 600 | Charleston . . . . . | 300 |
| New Port, R. I. . . . | 350 | Savannah & E. Florida . | 2000 |
| New York . . . . . | 1000 | New Orleans . . . . | |
| Philadelphia . . . . | 200 | Mobile &c . . . . . | 2500 |
| Norfolk . . . . . | 300 | Detroit, Malden &c . . | 2000 |
| North Carolina . . . | 100 | | |
| | | | 9350 |

This leaves a force of about twenty-six thousand regular troops, consisting of Infantry, Artillery, & Cavalry, provided the whole force contemplated by law is raised and kept in the field, to be employed in offensive operations against Niagara, Kingston, Montreal and all lower Canada, and likewise against Halifax. This whole force, however, even if raised, cannot be counted on as effective. The difference between the force on the muster rolls and the effective force in the field through a campaign, is generally estimated at a deficiency in the latter of one fourth, with troops

who have already seen service. With young troops it may be placed at one third. Take from the nominal force ten thousand, and it would leave about sixteen thousand for these latter purposes.

Will this force be sufficient? This will depend, of course, on the number of the British force which may be opposed to us. It is believed that the British force at Niagara, & its neighborhood, at Kingston, Montreal, Quebec, and in all lower Canada, ought to be estimated at twelve thousand regulars, and several thousand militia, say in all sixteen or eighteen thousand, and at Halifax at three thousand.

To demolish the British force from Niagara to Quebec would require, to make the thing secure, an efficient regular army of twenty thousand men, with an army of reserve of ten thousand. The Commander ought to have power to dispose of them as he thought fit. The movement against Niagara, & lower Canada ought to be in concert, and of course under the control of the same Commander, who alone could be a competent judge of the suitable time and manner. A corps of reserve is indispensible to guard against casualties, especially with raw troops. Nothing should be left to hazard. The Expedition should be of a character to inspire a certainty of success, from which the best consequences would result. Our troops would be more undaunted, and those of the enemy proportionately more dismayed. In the interior on both sides the effect would be equally salutary, with us it would aid in filling our ranks with regular troops, and drawing to the field, such others as occasion might require. With the enemy the effect would be equally in our favor. It would soon drive from the field the Canadian Militia, and by depressing the spirits of the people, interrupt and lessen the supplies to the British army.

If the conquest of Canada should prove to be easy, a part of this force might be directed against Halifax, but for that purpose a force should be specially provided, to consist of not less than six thousand men. Before this time next year the honor & interest of the United States require that the British forces be driven into Quebec and Halifax, and be taken there if possible. They must at all events be excluded from every foot of territory beyond the reach of their cannon. This may be done if timely and suitable

measures are adopted for the purpose, and they be executed with vigor and skill.

If the government could raise, and keep in the field, thirty five thousand regular troops, the legal complement of the present establishment, the deficiency to be supplied, even to authorise an expedition against Halifax would be inconsiderable. Ten thousand men would be amply sufficient. But there is danger of not being able to raise that force, and to keep it at that standard. The estimate therefore of the force to be raised for the next campaign, in addition to the legal complement, should cover any probable deficiency in it, as well as the addition which ought to be made to it. My idea is that provision ought to be made for raising twenty thousand men in addition to the present establishment. How shall these men be raised? Shall new regiments be added to the standing army to constitute a part of it, the volunteer Acts to be relied on, or any other expedient be adopted?

The first question to be answered is, can more than the force contemplated by the present military Establishment be raised in time for the next campaign, and that force be kept in the field by new recruits, to supply losses produced by the casualties of war? Will the state of our population, the character & circumstances of the people who compose it, justify a reliance on such a resource alone? The experiments heretofore made, even under the additional encouragement given by the Acts passed at the last session of Congress, and the excitement produced by the war, tho' great, forbit it. Abundant & noble proofs of patriotism have been exhibited by our citizens in those quarters where the approach and pressure of the enemy have been most felt. Thousands have rallied to the standard of their country, but it has been to render voluntary service, and that for short terms. The encrease of the regular army has been slow, and the amount raised, compared with the number sought, inconsiderable. Additional encouragement may produce a more important result, but still there is cause to fear that it will not be in the degree called for by the present emergency. If then there is cause to doubt success, that doubt is a sufficient motive for the Legislature to act on, and to appeal, in aid of the existing resource, to another not likely to fail.

In rejecting a reliance on the regular military Establishment

alone, for the force necessary to give effect to the next campaign, the alternative is too obvious to be mistaken by any one. The occurrences of the present year designate it in the most satisfactory manner. The additional force must be raised for a short term, under every encouragement to the patriotism of the people which can be given consistently with the circumstances of the country, and without interfering with enlistments into the old corps. The volunteer Acts of the last session may be the basis on which this additional force may be raised, but these Acts must be radically altered to enable the President to raise the force. Experience has not been less instructive on this very important point. Altho' whole sections of our country, and among them many of our most distinguished & estimable citizens, have risen in arms and volunteered their services, & marched in the ranks, it has not been done under the volunteer Acts. Those Acts contemplate a beginning at the wrong end, & require too long an engagement to produce the desired effect. They contemplate a movement in no particular quarter, and by no particular person—they require that the people shall take the affair up of their own accord, enroll themselves into companies, and then recommend their officers to the President; and that the President shall not appoint the field officers until a sufficient number of companies are formed to constitute a regiment. Thus it may happen that companies from different States, all strangers to each other, may be thrown into a regiment, & that the field officers appointed to command them may be strangers alike to all the company, officers & men. They contemplate also an enrolment for three years, with a service only of one. Conditions which in themselves could not fail to defeat the object, as they enlist on their side not one motive to action. The patriot citizen who really wished to serve his country would spurn the restraint imposed on him of two years of inactivity out of three, and enter the regular army, where he would find active employment for the whole term of his enlistment. And the farmer, the merchant, and the artist, willing to make a sacrifice of a certain portion of their time to the urgent calls of their country, would find a check to their impulse by the obligation they must enter into for so long a term. And by allowing no bounty, no pecuniary inducement, no aid to enable a

man to leave home, is offered. It is impossible that such a project should succeed on an extensive scale. The ardent patriotism of a few, in detached circles of our country, may surmount these obstacles, but such examples will be rare.

To give effect to such a measure the President alone should have the appointment of all the officers under the rank of Colonel, and it should be made in the following manner: He should first select such prominent men as had merited and acquired by a virtuous conduct the confidence of their fellow citizens, and confer on them, with the advice & consent of the Senate, the rank of Colonel, & then confide to them the selection & recommendation of all their officers, to be approved by the President. These men would go to their homes, look around the country where they are known, and where they know every one, select the prominent men there, such as enjoyed the esteem & confidence of their fellow citizens, & recommend them, according to their respective pretensions, as field officers, captains, & subalterns under them. Thus the service would be truly voluntary, as every man would act under officers to whose appointment he had essentially contributed. The several corps would consist of neighbors, friends, & brothers. Example would animate to action. Generous motives would be excited, patriotism roused, and the ties of kindred would unite with the love of country, and of free government, to call our young men to the field.

The first object is to complete the regular Establishment to its legal complement, & to keep it there. The pay of the soldiers has already been raised during the present session of Congress; but this, it is feared, will not afford a sufficient inducement to fill the ranks within the requisite time. Let the bounty be raised to the sum of forty dollars to each recruit, and let the officers receive the sum of five dollars per man for all whom they may recruit. These additional encouragements will, it is presumed, secure the desired success. When filled, how keep the regiment full? The presence of all the officers will be necessary, in that State, for their command. None could be spared to recruit. Different expedients have occurred to supply supernumerary officers for the recruiting business. It has, for example, been proposed to add a certain number of regiments, from fifteen to twenty, to the

present military Establishment, but this would be to rely on that Enstablishmet alone, which, as is presumed, it would be highly improper to do. This plan is farther objectionable on account of the expense attending it, and likewise as it would create delay in the organization of the corps, and appointment of the officers. The same objections are applicable to the addition of a company to each battalion, not to mention others. On much consideration the following expedient has occurred as most eligible. Let one field officer, a major, be added to each regiment, and a third lieutenant to each company. This will allow a field officer and ten company officers from each regiment for the recruiting service, which would be sufficient.

The additional force proposed for one year is intended to supply the probable deficiencies in the present military Establishment. This force to be raised for a shorter term, and for a special purpose, it is presumed that much aid may be drawn from that source, and with great despatch, for the purposes of the next campaign. It is probable also that it may be done without essentially interfering with enlistments into the old corps, as most of the men who may enter into this might not be willing to engage in them.

If a lingering war is maintained the annual disbursements will be enormous. Economy requires that it be brought to a termination with the least possible delay. If a strong army is led to the field early in the Spring the British power on this Continent must sink before it, and when once broken down it will never rise again. The reconquest of Canada will become, in the opinion of all enlightened men, and of the whole British nation, a chimerical attempt. It will therefore be abandoned. But if delay takes place reinforcements may be expected, and the war prolonged. It is to save the public money, and the lives of our people, and the honor of the nation, that high bounties & premiums, and the most vigorous exertions in other respects are advised. The prolongation of the war for a single campaign would exceed these expenditures more than tenfold.

## NOTES ON IDEA OF A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN FOR THE YEAR 1813.

The plan of campaign must be formed by the general who commands the expedition. He alone can best decide at what points

to make attacks and where to make feints, if any ought to be made. The plan of campaign must depend on circumstances, & may be altered just before it commences.

Some steps however should be taken by the Department of War preparatory to the Commencement of the campaign, for on these will its success depend. Supplies of every kind should be provided without delay, and placed at such stations in advance, as may best favor the intended operations. These should consist of provisions, or subsistence, for the troops, of ordnance, munitions of war, and every other article necessary for the service. They may be procured & collected without entering essentially into the plan of the campaign, or the number of divisions into which the army may be formed. We know that the enemy are posted along the S$^{t}$ Lawrence, from Niagara to Quebec, at different stations, at considerable distance from each other, and that it is on that river or near it, at some or at all of these stations, that we must attack them. The disposition of the supplies should be such, as to leave the commander perfectly at liberty to form his plan of attack & to conduct his military operations as he thought fit. There are two principal routes by which lower Canada may be entered; one by the Onandaga river into Lake Ontario, by the east side of that Lake to the S$^{t}$ Lawrence and down the S$^{t}$ Lawrence to Montreal; the other by Lake Champlain. The supplies necessary for the campaign should be collected on both routes & as near the enemy's lines as may be done with safety. This would secure to the commander as wide a range as he could desire for his operations & without loss to the public, even with respect to the article of supplies. By whatever route he entered Canada, he might avail himself of them. To facilitate the transportation of these supplies a sufficient number of boats should be provided for the purpose on each route. Everything should be prepared to move with the utmost rapidity, when the occasion called for it.

Of heavy ordnance there will be no occasion, until our Army lays siege to Quebec. It is the only fortified town in all Canada & of course the only one against which heavy ordnance can be of any use. The bayonet is the arm which will be principally relied on, in all the encounters that may be expected before we reach that city. It will be well however to be provided with a

proper train of light artillery, as opportunities may offer for using it with advantage. The same remark is applicable to Cavalry. The main army especially should consist of a due proportion of that force. The heavy ordnance must be taken to Canada by Lake Champlain ; to each division of the army light artillery in sufficient number must be attached as it may be equally useful in attacking the posts along the S$^{t}$ Lawrence, in descending the river from Ontario to Montreal, as in approaching that city by Lake Champlain.

When the supplies are secured, the force collected, and everything prepared, the commander will put his columns in motion and will himself direct the movement. Congress having passed a law authorizing the President to raise an additional force of about 20,000 men for one year it remains to be decided what portion of that force shall be raised & how much of it shall be applied to the invasion of Canada from Niagara to Quebec.

[INDORSED] "WAR PAPERS—NOTES—CERTAIN REPORTS—JESSUP GRAHAM, &C."

Can an expedition be set on foot against Canada this winter & if so at what time ?

What force would be adequate? At what point should it be directed ?

What preparation would be necessary in ordnance, sleighs, clothing & camp equipage ?

If by Champlain, what portion of regular troops could be brought to act in the expedition ?

If such an expedition is deemed impracticable during the winter what is the earliest season at which it may be undertaken in the Spring ?

What the force necessary for it ? At what points should we enter ? What the equipment in ordnance and every other article ?

If different columns are led by different routes the force composing each should be considered & the ordnance, transportation & every other preparation be adapted to it. How pass the river etc. ?

What number of regular troops aided by militia will be adequate to the conquest of Canada in the Spring ? The regular

force will be required for the van & to head the columns, & to be interpersed in other parts of the army, to give an example to the militia. Of militia any number may be obtained, which may be thought necessary.

Where should camps be formed with a view to the proposed invasion, whether to be made by regular troops only or with the aid of militia: What the preparation in either instance?

The risk seems to be great, and the loss attending it, may be that of the whole force. If we are repulsed again in our own country, that is by land, the effect may be easily anticipated. If we lose our army, by a hazardous measure, where there was no adequate motive for the risk, it may be difficult to trace its consequences. It is safe to put veteran troops in situations of imminent danger, because their courage being tried & mechanical, may be relied on, but the mere circumstance of the danger is apt to overwhelm young troops, even before the reality appears. Altho' our troops have been brave, yet we have seen in many instances, ever since the present war, the justice of this remark. While our army has the enemy in front, & our own country & people in its rear, it will have confidence, & be safe.

If we contemplate offensive operations there are three points of attack—

One by lake Champlain—

Another on Kingston—

A third on Niagara.

The first is supposed to be impossible at the present time, & with our present force.

The second seems to be declined for one principal reason, that we have not the command of the lake, & may not have it; tho' it is not said that our land force is in a state to push the war in that quarter if we had the command of the lake.

The last seems to be that only which is offer'd for consideration. One objection to the mode proposed is that, altho' a measure exposed to much danger, it is rather a defensive than an offensive mov'ment. It merits consideration, at least, if an attack on the strait of Niagara is contemplated, it may not be arranged in a manner, more free from danger, as to the force to be employed in

it, and with a better prospect of success, in regard to the corps of the enemy intended to be taken by it.

If a position at Burlington might be deemed important for any distinct purposes may not the object be accomplished without marching our whole force there? One thousand picked men, commanded by a gallant officer, might hold it against any force likely to be brought against it. The British force on the Strait would not be apt to move to attack it with the reminder of our army in its rear, and the force at Sacketts Harbour might keep in check the British force at Kingston, while it might be necessary to sustain the position at Burlington Heights—

5000 men at Burlington Heights—

500 at Matchadash—

a road of 50 miles between them.

The enemy holding 2000 at Forts George, Niagara, Erie, &c—

The enemy commanding the Lake at this time, & thro' this month—The command likely to be ours, thro' July, & the first weeks of August. The command afterwards theirs, without a battle, & victory on our side.

Arguments in favour of this position.

1. It secures to us the peninsula between that line & Detroit, & may check their communication with the upper lakes—

2. It enables us to cut off the force at Fort George and Niagara in case we have the command of the lake, and they be not withdrawn before we get the command.

3. May proceed thence, in case there be an object, on the north side of the lake, to Kingston.

4. A position secure against attacks—high on all sides, & rocky & inaccessible on the side of the lake.

Examination of these arguments.

1. No Indians, in the peninsula—the possession of Detroit, Sandwich & the upper lakes, which we now have, protects us against all the Indians against whom we should be protected (or nearly all) by the positions at Burlington Heights and Matchadash. It is indispensable to retain the posts of Detroit and Sandwich, and the command of the upper lakes, altho' we take the positions proposed at Burlington Heights & Matchadash. In

this view therefore no material advantage can be derived from the latter positions, while without lessening the expence of the natural barrier behind, vast expence will be incurred by that to be taken in advance.

2. A force posted at Burlington Heights can afford aid in cutting off the force at forts George & Niagara only in case of its retreat and in that direction. If our force placed there is to be useful elsewhere, it must move to the place where it must act. If the British force is to be taken where it is, it must be invested there, and all retreat cut off. While our force is so distant from it, a squadron may take it off without any check from us. The mov'ment of the squadron up the lake, making a feint towards Burlington Heights, would alarm our troops there, & put them on the defensive. Wheeling round, it might pass the mouth of the strait, & take off the troops, before ours knew its project. A closer investment taken at the proper time, perhaps that contemplated for the other position, might as effectually cut off its retreat by land, while it embarrassed, if it did not prevent it, by water. The British force must be withdrawn by water, while the enemy has command of the lake, or not at all. It will probably not be withdrawn now in the expectation of losing that command. The presumption therefore is that it will not be withdrawn at all by water. Should it however be attempted to withdraw it by water a close investment would give us all the advantage that circumstances would admit of for annoying it, with the certainty of preventing its retreat by land.

3. No attack is contemplated against Kingston without the command of the lake, as is understood. If that command is not obtained there will be no occasion for these troops to move down to Kingston—If it is they may be mov'd sooner, and at less expence, by water.

4. To this argument no remark is thought necessary. The idea is supposed to be correct.

The above remarks make it probable that all the advantages expected from the proposed positions may not be realized, while the following positive objections have occurred to them.

1. It puts our whole stake in that quarter, in the enemy's

country, at a distance from supplies, and from aid in case of danger, however imminent, by our militia or other force. If the enemy commands the lake it will cut off all but the first supplies by water; and the troops on the strait may do the same by land, unless they be sent round by Matchadash. The enemy will also have an opportunity of attacking this force with advantage. It may send up by water all the force from below which it can spare, to co-operate with that at the strait, both of which may be brought to bear on it, without our being able to afford it much assistance, if any. By what route, in that event, would it retreat.

2. By taking that position in the enemy's country it leaves our own country open to the incursions of the enemy, unless we have a sufficient force to prevent it, in the neighborhood of the strait, which we have not.

3. It takes a position distant from the enemy, menacing no vital interest, leaving it optional with the enemy when to attack it if ever, but under no absolute necessity to attack it at all. In itself it makes no attacks on the enemy, and is a force, put, as it were, in that respect *hors de Countrie.*

4. It is a good rule to make no hazardous experiments. War is, it is true, a game of risk, but yet the risk should in all cases be made as little as possible, care be taken that the losses attending it be made as small as possible.

## TO GENERAL DEARBORN.[1]

*Private.*

WASHINGTON, Jany 31. 1813

DEAR SIR,—I have just rec$^{d}$ y$^{rs}$ of the 25 inst. enclosing the answer of Gen$^{l}$ Prevost, to the proposition for the exchange of Gen$^{l}$ Hull, which you had made him, in consequence of instructions from the Dep$^{t}$ of War. I am astonished at his reply, because we had no knowledge of any such exchange of the men taken at sea by the Essex, as he suggests. The subject

[1] From the copy contributed by Mrs. Fogg.

shall, however, be fully investigated tomorrow, & I will write you officially on it without delay. It is probable, even admitting the fact to be as he states, that under the letter to Major Murray, an exchange may be effected, so as to proceed in the trial directed to be held of Gen! Hull, on the 25. of next month.

On taking a temporary charge of the Dep! of War, I was called on, in answer to certain inquiries of the com. of the H. of Reps., on military affairs, to digest something like a plan, whereby to estimate the force necessary for offensive & defensive operations, next campaign. I enclose you a copy of it, in confidence. It is not a question what species of force is best, but what we can get, to take the field with, early in the spring. Is then, this force, I mean the 12 months men, better than militia or volunteers? This is regular, enlisted for too short a term I admit; at the end of the year, it may be re-enlisted into the five years service. It would be new when first raised, if raised for 5 years, and at the end of the next campaign, if successful, it is to be hoped that 35,000 would keep the whole country. It is not contemplated to raise this force over the whole nation, but near the theatre of war, according to an idea suggested in one of your letters.

I regret that you cannot make a visit to this place. I will communicate your letter immediately to the President, & give you his sentiments on it without delay. With great respect & esteem, I am sincerely yours,

I should have sent the enclosed observations sooner, had I not expected the pleasure of seeing you here.

TO JOHN ADAMS.

[FEBRUARY 15, 1813.]

DEAR SIR,—I have the pleasure to enclose to you a report of the committee on foreign relations in which the communications between the Executive of the U States & the British government since the war are reviewed, and a project of an act of Congress relative to seamen submitted to consideration. The object of the report seems to be, as it undoubtedly is, to place the controversy between the two nations on a just footing, to support the measure of the Executive by a corresponding act of the Congress, and by taking from G. Britain all motive for the war terminate it by an honorable peace, or unite the country in a vigorous prosecution of the war. The bill, with certain amendments, has passed the House of Representatives, but has not yet been taken up in the Senate.

I had the pleasure to receive from you some time since a letter which excited much my feelings. Having highly respected in my life the great abilities and virtuous firmness which you displayed in our revolutionary struggle; having always entertained the utmost confidence in your independance of foreign influence, in your integrity, patriotism, and attachment to our happy Union, I could never be indifferent either to what concerned your welfare, or to your sentiments and disposition towards me. In acknowlegding that communication permit me to assure you that your opinion on the subject to which it related had much weight with me. My sincere wish is that no innocent person sho$^{d}$ fail to obtain redress, and I am persuaded,

whatever may have been the character of the original transaction, that many innocent persons have suffered. I am aware that this calamity affecting one portion of the Union only produces an injurious effect, and think that consideration in itself ought to have much weight. My hope is that this cause of inquietude and complaint may be settled on just principles, & to the satisfaction of all parties. Your favorable opinion of their claim tends much to promote that result.

From your son we have rec$^{d}$ no letters of a late date. The Baltic being frozen up, & the communication by land cut off by the war between France and Russia, have prevented it. His view of the present state of affairs between those powers, and in the north generally, will be very interesting, & is looked for with anxiety by the President. With great respect and esteem

## TO JAMES MADISON.

Feby. 25. 1813.

DEAR SIR,—Mrs. Monroe's indisposition preventing my leaving home this morning, I beg to submit to your consideration the following remarks on the subject of our short conversation last evening.

You intimated that you understood that Gen$^{l}$ Armstrong intended to repair to the Northern frontiers, and to direct the operations of the campaign; and it was afterwards suggested to me that he would as Secretary at War perform the duties of L$^{t}$ General. It merits consideration how far the exercise of such a power is strictly constitutional & correct in itself, &

secondly how far it may affect the character of your administration, and of those acting in it, & thirdly whether it is not otherwise liable to objection on the ground of policy. I shall be able to present to your consideration a few hints only on each of these propositions. The departments of the govt being recognized by the Constitution have appropriate duties under it. As organs of the Executive will, they contain records of its transactions, and are, in that sense, checks on the Executive. If the Secretary at War leaves the seat of govt, (the Ch: Magistrate remaining there) and performs the duties of a General, the powers of a Ch: Magistrate, of the Secry at War, Lt General, are all united in the latter. There ceases to be a check on Executive power as to military operations; indeed the Executive power, as known to the Constitution, is destroyed. The whole is transferred from the Executive to the General at the head of the army. It is completely absorbed in hands where it is most dangerous. It may be said that the President is Commander in Chief; that the Secry at War is his organ as to military operations, and that he may allow him to go to the army, as being well informed in military affairs, & act for himself. I am inclined to think that the President, unless he takes the command of the army in person, acts, in directing its movements, more as the Executive power than as Commander in Chief. What would become of the Secry at War if the President took command of the army I do not know. I rather suppose, however, that, altho' some of his powers would be transferred

to the military staff about the President, he would, nevertheless, retain his appropriate constitutional character in all other respects. The Adjutant General would become the organ of the Executive as to military operations, but the Secry of War would be that for every other measure, indeed for all except movements in the field. The Dept. of War would therefore still form some check on the Executive at the head of the army, but there would be none on the Secr$^{y}$. when he was General. On the 2$^{d}$ head, the effect it might have on the credit of your administration &c., there can be but little doubt. If there is cause to suspect the measure on unconstitutional grounds that circumstance alone would wound its credit deeply. But a total yielding of the power, as would be inferred, & might, and probably would be assumed (for any act which would be performed, or order given, without the sanction of the Ch: Magistrate, would in the degree operate in that way) would affect it in another sense not less injuriously. It is impossible for the Secretary at War to go to the frontier, and perform the offices contemplated, without exercising all those of the military commander *especially*. He would carry with him of course those of the War Dep$^{t}$., for by the powers of that Dep$^{t}$ would he act as General, & control all military and other operations. And, being forced to act by circumstances, and take his measures by the day, he could have no order or sanction from the Ch: Magistrate. This would be seen by the public, & injure greatly the credit of the adm$^{n}$. If General Armstrong is the per-

son most fit to command the armies let him be appointed as such; there will then be a check on him in the Ch: Magistrate, & in the War Dep$^{t}$. Does he possess in a prominent degree the public confidence for that trust? Do we not know the fact to be otherwise? That it was with difficulty he was appointed a Brigadier General, & still greater difficulty that he was appointed Secry at War?

On the ground of policy I have already made some remarks, but there are other objections to it on that ground. If he withdraw from the gov$^{t}$, & takes his station with the Northern troops, what will become of every other army, that under Harrison, Pinckney, & Wilkinson, and of those stationed in other quarters, especially along the coast? Who will direct the general movement, supervise their supplies, &c.?

I cannot close these remarks without adding something in relation to myself. Stimulated by a deep sense of the misfortunes of our country, as well as its disgrace, by the surrender of Detroit, the misconduct of Van Ranslaer, & Smyth, and by the total want of character in the northern campaign, and dreading its effects on your adm$^{n}$ on the republican party & cause, I have repeatedly offered my service in a military station, not that I wished to take it by preference to my present one, which to all others I prefer, but from a dread of the consequences above mentioned. I was willing to take the Dep$^{t}$ of War permanently, if in leaving my present station it was thought I might be more useful there than in a military command. I

thought otherwise. What passed on this subject proves that I considered the Dep$^{t}$ of War as a very different trust from that of the military commander. You appeared to think I might be more useful with the army, as did Mr. Gallatin, with whom I conferred on the subject. I was convinced that the duties of Secretary of War & military commander were not only incompatible under our gov$^{t}$, but that they could not be exercised by the same person. I was equally satisfied that the Secretary at War could not perform, in his character as Secry., the duties of General of the army. The movement of the army must be regulated daily by events which occur daily, and the movement of all its parts, to be combined & simultaneous, must be under the control of the General in the field, not of the War Dep$^{t}$. That this is the opinion of General Armstrong also is evident from his disposition to join the army. He knows that *here* he can not direct the movements of the armies. He knows also that he could not be appointed the L$^{t}$ General, and that it is only in his present character as Secretary of War that he can expect to exercise the functions of General.

As soon as General Armstrong took charge of the Dep$^{t}$ at War I thought I saw his plan, that is, after he had held it a few days. I saw distinctly that he intended to have no grade in the army which should be competent to a general control of military operations; that he meant to keep the whole in his own hands; that each operation should be distinct and separate, with distinct and separate objects, & of course to be directed by himself, not simply in the outline, but de-

tail. I anticipated mischief from this, because I knew that the movement could not be directed from this place—I did not then anticipate the remedy which he had in view.

I was animated by much zeal, in offering my services in a military station, in favor of your administration, & the cause of free govt, which I have long considered intimately connected together; I flattered myself that by my long services, & what the country knew of me, that I should give some impulse to the recruiting business, & in other ways aid the cause. The misfortunes and dangers attending the cause produced so much excitement that my zeal may have exposed me to the appearance of repulse and disappointment in the course things have taken. But as I well know that you have justly appreciated my motives, and that the public cannot fail to do it should any imputation of the kind alluded to be made, these are considerations which have no effect on my mind.

Having seen into these things from my little knowledge of military affairs, and the management of the War Dept for some weeks, which gave me a knowledge of the state of things there, and forseeing some danger to your admn, as well as to the public interest, from the causes above stated, I have felt it a duty which I owe to you, as well as to the public, to communicate to you my sentiments on them. I have written them in much haste, and without reserve. You will I am satisfied bestow on them the consideration they deserve.

I am, dear Sir, sincerely & respectfully your friend.

I will add that I cease to have any desire of a military station, having never wished one with a view to myself, & always under a conviction that I should incur risques, & make sacrifices by it; it is in consequence of feeling it strongly my duty that I entirely relinquished the idea. These hints are intended to bring to your consideration the other circumstances to which they allude.

TO MRS. JOHN ADAMS.

WASHINGTON April 10, 1813.

DEAR MADAM,—I fear that the pressure of much business, and an anxiety to write fully to Mr. Adams in reply to his kind letter, made me delay it longer than I ought to have done. I now return you the letter wh he had the goodness to submit to my perusal, & with many thanks to him. The sentiments which it conveys do honor to the head & heart of the author.

It is impossible for me to state when your son will return. He is associated in the negotiation with Great Britain to be commenced in St Petersburgh under the mediation of the Emperor of Russia. His service in that negotiation is deemed of high importance to his country. Whenever he resolves to return home, every facility in the power of the government will be rendered to him.

TO JOHN ADAMS.

WASHINGTON April 19. 1813.

DEAR SIR,—The arrangement being completed relative to the negotiations to be conducted at St Peters-

burg, I have the pleasure to apprise you of it, as that there will still be time to enable you to write to your son, by the vessel which takes his colleagues there. The occasion was thought to be of that high importance to require according to the usage of our country, a special mission of three. Mr. Gallatin & Mr. Bayard are the two others. There will be two commissions for treating with Great Britain; One, for peace, including a definition of neutral rights, under the mediation of Russia; a second to form a treaty of commerce. In these the order will be, Mr. Gallatin, your Son & Mr. Bayard. There will also be a Commission to form a commercial treaty. In this the order will be, your Son, Mr. Gallatin & Mr. Bayard. The first two commissions contemplating negotiations which might be carried on at any other place, being with another power and Mr. G being a member of the administration, it was thought correct to give him the priority. The other contemplating a treaty with Russia with whom your son is accredited, that circumstance seemed to justify the propriety of giving the priority to him. They are all Envoys Extraordinary & Ministers Plenipotentiary. They are also allowed an outfit upon the principle that they must be presented in a distinguished manner to the Court & be drawn much into Society of the first rank & greatest expence. In truth, if we allowed our Ministers abroad all that the law permits, in every case we shall hardly be able to put them at their ease there, & shall certainly never recompense them for their services & sufferings. Presuming that it would be satisfactory

to you to have these details I have taken an interest in communicating them. You will have sufficient time to write by these gentlemen after receiving this letter provided you forward to them without delay your despatches to Philadelphia. I am, dear Sir, with great respect & esteem your very obt. servant.

TO ALBERT GALLATIN.

*Private.*

May 5. 1813

DEAR SIR,—As the contemplated arrangements on the subject of impressment will be reciprocal in form; as what Great Britain may deem a concession will be balanced by a concession on the part of the United States; as the question of right can be put out of view in stipulating a course of practice; and as the stipulations will be in a treaty limited for a fixed term of years, it is not presumable that any motive or scruple, much less any serious difficulty, will be opposed to an article in the usual form providing for the object. The President being desirous that no unessential consideration should embarrass your negotiation or endanger its result, intends that in providing against the practice of impressment from American vessels you should exercise an entire discretion as to the mode and shape of the provision, taking care only that it be such as by fair construction will bind the faith of the British Government to an effective discontinuance of the practice in question. This practice being essentially a cause of war, and the primary object of your negotiation, a treaty of peace leaving in silence and trusting

to a mere understanding liable to doubts and different explanations would not be that security which the United States has a right to expect.

With respect to West Florida, possession will be taken of it before you get far on your voyage, if it is not already done, orders having been some time since given for that purpose. That is a question settled. Orders have been given for the evacuation of East Florida, of which I will endeavor to send you a copy in this Conveyance.

With respect to the insurance of yours and Mr. Bayards outfits, I can say nothing decisive at this moment. The claim will be examined & settled on principles which will be I doubt not satisfactory to you both.

The copies of the Census which you desire will be sent. I send a copy of certain letters from the governor of East Florida respecting some measures of an hostile nature towards the United States, the more reprehensible being after the conduct of General Matthews had been disavowed & steps taken for the evacuation of the territory.

Having noticed everything in your communication I have only to add my best wishes for your success and welfare.

Very sincerely, I am, dear Sir, yours.

Mr. Adams is possessed of the correspondence with Mr. Daschkoff on the subject mentioned in yours.

TO JAMES A. BAYARD.

WASHINGTON May 6, 1813.

DEAR SIR,—I had the honor to receive yours of the 5th. to day, acknowledging the receipt of the despatches which were forwarded to you by Mr. Todd. I had indulged the hope that he would have found it convenient to deliver them to you as he passed through Wilmington for which purpose they were addressed to you in a separate packet.

It is very satisfactory to the President to hear that there is nothing in your instructions which you cannot cordially promote. Of this no doubt was before entertained but it is particularly gratifying to know it from yourself. That you will use your best exertions to support the right & honor of your Country & to promote its interests he has the most perfect confidence.

It is believed that the ground taken in your instructions is the only safe ground for the United States to rest on. An informal understanding only would be considered by Great Britain as a complete victory in her favor, the fatal effects of which would soon be felt on all the most important interests of the nation. Her government would conclude that in accepting such an accommodation, we had resolved to give up the cause rather than maintain it by a prosecution of the war. As Great Britain will be completely secured against the injury of which she has complained by the arrangements you may enter into & must lose in many ways by the war, it is hoped that she will avail herself of the opportunity presented

by giving to it an honorable and advantageous termination.

## TO ALBERT GALLATIN.[1]

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1813.

DEAR SIR,—I have yours of the 4th. Mr. Brent one of the gentlemen in the office, left this with the mail this morning, with despatches to you and Mr. Bayard. The principal object was to convey an answer to your preceding private letter relative to your instructions.[2] That answer, though communicated in a

[1] From the Writings of Gallatin.

[2] In State Papers III., 695-700, with the exception of the following paragraphs:

"[Confidential Paragraph 1]—Knowing their origin he would naturally seek a complete and permanent remedy to them, consistent with his own principles and fame. It may also be reasonably presumed that Great Britain herself will see the advantage of adopting a more just and enlarged policy towards neutral powers. Her Cabinet must be aware that it will be difficult to preserve peace, especially after the relations of the moment subside, with Russia and the other Baltic Powers as well as with the United States, if a satisfactory arrangement be not made with them respecting neutral rights. It must be equally so if the tendency which the unjust and extravagant pretensions heretofore maintained by Great Britain could not fail to have, to incline all neutral powers, in every war, to the scale of her adversary. . . .

"[Confidential Paragraph 2]—The Article in the Treaty of 1794 which allows British traders from Canada and the Northwest Company to carry on trade with the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States must not be renewed. The pernicious effects of this privilege have been most sensibly felt in the present war, by the influence which it gave to the traders over the Indians, whose whole force has been wielded by means thereof against the inhabitants of our western States and territories. You will avoid also any stipulation which might restrain the United States from increasing their naval force to any extent they may think proper on the Lakes held in common; or excluding the British Traders from the navigation of the Lakes and rivers exclusively within our own jurisdiction. . . .

"[Confidential Paragraph 3]—A reciprocal stipulation may be entered into for the restoration of any territory which either party may have acquired by the

private letter was decided on by the President in a meeting of the members of the Administration here. I have thought much on the subject since receiving your letter as well as while the instructions were preparing, and my conclusions have always been the same. Confident that it will be agreeable to you to receive the result of my reflections in this mode, I do not hesitate to communicate them without reserve. My candid opinion is that if we do not secure, in a clear and distinct manner, the forbearance of the British practice, in consideration of the exclusion of British seamen from our service, that it were infinitely

war. The probable state of the war at the date of the treaty will render this stipulation favorable to Great Britain. It ought, therefore, not only to make her the more acquiescent in our reserving to ourselves the right of excluding her Indian traders from our territory & keeping a superiority of naval force on the Lakes but the more liberal also on the other subjects to be arranged. . . .

"[Confidential Paragraph 4]—There is not a single interest which you have to arrange in which Russia and the other Baltic Powers may not be considered as having a common interest with the United States. It is not to be presumed that the Emperor of Russia will wish the United States to make concessions which are to operate to his own disadvantage.

"It has been intimated by our Commercial Agent at Stockholm that the Crown Prince of Sweden is disposed to promote by his good offices a peace between the United States and Great Britain, and that he did not hesitate to disapprove the British practice of impressment, with the extraordinary claim set up by Great Britain to the right of search in foreign vessels for British Seamen. This favorable disposition of Sweden is an interesting circumstance and a knowledge of it may be useful in your negotiations. The President has it in contemplation to send a minister to Sweden immediately after the meeting of Congress. . . .

"[Confidential Paragraph 5]—A good intelligence between the United States and Russia respecting neutral rights may have an important influence in securing them from violation, in any future war, and may even tend to prevent war, to the advantage of all nations. The opportunity afforded by this mediation to explain fully to the Government of Russia the just views & concurring policy of the United States will it is presumed contribute much to the establishment of such an understanding and in that respect will merit your particular attention."

better that nothing should be done. An arrangement by understanding was obtained by Mr. Pinkney and me and the practice of the British government afterwards was an excellent commentary on such an arrangement. It would be considered as a complete victory over the United States, both by the British government and ourselves. You will recollect also that the second proposition made by Mr. Russell, suggested by motives of delicacy to save the pride of the British Government, which required as the basis of the negotiation or rather of the armistice, an understanding as to the object, was considered an insult and treated with disdain. It was called by the most odious epithets, even in the declaration of the Prince Regent in reply to our declaration of war. We have already manifested our willingness, Congress and Executive, to remove the British cause of complaint. It is to be presumed that if any arrangement is made this will be done. It would be deplorable indeed if we did all that we could and received in return nothing but the informal promise of the British Commissioners or government to do what it is otherwise their duty to do. I believe that such an arrangement would not only ruin the present Administration but the Republican party and even the Cause. This nation is high-minded and expects a result correspondent with our rights, and these are certainly moderately, or rather modestly estimated in the instructions. It is not easy to decide where a treaty which should fall short of the reasonable expectations of the country would place the United States. It

would be considered by Europe that we had no government whatever, and they would all begin immediately to trample us underfoot. The expulsion of the present people from office with ignominy would be among its least important effects. The opposition coming in on its principles—I speak of many of its leaders—could not resist the British pretensions, though I should not be surprised in the temper of the nation, under such circumstances, if we should be visited by other and greater calamities. There seems, therefore, to be but one course for the government and yourselves to pursue, marked by your instructions and otherwise too well traced to need repetition. I have no doubt of ultimate success, provided our nerves are equal to the crisis : first, because I believe that your mission will succeed, for I cannot think that England will prolong the war when so fair an opportunity is presented to her to terminate it with honor and advantage ; secondly, I think, if your mission fails, that it will arouse more fully the energies of the nation, and lead by greater efforts to a more honorable termination by the complete expulsion of the British from the Continent. In any event, I think it better for the United States, and more honorable for the government, that we continue to maintain in the best manner we can the public rights until we succeed, or our constituents, wearied with the effort, remove us from office and transfer the power to others. Should that be the case, we should at least leave an useful example to the country.

On the subject of East Florida, I think I intimated to you in my last that Colonel Lear was under the most perfect conviction, on the authority of information from respectable sources at Cadiz, that the Spanish Regency had sold that and the other province to the British government, and that it had done so under a belief that we had or should soon get possession of it. My firm belief is that if we were possessed of both it would facilitate your negotiations in favor of impressment and every other object, especially if it were distinctly seen by the British Ministers or Minister that, instead of yielding them or any part of either, we would push our fortunes in that direction and in Canada if they did not hasten to accommodate. Satisfied I am that the more we endeavor to tranquillize their fears and to conciliate their esteem by any species of concession or accommodation which may be imputed to timidity or a desire to get out of the war, by the tone assumed in the negotiation, the more certain its failure, and the longer will be the continuance of the war afterwards.

I send a letter of credence to the Emperor, which you will use if justified by usage and found necessary or useful as an evidence of respect. I write in much haste. With great respect &c

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON

WASHINGTON June 7. 1813—

DEAR SIR, — During the last session of Congress the current business pressed so heavily on me, and

after its adjournment, the preparation of instructions for our Ministers employed under the mediation of Russia, and in other duties connected with it, kept me so constantly engaged that I have scarcely had a moment of respite since I left you. I seize one to communicate some details, which it may be satisfactory to you to know. As I make the communication in confidence, it will be without reserve.

When we were together last summer, we conferr'd on the then state of the depts of War & Navy, and agreed, that whatever might be the merit of the gentlemen in them, which was admitted in certain respects, a change in both was indispensable. I mention'd that I had intimated to the President, before we left Washington, my willingness to take the former, if he thought that the public interest would be advanc'd by it. It seemed to be your opinion that it would. On returning here, such was the pressure of public opinion, supported by all our friends in Congress, that a change in the dept of war was soon decided on, & even solicited by Mr. Eustis himself. In conversation with the President I repeated what I had said before, and intimated that I would either take that dept or a military station, as might be thought most adviseable. On the surrender of Hull, I had offer'd to proceed to the State of Ohio, and to take the command in that quarter, with a volunteer commission, to which he willingly assented. In consequence, I had, with his approbation, sent off the cannon &c from this place, and made every other arrangement, for the prosecution of the campaign

against Upper Canada, and was on the point of setting out when it was thought best to decline it. The President was particularly induced to adopt this latter counsel, by the appointment conferr'd on General Harrison, by the gov^t^ of Kentuckey, and his apparent popularity in the western country. I do not recollect that I mention'd this to you before. To the offer which I now repeated the President replied, that he did not wish me to leave my present station, which tho' inactive at the time, might not long continue so, for an inferior one, to hold it while I remain'd in service. The state of public affairs led again to a general view of the whole subject. Our military operations had been unsuccessful; one army had been surrender'd, under circumstances which impeached the integrity of the commander; and to the north in the whole extent of that country, so important & delicately circumstanced, as it was, the management had been most wretched. The command at the important post of Niagara had been suffer'd to fall into state hands, and to be perverted to local & selfish purposes. Van Ranslear, a most incompetent man with high pretentions, took it. It was late in the year before General Dearborn left Boston, and repair'd to Albany. He had given no impulse to the recruiting business in the Eastern States by passing thro' them, and making appeals to the patriotism of the people, and when he took the command at Albany, it was in a manner to discourage all hope of active operations during the favorable season. The commander ought to lead every important mov'ment. If intended to

assail Montreal, that being the grand attack, his station was there. If a smaller blow only could be given, the first against Montreal should have been committed to another; while he commanded in person when real service was to be performed. It was soon seen that nothing would be done against lower Canada; Gen! D. doubtless saw it on his first arrival at Albany, if he did not anticipate it before he left Boston. Niagara was the object, next, in importance, and had he taken the command there, he might and probably would, by superceding little people and conducting our military operations, have prevented the riotous & contentious scene exhibited there, saved the country and the gov! from the disgraceful defeat of Van Ranslaer, & the more disgraceful & gaschonading discomfiture of Smyth.

The experience of the campaign had excited a doubt with many, if not with all, whether our military operations would prosper under General Dearborn; he was known to have merit as a patriot, a republican, and that in many other respects he was a safe man, but he was advanc'd in years, infirm, and had given no proof of activity or military talent during the year. He did not animate, nor aid, in any way, the republican party to the Eastward, while by his conduct as a partizan, he excited & invigorated the opposition to the government. Being at war, every thing would depend on success, and if he was not likely to succeed, a substitute ought to be provided. If he could not sustain his ground, those next in rank would push him aside, and as the army would be encreased, and, if the

war continued, become strong, attention ought to be paid, with a view to the liberties of the country, to the character of the person to be plac'd in the chief command. I stated that if it was thought necessary to remove me from my present station, on the idea that I had some military experience, and a change in the command of the troops was resolved on, I would prefer it to the dep$^{t}$ of war, in the presumsion that I might be more useful. In the dep$^{t}$ of war a man might form a plan of a campaign, & write judicious letters on military operations, but still these are nothing but essays. Every thing would depend on the execution. I thought that with the army I should have better controul over operations & events, and might even aid, so far as I could give aid at all, to the person in the dep$^{t}$ of war. I offer'd to repair instantly to the northern army, to use my best efforts to form it, to promote the recruiting business, in the Eastern States, to conciliate the people to the views of the government, and unite them, so far as it might be possible, in the war. The President was of opinion that if I quitted my present station I ought to take the command of the army. It being necessary to place some one immediately in the dep$^{t}$ of War, to supply the vacancy made by M$^{r}$ Eustis's retreat, the President requested me to take it *pro tempore*, leaving the ultimate decision on the other questions open to further consideration. I did so, and immediately set to work on the important duties of the office. I send you a copy of a report which I made to the military committees of Congress, which laid the foundation

of some changes in the military establishment, with which you are acquainted. It was intended merely as a skeleton. It was soon found to be improper, at a period of so much danger & urgency, to keep that depᵗ in the hands of a temporary occupant. It ought to be filled by the person, who would have to form the plan of the campaign in every quarter, & be responsible for it. It being indispensible to fill it with a prominent character, and the question remaining undecided, relative to the command of the army, some persons thinking a change ought, and the opinion of the President in regard to me being the same, General Armstrong, was put in the depᵗ of War. Had it been decided to continue the command of the army under Genˡ Dearborn, and the question been with me, would I take the depᵗ of War, the President & other friends wishing it, I would not have hesitated a moment in complying. But it never assumed that form. To secure the command of all important stations, along the *coast* & elsewhere, to men of talents & experience, who should be in the service of the U States, I had recommended a considerable augmentation of General Officers, which was approved by General Armstrong & adopted by Congress. On the day that the nomination of these officers was made to the Senate, the President sent for me, & stated that the Secretary at War, had placed me, in his list of Major Generals, at their head, and wished to know whether I would accept the appointment, intimating that he did not think that I ought to do it, nor did he wish me to leave my present station. I asked where I was

to serve. He supposed it would be with the Northern Army, under General Dearborn. I replied that if I left my present office for such a command, it would be inferr'd that I had a passion for military life, which I had not: that in such a station, I could be of no service in any view to the general cause, or to military operations, even perhaps with the army in which I might serve: that, with a view to the public interest, the commander ought to receive all the support which the gov[t] could give him: by accepting the station proposed, I might take from Gen[l] Dearborn, without aiding the cause, by any thing that I might add. I stated however that the grade made no difficulty with me, a desire to be useful being my only object, and that if the command was given to me, even with a lower grade, than that suggested, admitting the possibility, I would accept it. The difficulty related to General Dearborn who could not well be removed to an inactive station. I observed that if it was intended to continue him in the command, he would have my best support, as he already had had, as no one respected or esteem'd him more than I did. To a strong desire to make you acquainted with the real state of things in regard to this question, I have felt an additional motive growing out of the conversation between us, above alluded to, to communicate to you, the causes of certain events which may have excited your surprise. It is proper to add that, had I been transferr'd to the army, M[r] Gallatin claimed & would have succeeded to the vacancy in this department.

The campaign has commenc'd tolerably well and with a good prospect of success, tho' the mov'ment has been rather slow, which may give time for reinforcements from Europe. An opinion begins to circulate here, that a person of more vigorous mind should be on the frontier with the Northern Army, to direct its mov'ments, & that the Secretary of War is that person. This idea is founded on a doubt of the competency of those now there. The effect would be to make the Secretary at War Commander in Chief of the army, in the character of Secretary at War. While here, orders emanate from the President, in which case, the President, the Secretary at War, and commander of the troops, are checks on each other; but in the other case the powers of all three would be united in the Secretary, much to the disadvantage of the President, who by the distance could have nothing to do in the business. Besides, if the Secretary takes the command of the Northern Army, who would supply his place in the dep$^{t}$ of War, and direct the operations of the army against Detroit & Upper Canada, of that on the Mississippi, and of the extensive & burthensome operations along the coast, and of the supplies in munitions of war, & provisions necessary to each, forming separately an important duty, but in the whole a very complicated & arduous one, requiring also daily attention. Troops have been collecting for some time at Bermuda, destin'd against some part of our country. Should they be brought to bear against this city, or New Orleans, & the Secretary be absent, what the effect? These objections

have weight, yet a new & serious discomfiture, might shake the administration to the foundation, and endanger the republican party & even the cause. So nicely balanc'd are the dangers, attending either course, in the present state of things, admitting that the Secretary might be able to supply any deficiency in those with the Northern Army, that it is difficult to say which scale preponderates. My reflections on the subject are known to the President, but I take no part in the question.

The mediation of Russia offers some prospect of accommodation with G. Britain, but no certainty of it. It is not known that she has accepted the overture. The Russian minister was informed that the President accepted it because he wished peace on honorable conditions, and was willing to avail himself of every fair opportunity to promote it: that he did not ask whether G. Britain had accepted the mediation, because it was sufficient that the Emperor had offered it; and that the President sought by the manner of accepting it to evince his high respect for the character of the Emperor. It became a question whether authority should be given to M[r] Adams alone to manage the negotiation, or eclat be attached to the Mission, by adding two Envoys to it, to be sent from this country. The latter course was preferr'd, and M[r] Gallatin being desirous, of acting in it, he was employed. Before I knew this latter fact, I had thought that it would be well, to engage in the service, some distinguished popular man, from that portion of our country the western, which had given

such support, and suffer'd so much by the war, to secure the confidence of its people in the negotiation, & reconcile them to any result of it. But on finding that Mr. Gallatin, for whom I have always entertained a very high respect & esteem, desir'd the appointment, and that the President was willing to confer it on him, I readily acquiesc'd, tho' not without serious apprehension of the consequences. Mr King has begun his new career by an attack on the measure, objecting to Mr. Gallatin's absence at this time, to the union of two such important offices in the same person &c. The nomination is still depending before the Senate. It will I doubt not terminate favorably, but still it has encreased our difficulties.

I had written the above some days since, when I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 30th ultº To the very interesting observations it communicates I will pay attention at an early day. I am forced to close this, to avail myself of this days mail for its conveyance. I am, etc.

Be so good as to return me the enclosed paper, it being the only copy which I have.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON June 16th 1813—

DEAR SIR,—At the commencement of the war I was decidedly of your opinion, that the best disposition which could be made of our little navy, would be to keep it in a body in a safe port, from which it might

sally only, on some important occasion, to render essential service. Its safety, in itself appeared to be an important object, as while safe, it formed a check on the enemy in all its operations along our coast, and encreased proportionally its expence, in the force to be kept up, as well to annoy our commerce, as to protect its own. The reasoning against it, in which all our naval officers have agreed, is that if station'd together, in a port, New York for example, the British would immediately block it up thus, by a force rather superior, and then harrass our coast and commerce without restraint, and with any force however small: in that case, a single frigate might, by cruizing along the coast and plundering & menacing occasionally, at different points, keep great bodies of our Militia in motion: that while our frigates are at sea, the expectation that they may be together, will compel the British to keep in a body, whenever they institute a blockade, or cruize, a force, equal at least to our whole force: that being the best sailors, they hazarded little by cruizing separately, or together occasionally, as they might bring on an action or avoid one, whenever they thought fit: that in that measure they would annoy the enemy's commerce wherever they went, excite alarm in the W Indies & elsewhere, and even give protection to our own trade, by drawing at times the enemy's squadron off from our own coast: that by cruizing, our commanders would become more skilful, have an opportunity to acquire glory, and if successful, keep alive the public spirit. The reasoning in favor of each plan is so nearly equal, that it is

hard to say, which is best. I have no doubt at some future day, that a fortification will be erected on the bank in the middle of the bay, and so connected in the manner you propose with a naval force in Lynhaven bay, for the protection of Norfolk, and all the country dependant on the Chesapeake. In time of war it will be difficult to accomplish so extensive an object.

The nomination of ministers, for Russia is still before the Senate. Mr Giles & Genl Smith, uniting with Mr King, & others, against Mr Gallatin have so far succeeded in preventing its confirmation. They appointed a committee, the object of which was, to communicate with the President, on the subject, & give him to understand that if he would supply his place in the Treasury, they would confirm the nomination to Russia. The President, had before answer'd a call of the Senate, that the appointment to Russia did not vacate the commissn in the dept of the Treasury & that the Secretary of the Navy did the business in Mr G's absence. To the chairman, who asked & obtained a personal interview, he communicated his objections, to a conference with the committee, on the ground, that the resolution under which they were appointed, did not authorize it, even could any advantage result from it, which however was improbable, as neither party would be apt to change its opinion, and on the principle of compromise that nothing could be done, or ought to be done. Various resolutions tending to embarrass the nomination, divide the republican party in the Senate, & perpetuate that division, by irritating its members towards each other, have been

introduced & are still depending. Among them is one, intended to express the sense of the house, against the compatability of the two offices. The delay has done harm & doubtless was intended to have that effect. The result is yet uncertain.

With great respect, etc.

The President is indisposed, with a bilious attack, apparently slight.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON June 28th 1813.

DEAR SIR,—From the date of my last letter to you the President has been ill of a bilious fever; of that kind called the remittent. It has perhaps never left him, even for an hour, and occasionally simptoms have been unfavorable. This is I think the 15th day. Elzey of this place, & Shoaff of Annapolis, with Dr Tucker, attend him. They think he will recover. The first mention'd I have just seen, who reports that he had a good night, & is in a state to take the bark, which indeed he has done on his best day, for nearly a week. I shall see him before I seal this, & note any change, should there be any, from the above statement.

The federalists aided by the malcontents have done, and are doing, all the mischief that they can. The nominations to Russia, & Sweden, (the latter made on an intimation that the Crown prince would contribute his good offices to promote peace on fair conditions) they have embarrassed, to the utmost of

their power. The active partizans are King, Giles and (as respects the first nomination) S. Smith. Leib, German and Gilman, are habitually in that interest, active, but useful to their party by their votes only. The two members from Louisiana, Gailliard, Stone, Anderson, & Bledsoe, are added to that corps, on those questions. They have carried a vote 20. to 14. that the appointment of Mr Gallatin to the Russian mission, is incompatable, with his place in the treasury, & appointed a committee, to communicate the resolution to the President. They have appointed another committee to confer with him on the nomination to Sweden. The object is to usurp the Executive power in the hands of a faction in the Senate. To this, several mention'd are not parties, particularly the four last. A committee of the Senate ought to confer with a committee of the President, that is a head of a dep[t] and not with the ch : Majistrate, for in the latter case a committee of that house is equal to the Executive. To break the measure, & relieve the President from the pressure, at a time when so little able to bear it, indeed when no pressure whatever should be made on him, I wrote the committee on the nomination to Sweden, that I was instructed by him to meet them, to give all the information they might desire of the Executive. They declin'd the interview. I had intended to pursue the same course respecting the other nomination, had I succeeded in this. Failing, I have declined it. The result is withheld from the President. These men have begun, to make calculations, &

plans, founded on the presum'd death of the President & Vice-President, & it has been suggested to me that Giles, is thought of to take the place of the President of the Senate, as soon as the Vice President withdraws.

Gen! Dearborn is dangerously ill, & Gen! Lewis doing little. Hampton has gone on to that quarter, but I fear on an inactive command. Gen! Wilkinson is expected soon, but I do not know what station will be assign'd him. The idea of a com! in Ch : is in circulation, proceeding from the War dep!, as I have reason to believe. If so, it will probably take a more decisive form, when things are prepar'd for it. A security for his (the Secy!) advancement to that station, is I presume the preparation desir'd.

Your friend, etc.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

Oct! 1st 1813.

DEAR SIR,— I have read with great interest & satisfaction your remarks on finance, which I return by the bearer. We are now at the mercy of monied institutions, who have got the circulating medium into their hands, & in that degree the command of the country, by the adventurers in them, who without much capital are making fortunes out of the public and individuals. Many of these institutions are hostile to the gov!, and the others have already gone far in loans made to it. Hamilton's plan, was a reliance on monied institutions, aided by taxes, at the head of which he had plac'd a

national bank, since extinct; and Gallatins has been the same, in respect to a national bank, having proposed to reinstate it, & in respect to any species of taxes. Yours appears to me to be more simple, more consistent with original principles & with those of the Constitution, much more economical, and certain of success, in both its parts, if it could be got into operation. I fear however that that has become difficult if not impracticable, by the ascendancy gain'd by the existing institutions, and the opposition they would be sure to make, to its introduction in the radical form proposed, on which its success would principally depend. That corporate bodies would make a great struggle, before they would surrender either their power, or the profit they are making by the use of it. Something however ought to be done to relieve the nation from the burthen & danger inseparable from the present plan.

The fatiguing process of my concerns here has kept me constantly at home and engaged. We will have the pleasure to dine with you to-morrow if the weather permits, and M^r^ Hay who join'd us last night, indisposed, will accompany us, if his health should improve.

With great respect, etc.

I find among my papers a bond of yours which came into my hands, while you were in Europe, & your aff^rs^ in those of Colonel Lewis which is enclosed.

TO JAMES MADISON.[1]

WASHINGTON, December 1813.

DEAR SIR,—The following communication from the Secretary of the Navy is the cause of this letter. Just before I left the office he came into it and informed me that Genl. Armstrong had adopted the idea of a conscription, and was engaged in communicating with members of Congress in which he endeavored to reconcile them to it. I believe that the militia could not be relied on & regular troops could not be enlisted. Mr. Jones was fearful should such an idea get into circulation, that it would go far, with other circumstances to ruin the Administration. He told me that he had his information from Genl. Jacock, and he authorised me to communicate it to you. I suspect that many other members have already been sounded on it, as Mr. Roberts remarked to me yesterday that Genl. Armstrong had returned & had many projects prepared for them.

Other circumstances which have come to my knowledge ought to be known to you. Mr. Dawson called on me yesterday-week & informed me that Mr. Fisk of New York intended to move on the next day a resolution calling on you to state by what authority Genl. Armstrong had commanded the Northern Army during the late campaign—who had discharged the duties of his office in his absence, and for other information relating particularly to his issuing commissions & exercising all the duties of Secretary at War on the frontiers. I satisfied Mr. Dawson that an attack on

[1] From a draft indorsed: "To Mr. Madison—Private."

the Secretary on those grounds would be an attack on you, & that we must all support him against it, to support you. He assured me that he should represent it in that light to Mr. Fisk & endeavor to prevail on him to decline the measure. I presume he did so.

Genl. K. whom I have seen, informed me that this gentln. was engaged in the seduction of the officers of the army, particularly the young men of talents; promising to one, the rank of Brigadier, to another that of Major General, as he presumed without your knowledge, teaching them to look to him & not to you for preferment and exciting their resentment against you if it did not take effect. He says that the most corrupting system is carrying on, throughout the State of New York, particularly in the Q$^{r}$ M$^{s}$ dept., by placing in office his tools and the sons of influential men under them as clerks etc. I did not go into detail. Other remarks of his I will take another opportunity of communicating to you.

It is painful to me to make this communication to you nor should I do it if I did not most conscienciously believe that this man if continued in office will ruin not you and the administration only, but the whole republican party & cause. He has already gone far to do it and it is my opinion, if he is not promptly removed, he will soon accomplish it. Without repeating other objections to him & if the above facts are true none others need be urged, he wants a head fit for his station &, indolent except for improper purposes, he is incapable of that combination & activity which the times require. My advice to you therefore is to

remove him at once. The mere project of a conscription adopted & acted on without your approbation and knowledge, is a sufficient reason—the burning of Newark if done by his order is another—the failure to place troops at Fort George another. In short there are abundant reasons for it. His removal for either of the three, would revive the hopes of our party now desponding & give a stimulus to measures. I do not however wish you to act on my advice—Consult any in whom you have confidence. He has as you well know few friends & some of them cling to him as I suspect either from improper motives or on a presumption that you support him.

This communication is of course confidential, because I see no reason why it should be considered otherwise. Either of the persons above mentioned will if asked support the facts stated on his authority & their truth is the only material point in question.

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VIEWS RESPECTING THE REJECTION OF THE MEDIATION OF RUSSIA.

1 If it is usual for England to send more than one minister on such occasions.

Answer, the example of England not regarded in this case. The monarch does as he pleases. With us every part of the nation ought to be represented to secure confidence. Mr. Adams the Eastern States—Mr. Bayard the Middle—Mr. Clay the Western & Southern—Mr. Russell commerce—The same done in our treaty of peace, and in our several missions to France. It is believed however that England has appointed more than one on some occasions. Instance L^d^ Holland & Auckland lately to meet Mr. Pinckney & J Monroe.

2 Appointment sho^d be delayed till intelligence mentioned L^d Castlereagh's despatch rec^d—the President intimated as much himself.

Why delayed? there must be some motive for it. Can there be anything from our ministers to prevent the acceptance? A doubt might have existed at first whether the acceptance of the overture, after rejection by G. B. of Russian mediation, would give offense to the Emperor, but that must have been momentary. The proposition of the Emperor to bring the parties together to make peace was founded in a sincere desire to accomplish the object. It was his interest that peace should be made between the U States & G. B., as the war between them interrupted the commerce of Russia. After the rejection of the Russian mediation by G. Britain, and the offer to treat directly with the U States, had Russia objected to the acceptance of the overture on acc^t of such rejection, she would have counteracted what she professed to wish might succeed. Russia therefore could not be opposed to the acceptance of the overture, nor could any delay on that head be justified.

The doubt could otherwise have been entertained of the sentiments of our ministers on this head, the language of L^d Castlereagh's letter to the Sec^y of State supposing him to state the truth would have removed it. He says that our ministers had agreed not only to waive the Russian mediation, but to treat even at London. Would they have expressed their willingness to waive that mediation had they foreseen that it would have given offense to Russia, without knowing the sentiments of the gov^t, and to have conveyed that answer to L^d Cathcart's communication to the Russian gov^t, back to him thro that Gov^t, without knowing that it would not give offense?

What other cause of doubt would exist, as a reason for delaying the nomination?

This was a direct advance by the British gov^t to treat with the U States on fair and equal ground. Had it been rejected, or delayed for any time, what would not have been said against the gov^t? The U States offered to treat thro' Mr. Russell immediately after the declaration of war, which was rejected. They accepted the Russian mediation without knowing whether G. B.

would accept it. In both these instances the U States made advances, which it was just and wise to make. The nation has approved them. If the nation approved those advances, would it not have disapproved the rejection of a direct advance made to this gov$^{t}$ by the British gov$^{t}$, or any delay in accepting it.

3$^{d}$ Are there any instances of a gov$^{t}$ accepting a mediation and acting without knowing that it was accepted by the opposite party?

Believe there is no rule on this subject. Each nation acts as it thinks fit in such cases. The offer was from a distinguished sovereign, the friend of Eng$^{ld}$, as well as of the U States. It was honorable to accept it. It was wise to accept it. If G. Britain accepted it the result was likely to be safe & even advantageous. The influence of Russia would never be exerted against a just code of neutral rights. If G. Britain rejected it she would do so on her own responsibility. She would be likely to offend Russia, and even offend her own people, unless she opened the door elsewhere; and even then she would have offended Russia; for the rejection of her mediation would be an offense.

It is the offer of the Russian mediation, with our victories at sea, & its rejection by the British gov$^{t}$, that has produced this overture of a direct negotiation with the U States from that gov$^{t}$. It has gained us ground which we ought to improve. But it is said that the overture of G. Britain was a magnanimous act. That she did it when her fortune was at the height. The fact is not so, No magnanimity in it.

This opens another view of the subject, one which proves the solidity of the measures taken.

It is a truth that French victories are not more formidable to G. Britain than Russian victories, when carried to a certain extent. While Russia, Austria and Prussia balance France, and the parties remain at war, England has nothing to fear. But if either preponderates completely, then her situation becomes critical. As soon as Bonaparte is driven within his just limits. then Russia takes a new attitude, and looks at the usurpation of England by sea. The Emperor Alexander has two objects in view, one to curb the power of France, the other to curb the power of G. Britain.

Why has G. Britain rejected the Russian mediation? Because she dreaded it. Why has she offered to treat directly with us? because she wished to prevent a concert between the U States & the northern powers, to prevent our affairs, as she says, being mixed with those of the continent.

She has long dreaded this. An example is to be found in the convention between G. B. & Russia in 1801. 4 Sect: 4 art: in which it is stipulated that Russia should be placed, as to the trade between enemy colonies & the parent country, on the footing on which the U States might be placed. When she treats with one party, she endeavours to induce it to be satisfied with the conditions accorded to the other, and when she treats with the latter, she refuses, till compelled to accede to any whatever, & thus she keeps both parties at bay & suspended. She now invites us to treat by ourselves, to separate us from the continent, that is, from our friends. To take us aside; where? in her own capital, or in a bye corner, where she hopes we shall have no communication with other people.

It is a little surprising that at a moment of Russian victories, when under great obligations to Russia, she should refuse the Russian mediation. Was it an act of magnanimity to an ally, to a benefactor, to treat him with distrust and contempt?

But we are under obligations to her; she is our friend; she is most generous to us! It will be difficult to make us confide much in British friendship with the kind of proofs before our eyes.

Her object is to treat with us apart from the continent, and get us to make a treaty disadvantageous to us; without that aid which we might get by a concert & friendly communication with the northern powers.

All these political considerations are applicable in like manner to Sweden—The same interest as to neutral rights, impressment &c. The character of the crown prince, head of northern armies —Leader of the coalition—Friendly to us—connected with La Fayette—Our agent at Stockholm introduced by a letter from La Fayette—The crown the first to intimate his desire to promote an accommodation between U States & G. Britain. The appointment to Sweden intended to conciliate, & bring his aid in favor of our rights.

There ought to be a minister for that purpose—who ought to be a member of the commission. For the same reason Mr. Adams, our Minister in Russia, who has promoted the good disposition of the Emperor towards us, and toward our rights, ought to be a member of the commission.

Will we revive the armed neutrality of 1780? Not if G. B. will meet us on fair ground, & settle at this time. But if she does not we will do all we can to bring her to just terms. At this time moderate conditions will satisfy the northern powers, as well as us. Let her act fairly, & meet us in that spirit—and she may make arrangements that will be durable.

The persons nominated friendly to the war. The com$^{n}$ will compromise: Mr. Adams & Mr. Bayard, especially the latter very friendly to peace. Mr. Clay & Mr. Russell friendly to it no just conditions—But not appoint to please the enemy. The way to obtain good peace, to fight well and appoint men known to be resolved to prosecute the war till honorable terms are obtained. Appoint *peace men*, as they are called, and G. B. will think her work is done, that she has gained everything.

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TO THE PRESIDENT.

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1814.

DEAR SIR,—I inclose you two letters on the subject of finance—one from Mr. Astor, the other from Mr. Parish, the latter sent me by Mr. Dallas, whose letter is also inclosed. The two last have been shewn to Mr. Campbell; the first would have been had Mr. Astor not have written to Mr. C. himself.

On this subject I have put together some few remarks, suggested to me by what I saw abroad, particularly in the negotiation for Louisiana, and the communications into which it led with the house of Hope and Baring, which I also inclose to you.

The agent to be employed in such a trust should in my opinion be a political character of respectability, and of great purity, unconnected with commerce and loans. In looking about for such a person, Mr. Short has occurred as the most fit, but I have not mentioned him to any one, nor indeed have I spoken to any one, Mr. Campbell excepted, of late, on this subject. Mr. Campbell thinks that a contract might be formed with Messrs Astor, Parish & Girard, for five, or even ten millions, on the terms of the last loan, giving them credit for the payments.

I received yesterday a letter from Col. Pinkney, communicating the result of a conference with Col. Boynes, by which it appears that much surprise was expressed by Prevost that the idea of an armistice along the coast should have been thought of after the reply to Genl. Winder on that point. Mr. Prevost, in appointing Boynes to treat, gasconades as usual, accepting the overture as a favorable evidence of the sincerity of this government to terminate the negotiation at Gottenburg by peace. I sent the despatch to Genl. Armstrong yesterday, but will endeavour to get and forward it to you today.

## TO GENERAL DEARBORN.[1]

WASHINGTON, June 18. 1814.

DEAR SIR,—I ought to have answered your letter sooner, especially as it related to a subject which I find deeply interests you. The late extraordinary

[1] From the copy courteously supplied by Mrs. Fogg.

events in Europe, with the duties imposed on me by the arrival of the *Olivier*, will, I hope, plead my apology.

You say that you ought to have an inquiry into your conduct, to justify you against any imputation arising from the terms of the order which withdrew you from the command on the lines. I have communicated your impression to the President, who is perfectly well disposed to afford you the opportunity which you desire, at a time when it may be done without injury to the service. My own idea is that you require no vindication in the case alluded to; that public opinion has already done you justice.

You may recollect that you had been infirm, and had over estimated, no doubt, whether your health would permit you to retain the command of the troops. Of the President's constant friendship for you, and attention to every circumstance, interesting to your honor and feelings, I can speak with the utmost confidence, as I can, that this disposition towards you has undergone no change. I am satisfied that he had the highest confidence in your integrity, attachment to free gov$^{t}$ and ability to command, diminished only by the infirmity alluded to, which had more weight, considering the very active services imposed on you at your time of life. That confidence is unimpaired.

In such a mov'ment as that in which we are engag'd, every thing is experimental. The fitness of men for stations is equally so. In my opinion, you have much reason to be satisfied, because the door has been

opened to others, who, whatever may have been their merits, have not plac'd you in an unfavorable light before our country. What you did, gain^d^ you credit. Had you been continued on the frontier, exposed to the change of season & extry fatigues of the campaign, and sunk under them, by ill health, reproach and censure *might* have fallen heavily on you, as well as on the government. I am, however, far from dissuading you from taking any course which, on great consideration, you find essential to your honor or happiness. I only wish that it be not done under improper impressions, and that, in taking that which you seem to contemplate, it may be done at a suitable time. In pursuing any object which you may have in view, I beg you to command my services without reserve. Be assured it will give me sincere pleasure to be useful to you.

Always recollecting, as Mrs. Monroe & I do, with deep interest, our meeting with your Lady, in London, and the very friendly intercourse which passed between us & our families, at a time the most interesting to our country & ourselves, we beg you to assure her of our constant and affectionate regards.

With great respect & esteem, believe me
my dear Sir, sincerely yours.

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TO ——.

July 3. 1814.

DEAR SIR,—I had written the inclosed, and intended to add a parag^h^ or two to it, and deliver it to-day to Mr Gales, who had called to receive it,

when Mr. Campbell called to confer about his loan. We conferr'd together on his subject; after which, I told him that I was glad to have an opportunity of reading to him what I had written for the *Intelligencer*, to convey unofficially the sentiments of the gov^t^ on the present crisis of aff^rs^, to the publick. I read this paper. His decided opinion was that it would give too great an alarm, one beyond the real danger, & which would defeat the loan. I replied that if the loan was taken & the danger occurred, the contractors might not be able to comply; in which case, by not rousing the nation, & taking the lead on the part of the gov^t^, we should not only be charged with supineness & negligence in a great emergency, by which the nation would be taken by surprise, but gain no advantage from our contract; that he might possibly get on with the treasury a month without any loan, after which, if the danger disappeared, he might make a much more advantageous contract than he could do at this time; and if it occurred that the Congress being then in session, as I really wished it to be, would be prepared to take such legislative measures as the nature of the crisis might require. His idea was that no danger whatever existed; that G. Britain would send very few men here, and with none of the views imputed to her; that true wisdom consisted in making the best bargain now that could be made, and not lessening the price of our stock by publications or other acts tending to excite alarms: in other words, that as stock would sell well if the prospect of peace was good, and as he thought that it

was good his opinion was that we ought not to darken the prospect. I suppressed the paper, being quite willing to take no step not dictated, on the most mature consideration, by the manifest interest of the country, and the concurrence of all.

I have since reflected further on this subject, and am persuaded that it would be safest to act on the presumption that dangers which are possible will occur, I think I see manifest advantages resulting from it, without any real loss under any circumstances that may occur. Suppose the troops should not arrive, in which case only could there be any objection to the course suggested, I have no doubt that this course, which made an appeal to the nation, would give support to our negotiation. The present appears to me to be a time when silence on the part of the gov$^{t}$ can be justified by confidence & certainty only that no danger exists. If that were really the case, the fact ought to be stated. The mov'ment on the other side is active & vigorous, as we can see by the proceedings eastward. That mov'ment has more effect in consequence of our inactivity, even before the danger shows itself, and while there is a hope that we possess information of our security not known to the public. Even in this state the gov$^{t}$ shakes to the foundation. Let a strong force land anywhere, and what will be the effect? We have a great majority of the nation with us, but to give energy to our cause, we must take the passions of the people with us also.

In looking to the worst my idea really is that the Congress sho$^{d}$ be conven'd for the purpose of pro-

viding more ample funds, preventing the exportation of specie from the country, establishing a national bank, and doing everything that will give energy to the govt, & success to the war. This little supply in view, on which everything is suspended, is so temporary in its nature as to be comparatively a trifling object. It appears to me the more so, because if the basis on which [it] rests should fail, the supply itself would fail.

I have put together in haste these thoughts for your consideration, without any anxiety as to myself that they should obtain the result they contemplate. I wish only that the subject may be profoundly weigh'd.

With great respect & esteem yr friend

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON July 25. 1814

DEAR SIR,—I think you show'd me last summer a note of the courses and distances taken by Mr N. Lewis, of my land; lying between the old road, passing by my house, & the top of the mountain, being, the first purchase, which I made of Mr. Carter. Mr Lewis made this survey at the time & in consequence of Mr. Shorts purchase. I will thank you to have the goodness to send me a copy of that survey, as it may save me the trouble & expence of another.

The present appearing to be a favorable time for the sale of land in our state, I advertised my tract in Loudoun some months past, in the hope of profiting

of the high price given for such land in that county. In this I have not yet succeeded. As I lately passed thro' Richmond, it was intimated to me, that I might obtain a very advantageous price for my tract in Albemarle, in consequence of which I authorized Mr T. Taylor to sell it, provided that suggestion could be realised.

It is my intention to sell one of these estates, and to apply the money arising from the sale, to the payment of my debts, and improv'ment of the other. By this arrangement I shall try the market for both & dispose of that which can be sold to greatest advantage, intending however, not to sell that in Albemarle unless the price shall be such, as to indemnify me for the sacrifice I shall make in relinquishing a residence of 26. years standing, as mine in Albemarle has been, and near old friends to whom I am greatly attached.

Our financial affairs seem likely to take the course which it was easy to anticipate under all the difficulties of our situation. Of monied men there are few in the country, and we cannot expect to obtain cases equal to the demand, from our monied institutions, many of which are not disposed to make them. I do not know, nor do I think, that an absolute failure in that respect, would do us any injury, as it would lead to some substitute, more economical as well as consistent with the state of our country and the genius of our govt & people. Your idea had much weight on my mind, but so wedded were our financiers to the plan in operation that it was impossible to make any

impression on them, then in favor of any other. Will you have the goodness to confide to me a copy of your thoughts on this subject with which I was favor'd last year? The moment for promoting the arrangement contemplated by them is now more favorable, & I shall be happy to avail myself of it. With great respect, etc.

TO GENERAL ARMSTRONG.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 1814.

DEAR SIR,—The movement of the enemy menaces this place among others, and this, I conceive, in a more imminent degree than any other.

In aid of the measures of the Government I should be happy to proceed with a troop of horse to the coast opposite the enemy, from which point I will advise you of their force & objects so far as I may be able to collect them, & should they land, retire before them. It would be agreeable to me to set out this evening. Should you approve the suggestion, I will thank you to give an order to Gen! Van Ness to supply the force necessary. With great respect & esteem yours &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

HORSE ROAD, 21st August, 1814.

DEAR SIR,—I quartered last night near Charlotte Hall, and took a view this morning at 8 oclock, from a commanding height, below Benedict creek, of all the

enemy's shipping near the town, and down the river to the distance at least of 8 or 10 miles. I counted 23 sq: rigged vessels. Few others were to be seen, & very few barges. I inferred from the latter circumstance that the enemy had moved up the river, either against Com: Barry's flotilla at Nottingham, confining their views to that object, or taking that in their way & aiming at the city, in combination with the force on Powtowmac, of which I have correct information. I had, when I left Aquosco Mills last night, intended to have passed over to the Powtowmac, after giving you an account of the vessels from the height below Benedict: but on observing the very tranquil scene which I have mentioned, I was led by the inference I draw from it to hasten back to take a view of the enemy's movements in this quarter, which it might be more important to the govt. to be made acquainted with. I am now on the main road from Washington to Benedict, 12 miles from the latter, & find that no troops have passed in this direction. The reports make it probable that a force by land and water has been sent against the flotilla. I shall proceed with Capt. Thos. Trist immediately to Nottingham, and write you thence whatever may be deserving notice.

The enemy have plundered the country to the distance of 3 or 4 miles of all their stock &c.

The intelligence of the enemy's force in the Potowmack varies here as much as in Washington. I have had no means of forming a correct estimate of it.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

Sep. 3, 1814.

DEAR SIR,—It is necessary that I should distinctly understand my own situation to give it the greatest effect.

In the absence of the Secretary of War, on your arrival here, and of Gen! Winder the duties of both devolved on me. It was your wish that I should act in both places, and the desire of the officers and citizens concurred. The duties of the military commander was undertaken, not on the principle that I might exercise them as Secretary at War, but common consent founded on and growing out of the actual emergency.

In discharge of those duties I have acted on those principles, and I think that affairs are in such a train as to promise a happy result, not only here but at Baltimore & elsewhere, provided I have adequate support.

Since my return I understand that Genl. Winder has acted in my absence as commander of the District, in directing a guard to you, and perhaps in other things. This of course tends to deprive me of all military command. You may recollect that before he came here I offered to you to resign the momentary power which I had assumed to him, and repeated the same to him after his arrival, which you forbade, and he declined. Unless I am strongly supported I had better decline at once. There can be no interfering command or authority, and I am far from wishing to embarrass others. I prefer to aid them as a volunteer, tho' I am not unwilling to take any ground, with

the responsibility attached to it, which you may think proper to support me in.

Your friend

[Endorsement] To the President.—He called on me and stated that he would give me a commission P. T., of Secretary at War, & that I should command by consent.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

WASHINGTON 8th Sept. 1814.

SIR,—I send you several interesting letters from Baltimore particularly one from General Winder, to which I will prepare an answer, and submit it to you early this morning.

The report from Commodores Rodgers, Porter & Perry ought not to be published till I get one from Generals Hungerford & Steuart; It is, I rather think, an anomaly for naval commanders on land to report at all to the Secretary of the Navy; Naval officers ought in principle and in reason when on land to be considered as volunteering their services, and acting under the military commander: I wish however in this instance to dispense with any form not indispensable in such a case, and above all to do full justice to the patriotism and gallantry of the naval officers; all I wish to secure is such a view of these occurrences, to be presented by the militia generals, as may do justice to the conduct of the militia, and operate as an excitement to that body in future, on whom so much depends.

The report of the naval gentlemen ought not to be published till those of the militia generals are prepared, and likewise published. I send these ideas for your consideration.

and have the honor to be very respectfully &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

25 Sepr. 1814.

DEAR SIR,—I have thought much on the state of the Departments at this time, and of the persons whom it may be proper to place in them, and have concluded, that whatever may be the arrangement with regard to other Departments, that the Department of War ought to be immediately filled. I think also, that I ought to take charge of it.[1]

[1] I am sensible that the motive to my last letter may be misconceived, even by you, unless a retrospect is taken of some circumstances of a personal nature on which an opinion ought to be formed. I owe it to myself to take this retrospect, and I do it the more willingly because it will afford a strong argument in support of my letter.

The imputation to which it exposes me is that of acting under the influence of resentment or prejudice against Mr. Armstrong, for some supposed injury received from him. All the facts when noted will be remembered by you, and you will judge on a view of the whole whether my present advice is prompted by feelings of that kind, or a just regard for the interests of our country.

The supposed injury is the idea that he excluded me from the command of the northern army last campaign. That he did so I admit. That I have considered his doing so a personal injury, or acted in any one instance on that principle, I solemnly deny.

The circumstances relating to that transaction will best explain the principles which have governed his and my conduct in it.

I beg you to remember first that when war was decided on, & that an army sho$^{d}$ be raised, I expressed no wish for a military station. That you offered me, as you stated, on the suggestion of our common friends, who are the friends of free gov., the second station in it, which I declined, among other reasons, for these, that I did not wish to leave my present one, and had no desire for mili-

I have been twice brought into it by circumstances, by temporary arrangement, in consequence, I presume, of a prevailing opinion, that I might discharge its duties to the satisfaction of the public. I made the arrangements for the campaign 1813, and had I continued in the Dept., would have conducted it, on different principles from those observed by General Armstrong. I must now lay the foundation for the next campaign, and if another takes the Dept. there is no certainty that he will follow the plan which will be in contemplation.

By taking charge of the Dept. twice, and withdrawing from it a second time, it may be inferred that I shrink from the responsibility, from a fear of injuring my reputation; and this may countenance the idea, that the removal of the other was an affair of intrigue, in which I partook, especially in the latter instance, from selfish and improper motives; and did

tary service. You will remember also, that the first intimation which I gave of such a desire, was after the disgraceful surrender of our troops at Detroit, when I offered to go as a volunteer, surrendering to you my comn in the Dept. of State: that you approved the measure, and instructed the Secretary of War to cooperate with me in the means of giving it effect. That I was on the point of going. when on your return, yielding to considerations wh had also due weight with me, it was declined, & never spoken of afterwards.

You will remember also that the next instance in which I expressed a willingness to take a military command was after the termination of the campaign of 1813, when Mr. Eustis withdrew from office. The result of that campaign discouraged the last friends of the govt., and shook even the foundation of the republican party. Genl D. was infirm. Many friends expressed a desire that I would take a military station. At your request I took the Dept. of War ad interim. In doing so I stated to you, that I wod do it permanently if it was thought, taking into consideration the state of Genl Ds health & his years, he cod be relied on to retain the command of the troops—that if he cod not, and I left my present office, to render military service, I preferred taking a military command, to the Dept. of War. You concurred in the idea.

not proceed from his incompetency or misconduct. It seems due therefore to my own reputation, to go thro' with the undertaking, by accepting permanently a trust, which I have not sought, never wished, and is attended with great responsibility and hazard. By taking the place all clamour will be silenced. It is known here at least that I was put into it, when the other could no longer hold it; those who wished it in the first instance will be satisfied, and I shall go on with your support, and a favorable expectation of the public, that I shall discharge to advantage its duties.

If the office is given to another some weeks must expire before he can take it, and be able to act. For the interim it will be as if it was vacant. No one will be responsible for the safety of this place against another attack. Preparations for another year will go on heavily. In short I think that great injury to the adm$^{n}$, to the country, and its cause will arise, from suffering things to remain in that state a single week, and that every day does injury.

If the War Dept. is filled, you may take some days to fill that of the State. Its duties may be discharged in two days that are pressing, which I can do, without interference with those of the other Dept., and would wish to do, as the letters to be now written to our ministers abroad will form a kind of termination to that highly interesting branch of our affairs, and of course to my agency to them.

TO GENERAL JACKSON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Sept. 27th, 1814.

SIR,—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 10th August by Mr. Capida, and subsequent letters of August 23d 24th 25th and 27th by mail.

By these communications, which are strongly supported by others from various quarters, there is great cause to believe that the enemy has set on foot an expedition against Louisiana, thro' the Mobile, in the expectation, that while so strong a pressure was made from Canada, and in this quarter, whereby the force of the country, and attention of the government, would be much engaged, a favorable opportunity would be afforded them to take possession of the lower parts of that State, and of all the country along the Mobile.

In this, as in all their other disorganizing and visionary projects, they will be defeated, by the virtue and gallantry of our people. The European governments, reasoning from examples of their own, are always led into false conclusions of the consequences to be expected from attacks on our Union, and the distress of our citizens. This war will give them useful lessons in every quarter of the U. States where the experiment may be made.

By your last letters it seems probable that a considerable British force had been landed at Pensacola, with the connivance of the Spanish authorities there, and at Havana; and by other intelligence it may be presumed that a pressure, or at least a menace, will be made on the Western side of the Mississippi by

Nacagdoches and Natchitoches, which latter will probably be by Spanish troops, and for the purpose of menace only.

You have had at your command all the regular force in the District, with the detailed militia in Louisiana & Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee. And you have also had authority to engage on our side the warriors of the Choctaw, Chickesaw & Creek Nations, or so many of them as you might think proper to employ, having it in view, at the same time, to secure the affection and neutrality of all the members of those tribes. It is known that the regular troops are distributed into many posts, and that the militia of Louisiana will be less efficient for general purposes from the dread of domestic insurrection, so that on the militia of Tennessee your principal reliance must be.

The President, taking all circumstances into consideration, has thought proper to order five thousand additional troops from Tennessee to march to your aid as soon as possible, in the most direct and convenient routes, unless before they set out on their march they shall receive countermanding orders from you. He has likewise requested the Governor of Georgia to hold in readiness, subject to your order, twenty five thousand men, on the presumption that a cooperating force from that quarter may possibly be necessary. I send you a copy of my letter to the Governor of Tennessee, to whom you will hasten to communicate your views and wishes. Full confidence is entertained in your judgment in the discharge of this discretionary power vested in you.

Measures are taken for procuring in the neighboring towns, and forwarding to your order, blankets, and some other presents, for the Creeks, Choctaws, and other friendly Indians. These will be sent by wagons direct to . Apprehending much difficulty in the prosecution of your campaign, which it may not be in your power to remove without money, I have transmitted to Governor Blount one hundred thousand dollars in Treasury notes to be applied to the necessary expenses of the campaign, in discharging Indian claims, and supplying their wants, an object to be attended to at the present time, equally from motives of policy and humanity. You will therefore draw on him for the necessary funds. Should it be found more convenient, you are authorized to draw on this Department for such expenditures, at sixty or thirty days sight.

I have the honor to be

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON Oct$^{r}$ 4, 1814.

DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 24$^{th}$ of Sep$^{r}$, to which I shall pay particular attention, and on which I will write you again soon.

Nothing but the disasters here, and the duties which have devolved on me, in consequence, the most burthensome that I have ever encountered, would have prevented my writing you long since, as well as more recently. I have devoted this morning to a full

communication to you, but have been pressed by committees, on military topics, till the period has passed. You shall hear from me again in a few days.

With great respect, etc.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON Oct$^{r}$ 10$^{th}$ 1814.

DEAR SIR,—The suspension of payments in specie by the banks is undoubtedly a species of insolvancy. At this time, the foundation of their credit with the public, in a principal degree at least, is the stock of the U States in their possession. On it they issue their paper, for which they obtain an interest of about 7 p$^{r}$ cent. The U States pay them that interest on advances, on the credit of their own funds. The demonstration is complete, that having better credit than any bank, or than all the banks together the gov$^{t}$ might issue a paper, which would circulate without their aid, throughout the U States, and on much better terms to the public. Your letters I shall take the liberty of shewing to M$^{r}$ Dallas, who is expected here in a day or two. They were put up with my papers on the late occurrence, and are not yet unpacked, being sent to Kirby.

I shall be happy to promote the disposition of your library in the manner you propose, tho' I regret that you are to be deprived of such a resource & consolation in your retirement.

Letters were rec$^{d}$ yesterday from our Ministers at Ghent, which announce the approaching closing of

the negotiation, without any hope of peace. They will probably return in less than a month. The demands of G Britain, corresponding with what the papers had before given us, have render'd all accommodation impracticable. The President will communicate these despatches to Congress to-day, so that you may probably receive them by this mail.

Very respectfully, etc.

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TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON Nov^r 30. 1814.

DEAR SIR,—Despatches are rec^d from our ministers as late as the 31 ult^o, at which time the negotiation was depending. On paper serious difficulties seem to be remov'd, and few only to remain, the principal one of which is however important. Impressment is laid aside for the reason urg'd in the instructions to our Ministers, which is strengthened by being us'd as an argument on the part of the British Ministers. The Indian boundary is given up by them, with the claim to the exclusive command of the lakes, & occupancy of our shore, for military purposes. A stipulation of peace for the cessation of fighting on their side, to be reciprocal is all that is desir'd on that point, & and to that our Ministers have assented. In this stage the *uti possiditis* was proposed, as the basis, of the treaty relating to limits, & was suggested by intelligence that British troops had taken possession of certain parts of Maine, which was rejected by our gent^n. Thus it appears that the principal obstacle to accommoda-

tion, is the basis of the British gov^t^ to hold a part of Massachusetts, to relieve which the war goes on.

Our gent^ln^ think that if this difficulty was settl'd another would arise, believing that they are gaining time only, to see the result of negotiation at Vienna, which is very uncertain, but more likely to preserve peace than produce war. The communication will go to Congress to day but presuming that it will not be in time for the mails, I endeavour to give you an idea of the contents.

With great respect, etc.

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TO GENERAL JACKSON.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR,
Dec^r^ 7^th^, 1814.

SIR,—I had the honour to receive your letters of the 23^d^ & 31^st^ of October two days past.

I hope that my letter to you of the 21^st^ of October had reached you in time to prevent the attack which you then contemplated making on the British at Pensacola. As the conduct of the Spanish authorities there may justify the measure, the President desires that it may be avoided, in the hope that the new efforts which he is now making to obtain justice, and preserve amity with that power, may be successful Should you have made the proposed attack, you will, on the receipt of this letter, withdraw your troops from the Spanish Territory, declaring that you had entered it for the sole purpose of freeing it from British violation.

General Gaines is ordered to join you and act under you in the defence of New Orleans, and of the district under your command. Full confidence is entertained that the appointment of an officer of his merit will afford you a very acceptable aid in the discharge of your highly important duties.

Recent intelligence tends to confirm the intelligence before entertained that the enemy have already, or will soon make an attack on New Orleans. A strong force from Europe, connected with that which lately infested this bay, and the troops released from Guadaloupe and Martinique were said to be making preparation to assail you. I need not assure you of the entire confidence which exists, that you and the troops under you, will do your duty.

Much anxiety is felt lest you should remain too long on the Mobile, or at other points east of New Orleans. The city, it is presumed, is a principal object of the enemy, and it cannot be defended on either of the passes by which it may be approached, one by the river Mississippi itself, another by La Fouche, the third by Lake Pontchartrain, without occupying the ground bearing on those passes.

The Indian goods will have reached you, I presume, before you receive this letter. You shall want for nothing necessary to your comfort, and to that of our fellow citizens acting under you, which your country can supply.

I have the honor to be, etc.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON Dec^r 21. 1814.

DEAR SIR, — On inquiry I found that Major Armstead had been regularly appointed principal assessor for our district by the advice of the Senate & been furnished with his commission. It had been intended, as I understood, to app^t M^r Minor, but the office of Collector, having been disposed of in our county, it was decided on the distributive principle to confer the other office on some person in another county. The functions of the Assessor having hitherto been suspended led to the mistake that the office had not been disposed.

I have never been in a situation of as much difficulty & embarrassment as that in which I find myself. I came into it not as a volunteer. This city might have been sav'd, had the measures proposed by the President to the heads of dep^ts on the 1^st of July, and advised by them, and order'd by him, been carried into effect. For this there was full time before the attack was made. Whatever may be the merits of General Winder, who is undoubtedly intelligent & brave, an infatuation seemed to have taken possession of Gen^l Armstrong, relative to the danger of this place. He could never be made to believe that it was in any danger. The representatives of corporate bodies, committees of citizens &^c were slighted & divided both before & after the first of July. As late as the 23. of Aug^t when the enemy were within 10 miles, by a direct route & marching against it, he treated he idea with contempt altho there was no

serious impediment in their way, for the force intended for its defense, was then to be collected at the places of rendevouz & formed into an army. The battle of the next day gave the city to the enemy. The consternation attending in Alex[a] & the neighboring country need not be describ'd. The President, M[r] Rush & I return'd on the 27[th]. The squadron of the enemy was then before fort Washington. Alex[a] had capitulated; this city was prepar'd to surrender a second time, & Georgetown, was ready to capitulate. The infection ran along the coast. Baltimore totter'd, as did other places, all of which were unprepar'd to resist an immediate attack. Armstrong was at Frederick town & Winder at Baltimore. No time could be spar'd. The President requested me to act in their stead, which I did as well as I could. The citizens cooperated with me. In two or three days the Secr[y] of war return'd, but all confidence in him was gone. I observ'd to the President that the Secry. having return'd my functions must cease; that the delicate relations subsisting between the heads of dept[s] rendered it improper for me to act while he was here, without his knowledge & consent. The President saw the justice of the remark. He had an immediate interview with the Secry., the consequence of which was the departure for his home the next morning. Such was the state of affairs, and the evident tendency, that no time could be spar'd for corresponding with any one at a distance to take the office. The pressure on Alex[a], and approaching attack on Bal: with other dangers and in many quarters allowed not

a moment of respite for the depᵗ. 24 hours of inaction was sure to produce serious mischief. These considerations induc'd me to retain the office & to incur a labour, & expose myself to a responsibility, the nature & extent of which I well understood, & whose weight has already almost borne me down.

Our finances are in a deplorable state. With a country consisting of the best materials in the world, whose people are patriotic & virtuous, & willing to support the war; whose resources are greater than those of any other country; & whose means have scarcely yet been touch'd, we have neither money in the treasury or credit. My opinion always was that a paper medium supported by taxes, to be funded at proper times would answer the public exigencies, with a great saving to the Treasury. Your plan with some modifications, appear to me to be admirably well adapted to the object. Mr Dallas had decided on another, which he reported to the committee immediately after his arrival. As soon as I obtain'd my papers from Freds'burg, I put your remarks on the subject into his hands. He spoke highly of them, but adhered to his own plan, & such is the pressure of difficulties, and the danger attending it, that I have been willing to adopt almost any plan, rather than encounter the risk, of the over throw of our whole system, which has been so obvious & imminent. Mr. Dallas is still in possession of your remarks, but I will obtain & send them to you in a few days.

Of the Hartford convention we have yet no intelligence. These gentry, will I suspect, find that they

have over acted their part. They cannot dismember the union, or league with the enemy, as I trust & believe, & they cannot now retreat without disgrace. I hope that the leaders, will soon take rank in society with Burr & others of that stamp.

With great respect, etc.

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF MILITARY COMMITTEE OF SENATE.

DEPT. OF STATE, February 1815.

SIR,—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 7th ultimo, stating that the Military Committee of the Senate had observed that difficulties had arisen between the authorities of the United States and some of the individual States respecting the relative command of officers of the regular army, and of the militia, when called to act together, and were desirous of such information on the subject as this Department might possess, and of its opinion, whether some legislative provisions might not be adopted which would tend to heal such differences, to prevent the recurrence of the like for the same causes, and to facilitate the operations of the Department in other respects.

My late indisposition will I trust explain satisfactorily to the Committee the cause of the delay of my answer, which I have much regretted.

In complying with the request of the Committee, it has appeared to me advisable to communicate all the documents in this Department relating to the objects of its enquiry. By a detailed view of the several

measures which have been adopted by the President since the war for the defence of the country, in discharge of the duties imposed on him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, of the objections to these measures by the executives of some of the States, and of the correspondence between the Department and the military authorities acting under it, with the executives of such States, the Committee will see the grounds of the differences which have attracted attention, and be enabled to judge how far any legislative interposition may be useful, or proper.

The paper A. contains a copy of the letters of the Secretary of War to the Governors of the several States, detailing their respective quotas of militia under the Acts of Congress.

B. is a copy of a report of the Secretary of War to the military committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, bearing date on the 21st December 1812, communicating a division of the United States into military districts, then contemplated by the Department of War, with the reasons for it, which division, with certain modifications, was afterwards adopted.

This report treats on some subjects not immediately within the scope of the call of the Committee, yet treating in all its parts on the important subject of defence, and thereby intimately connected with the object of the call, I have thought that a view of the whole paper at this time would not be unacceptable.

C. is a copy of the answers of the Governors of

several of the States to the Department of War on the requisitions made for parts of their quotas of militia under the several acts of Congress, and of the correspondence which passed between them and the Department of War, and the commanders of the military districts acting under it, within which those States were.

D. is a copy of a correspondence between the Governor of New Jersey and the Department of War relating to the appointment of the Governor of New York to the command of the military district No. 3. A copy of this correspondence is presented to communicate to the committee every circumstance that has occurred relating to the command of the militia in the service of the United States.

It appears by these documents that the Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut & Rhode Island have objected to the requisitions made on the several States for parts of their respective quotas of militia on the following grounds: 1st, That the President has no right to make a requisition for any portion of the militia for either of the purposes specified by the Constitution unless the Executive of the State on whose militia such call is made admits that the case alleged exists, and approves the call. 2ndly That when the militia of a State should be called into the service of the United States no officers of the regular army had a right to command them, or other person not an officer of the militia, except the President of the United States in person. These being the only difficulties which have arisen between the Executive

of the United States and the Executive of any of the individual States relative to the command of the militia, known to the Department, are, it is presumed, those respecting which the Committee has asked information.

By these documents it is also shewn that certain portions of the militia were called out by the Executives of these States, and a part of them put into the service of the United States. These doctrines were nevertheless adhered to. I do not go into a detail on these points, deeming it unnecessary, as all the facts will be found in the documents.

Respecting as I do and always have done the rights of the individual States, and believing that the preservation of those rights, in their full extent, according to a just construction of the principles of our Constitution, is necessary to the existence of our Union, and of free government in these States, I take a deep interest in every question which involves such high considerations. I have no hesitation however in declaring it as my opinion that the construction given to the Constitution by the Executives of these States is repugnant to its principles, and of dangerous tendency.

By the Constitution Congress has power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment

of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The President is likewise made Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.

The power which is thus given to Congress by the people of the United States, to provide for calling forth the militia for the purposes specified in the Constitution, is unconditional. It is a complete power, vested in the National government, extending to all those purposes. If it was dependent on the assent of the Executives of the individual States it might be entirely frustrated. The character of the government would undergo an entire and radical change. The State Executives might deny that the case had occurred which justified the call, and withhold the militia from the service of the general government.

It was obviously the intention of the framers of the Constitution that these powers vested in the general government should be independent of the State authorities, and adequate to the end proposed. Terms more comprehensive than those which have been used cannot well be conceived. Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union; what laws? All laws which may be constitutionally made. Whatever laws are adopted for that purpose within the great scope of that power, which do not violate the restraints pro-

vided in favor of the great fundamental principles of liberty, are constitutional, and ought to be obeyed. They have a right to provide for calling forth the militia to suppress insurrections. This right is also unqualified. It extends to every case of insurrection against the legitimate authority of the U. States. It may be said that the government may abuse its authority, and force the people into insurrection in defence of their rights. I do not think that this is a probable danger under our system, or that it is the mode of redress, even if such abuse should be practised, which a free people, zealous of their rights, ought to resort to. The right which they have to change their Representatives, in the legislative & executive branches of the government, at short intervals, and thereby the whole system of measures, if they should think proper, is an ample security against the abuse, and a remedy if it should occur. Congress have also a right to provide for calling forth the militia to repel invasions. This right, by fair construction, is, in my judgment, an exemplification of the power over the militia, to enable the government to prosecute the war with effect, and not a limitation of it, by strict construction, to the special case of the descent of the enemy on any particular part of our territory. War exists; the enemy is powerful; his preparations are extensivė. We may expect his attacks in many quarters. Shall we remain inactive spectators of the dangers which surround us, without making the arrangements suggested by an ordinary instinctive foresight for our defence?

A regular army in sufficient extent may not exist. The militia is the principal resource. Is it possible that a free people would thus intentionally trammel a government which they had created for the purpose of sustaining them in their just rank, and in the enjoyment of all their rights as a nation, against the encroachments of other powers, more especially after they had experienced that reliance could not be placed on the States individually, and that without a general government thus endowed, their best interests would be sacrificed, and even their independence insecure?

A necessary consequence of so complete and absolute a restraint on the power of the general government over the militia would be to force the United States to resort to standing armies for all national purposes. A policy so fraught with mischief, and so absurd, ought not to be imputed to a free people in this enlightened age. It ought not, more especially, to be imputed to the good people of these States. Such a construction of the Constitution is, in my opinion, repugnant to their highest interests, to the unequivocal intention of its framers, and to the just and obvious import of the instrument itself.

The construction given to the Constitution by the Executive is sanctioned by legislative authority, by the practice of the government, and by the assent and acquiescence of all the States, since the adoption of the Constitution to the period of the late unhappy differences, respecting which the Committee has asked to be informed. By the law of 1795 the President is authorized to call forth the militia, for the purposes

mentioned in the Constitution, by a direct application to the militia officers, without any communication with, or reference to the Executives of the individual States, and penalties are prescribed for carrying the law into effect, should resort to them be necessary. It merits attention, in regard to the question under consideration, that the power given to the President to call forth the militia, is not made dependent, by this law, on the fact of our invasion having actually occurred, but takes effect in case of an eminent danger of it. In the year 1795 the President of the United States, on the certificate of a Judge of the Supreme Court that an insurrection existed in the western parts of Pennsylvania, called out the militia of several of the States, including the militia of Pennsylvania, to suppress it, which call was obeyed. In this instance the assent of the Governor of Pennsylvania to the existence of an insurrection was not asked. General Washington, who then held the office of Chief Magistrate, relied exclusively on the powers of the general government for the purpose. The opinion of the same Chief Magistrate of the power of the general government over the militia was also made known by another distinguished act of his administration. By a report from General Knox, the then Secretary of War to Congress, bearing date on the [blank] this doctrine is maintained to the utmost extent, and exemplifications of it insisted on, which prove that from the nature of our population the militia was the force which, in his judgment, ought principally to be relied on for all national

purposes. See the instances under consideration. Powers are granted to Congress for specified purposes, in distinct terms. A right to carry powers thus granted into effect follows of course. The government to whom they are granted must judge of the means necessary for the purpose, subject to the checks provided by the system. It adopts a measure authorized, supervises its execution, & sees the impediments to it. It has a right to amend the laws to carry the power into effect. If any doubt existed on this point in any case, on general principles, and I see cause for none, it cannot in the present, a power having been explicitly granted to Congress by the Constitution to pass all necessary & proper laws for carrying into execution the powers which are vested in the general government. Equally unfounded, in my opinion, is the other objection of the Executives of the States above mentioned, that when the militia of a State is called into the service of the United States no officer of the regular army, or other person not a militia officer, except the President of the United States in person, has a right to command them.

When the militia are called into the service of the United States all State authority over them ceases. They constitute a part of the national force, for the time, as essentially as do the troops of the regular army. Like the regular troops, they are paid by the nation. Like them, their operations are directed by the same government. The circumstance that the officers of the militia are appointed by, and trained under the authority of the States individually (which

must however be done according to the discipline prescribed by Congress) produces no effect on the great character of our political institutions, or on the character and duties of the militia, when called into the service of the United States.

That the President alone has a right to command the militia in person, when called into the service of the United States, and that no officer of the regular army can take the command in his absence, is a construction for which I can see nothing in the Constitution to afford the slightest pretext. Is it inferred from the circumstance that he is appointed Commander in Chief of the Militia when called into the service of the United States? The same clause appoints him Commander in Chief of the land & naval forces of the United States. Equally sound therefore would the inference be that no other person could command either the land or naval forces of the United States. In construction of law he is Commander in Chief tho' not present. His presence is not contemplated in either case. Equally necessary is it in the one as in the other. What has been the practice under the Constitution, commencing with the first Chief Magistrate, and pursuing it under his successors to the present time? Has any President ever commanded in person either the land or naval forces, or the militia? Is it not known that the power to do it is vested in him principally for the purpose of giving him control over militia & naval operations, being a necessary attribute of the Executive branch of the government? That altho' he might take the

command of all the forces under it, no President has ever done it? That a provision for the actual command is an object of legislative regulation, and the selection of the person to whom committed, of Executive discretion?

Under the commander, all the officers of every species of service and corps, regular and militia, acting together take rank with common consent and perfect harmony according to an article of war sanctioned by the Constitution. By this the officers of the regular army take rank of those of the militia of the same grade, without regard to the dates of their commission, and officers of any and every grade of the militia take rank of all officers of inferior grade of the regular army. When these troops serve together they constitute but one national force. They are governed by the same articles of war. The details for detachment, guard, or any other service are made from them equally. They are in truth blended together as much as are the troops of the regular army when acting by themselves only.

The idea advanced by the Hon^ble^ Judges of Massachusetts that when the regular troops and militia act together, and are commanded by the President in person, who withdraws, there can be no chief commander of right, of either species of force, over the whole; but that the regulars and militia as implied may even be considered as allied forces, is a consequence of the construction for which they contend. It pushes the doctrine of State rights further than I have ever known it to be carried in any other

instance. It is only in the case of powers who are completely independent of each other, and who maintain armies, and prosecute war against a common enemy for objects equally distinct, and independent, that this doctrine can apply. It does not apply to the case of one independent power, who takes into its service the troops of another, for then the command is always at the disposal of the power making War, and employing such troops, whether regular or militia. How much less does it apply to the case under consideration, where there is but one power, and one government, and the troops, whether regular or militia, tho' distinguished by shades of character, constitute but one people, and are in fact countrymen, friends & brethren.

The President is in himself no bond of union in that respect. He holds his station as Commander in Chief of the land and naval forces, and of the militia, under a constitution which binds together as one people, for that, and many other important purposes. His absence would not dissolve the bond. It would not revive discordant, latent claims, or become a signal for disorganization.

The judicious selection of the Chief Commander for any expedition, or important station, is an object of high interest to the nation. Success often depends on it. The right to do this appears to me to have been explicitly vested in the President, by the authority given to Congress to provide for calling forth the militia, organizing, arming, disciplining and governing them, when employed in the service

of the United States, and by the powers vested in him as Chief Executive of the United States. The rights of that highly respectable and virtuous body of our fellow citizens are I am persuaded completely secured when the militia officers commanding corps are retained in their command, a Major-General over his division, a Brigadier over his brigade, a Colonel over his regiment and inferior officers in their respective stations.

These rights are not injured or affected by the exercise of the right of the Chief Magistrate, a right incident to the executive power, equally applicable to every species of force, and of high importance to the public, to appoint a commander over them of the regular army when employed in the service of the United States, if he should deem it expedient. The rights of the militia officers, and those of the general government, are strictly compatible with each other, there is no collision between them. To displace militia officers for the employment of regular, or to multiply commands of a separate character, especially of small bodies, for that purpose, would be improper.

In dividing the United States into military districts, and placing a General of the regular army in command in each, with such portions of the regular force, artillery and infantry, as could be spared from other service, it was the object of the President to afford the best protection to every part of the Union that circumstances would admit of, with the least burthen that might be possible to the people.

These commanders were specially charged with the defence of their respective districts. It was enjoined on them to watch the movements of the enemy, to communicate them to the government, and to execute its orders in summoning to the field, on menace of invasion, such portions of the quotas of the militia of each State within their respective districts, as has been provided for by act of Congress, and detailed by this Department, as were thought necessary.

When this arrangement was entered into it will be observed that there was no menace of immediate invasion, and but few militia in the field. It was intended as a measure of precaution to guard against possible, but, as was hoped and presumed, distant dangers. The Executive had then no alternative between that arrangement and any other. The militia officers of rank afforded none. They were at home, for the Executive has no power under existing laws to call them into the field without a command of men suited to their rank, and even when thus called forth their term of service must expire with that of the men whom they command. These facts shew that nothing was more remote from the intentions of the government than to disregard the just claims of our fellow citizens of the militia. They show also how difficult it is to provide by any arrangement which can be adopted for a general & permanent defence of our principal cities & seaboard without employing officers who are always in service, at least in principal commands for the purpose.

It is admitted that by the increased pressure of the war, in consequence of which large bodies of militia have been called into service, and with them many general officers of experience and merit, these difficulties have proportionably diminished. Of these officers several have been already advanced to distinguished commands, with great satisfaction to their fellow citizens, and advantage to their country. The committee may be assured that opportunities of this kind regarding the obligation of a just responsibility will be seized by the Executive with pleasure.

How far these differences may be healed, or the recurrence of the like in future be prevented, by legislative provisions, the Committee, on a full view of these documents, and on a due consideration of the whole subject, will be able to decide. It is proper however to remark that the division of the country into military districts, so far as relates to that special object, requires no legislative sanction, if indeed it admits of one. The definition of boundary was intended for the purpose of prescribing a limit to the civil duties, if they may be so called, rather than the military, of the commander of each district; rather to the period preceding an invasion with a view to the necessary preparatory measures for repelling it, than after it should take place. An invasion by a large force would probably require the concentration of all our troops, along the sea coast, who might be brought to act in it. In such an event all limitations of boundary to the several commanders would cease. The march of the enemy would regulate that of our

armies, who would from every quarter be directed against them.

TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE.

DEPT. OF WAR, February 22, 1815.

SIR,—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 20th instant, requesting the opinion of this Department on the propriety of reducing the military establishment under present circumstances, and on the extent of the reduction.

The haste with which I am compelled to make this report will put it out of my power to present to the consideration of the Committee all the circumstances which merit attention, in deciding the important question.—What force ought the United States to retain in their service in the present situation of the world? The result of my reflections on the subject I do not hesitate to submit forthwith, relying on the candour of the Committee for such indulgence as may be due to time.

The late war formed an epoch of a peculiar character, highly interesting to the United States. It made trial of the strength and efficiency of our government for such a crisis. It had been said that our Union, and system of government, would not bear such a trial. The result has proved the imputation to be entirely destitute of foundation. The experiment was made under circumstances the most unfavorable to the United States, and the most favorable to the very powerful nation with whom we were engaged.

The demonstration is satisfactory that our Union has gained strength, our troops honor, and the nation character, by the contest.

The peace forms another epoch, not less interesting, tho' of a nature in some respects different from the other. By the war we have acquired a character and a rank among other nations, which we did not enjoy before. We stand pledged to support this rank and character by the adoption of such measures as may evince on the part of the United States a firm resolution to do it. We cannot go back. The spirit of the nation forbids it. The privations to which our fellow citizens have been exposed, the losses which they have suffered with extraordinary patience and fortitude, and the blood which has been gallantly shed in defence of our rights, point out our future course of conduct, and impose on us new obligations to pursue it.

In deciding on the reduction which ought now to be made of our forces attention is due to our relations with other powers.

With Great Britain an honorable peace is made, but it must be admitted that the effect of the peace in Europe laid the foundation for the peace between the United States and Great Britain. The United States did not make war to prevent a possible injury at a distant day. They declared it in retaliation for wrongs daily suffered, for which redress was refused. As soon as these wrongs ceased the causes of war ceased, and the United States were willing to put an end to it. Still the controversy itself is yet to be ac-

commodated. The presumption is that it will be accommodated, since it is certain that it may be done with honor and advantage to both nations. While the European war lasted the British government might find a motive of interest, as well as of pride, to refuse an accommodation on fair conditions; but now that peace is established that motive no longer exists. It may, without the slightest compromitment of character, meet the United States in such an arrangement as may be consistent with the honor and interests of both nations.

At this time Great Britain may be supposed to have on this Continent about 35,000 regular troops. None have been withdrawn, nor is it probable that any will be until the exchange of ratifications is known in England, if indeed it is the policy of the British government to diminish her force on this Continent. Our force ought, in some degrees at least, to be regulated by that of Great Britain. It may be presumed that the British government will watch attentively the measures which may be adopted at this moment by the United States, and infer from them the danger which may be expected of a new struggle for the same causes, and regulate its future pretensions and conduct towards us by that estimate. A yielding spirit may invite war.

With Spain our affairs are yet unsettled. The persevering resistance of the government of Spain for so long a time to the just claims of the United States has been equalled only by their moderation and forbearance. The period is perhaps arrived

when it may be practicable to settle on just and honorable conditions all our differences with that power, which is an object much to be desired. It is certain that the more independent our attitude, the better will the prospect be.

What may be the future arrangement, or combination of power among the nations of Europe is uncertain. They will undoubtedly, each of them, look to their own aggrandizement, and form such alliances as may be most likely to promote it. Absurd it would be for us to calculate on the friendship of any nation. All are governed by their interests, of which they do not always form a correct estimate. It is consoling for us to know that such is our distance from them, so great our actual strength, and abundant our resources, that if we are true to ourselves, cherishing a pacific policy, are prepared to resent wrongs, we have no cause to fear harm from any of them, nor have we any pretensions which we cannot sustain.

In reducing our force to a peace establishment, it is incumbent on the United States to afford to our fellow citizens all the relief which may be consistent with their permanent and best interests. All useless expenditures should be retrenched. It will be admitted however that a force should be retained for every necessary national purpose.

The late war has shewn our vulnerable parts, or rather our defenceless situation. It is our duty to put these parts in a proper state of defence now that we have a fair opportunity for it. If we neglect the

opportunity it is easy to foresee the consequences. Other powers knowing our weakness will calculate on it, and regulate their conduct by it. We must either submit to wrongs, insult and humiliation, or resent them by engaging in war unprepared for it. The spirit of the nation, as already observed, will not submit to the former, and recent experience has given us abundant admonition of the latter.

It seems to be our duty to fortify our coast in such a manner as to afford, in case of war, protection to our principal cities, harbours, and even to our great bays and inlets; to maintain our fortifications at the principal points on our frontiers, and to establish others, higher up the Mississippi, at such points as will secure to us in future the friendship and exclusive commerce with the Indian tribes within our limits. This may be done by the establishment of a few strong posts on that river and elsewhere, near the boundary of the United States and Great Britain, not too remote to prevent their being supplied with provisions. Under the protection of these posts trading houses would soon be opened sufficient to supply all the wants of these tribes.

From the view which I have taken of the subject I am of the opinion that not less than 20,000 troops ought for the present to be retained in service, to be composed of every species of force, that is of infantry, (including riflemen) cavalry and artillery. It will be recollected that the corps will never be complete, that they will seldom contain more than two thirds, and often not more than one half, their legal complement.

Important works have already been erected in different parts of the United States on which vast sums have been expended. Those ought to be completed. Should they be neglected they will go to decay, and the money be lost.

It appears to me to be expedient to retain the corps of engineers, and to give to the President the power to employ a few others, not exceeding four, and to give them brevet rank, not higher than that of colonel; to retain the whole of the artillery, a portion of the cavalry, of which two troops to be mounted, and the residue of infantry, including riflemen, making in the whole 20,000 men. This establishment would seldom give us 15,000 effectives, and often less than 12,000.

By retaining a part of every species of force now in service the knowledge which has been acquired in the science of war may be preserved and improved. This may be done on either of the plans which have been suggested.

Two modes have occurred by which to regulate the reduction. One by retaining the skeleton of every corps now in service, dismissing as many officers and men in each as will reduce the establishment to the proposed number; the other by reducing the number of regiments down to that standard. I will have the honor to submit to you the observations of officers of experience on this subject to-morrow, or next day.

From the reflections and calculations I have been able to make I am of opinion that the whole expense of

this establishment may be reduced to a sum not exceeding, and perhaps less than six millions of dollars. An estimate of this will be communicated to you with the observations which I have already promised.

TO ———

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have yours of the 28th, and am much gratified to find that we agree in every circumstance, as to the dangers with which we are menaced by the late events in France, and the precautions we ought to take to avoid them. It would be highly improper to suffer our squadron to sail for the Mediterranean, or to disband our army, until we see how the late events in Europe were likely to affect us. This is the moment when we may fix our destiny in the approaching European struggle, for on the part which we now act it will probably depend whether we shall ride triumphantly thro' it, profiting of the firmness and gallantry displayed in it, or have made that struggle in vain. If we take a decisive and manly attitude at once, we may, and probably shall command the respect of both parties; if we hesitate & shake we shall be sure of their contempt.

I deriv'd great satisfaction from a perusal of your report to the legislature of your State on the amendments to the constitution of the U States from some of the Eastern States. It combin'd all the learning, on the various topics on which it treated, which much research, and many discussions before and after the

adoption of the constitution in the latter stage, in relation to amendments, had shed on them, and in a manner to produce the best effect. In connection with that subject, I send you a copy of a report from the Dept. of War, which I made to a Committee of the Senate, just before the peace. It examines the relative powers of the general & State governments over the militia, meeting the opposition in those States, in a point of attack on the general government which they had pressed with great violence during the war, and by which they had paralized its measures, and done great injury in that quarter.

## TO ALEXANDER J. DALLAS.

RICHMOND, May 28, 1815.

DEAR SIR,—We have been some days at Mr. Hay's country seat near this place. My health is much improved, as is that of my family. I propose setting out for Albemarle on the first of next month, to remain there a week, & proceed thence by the President's, and Loudoun, to Washington, where I expect to arrive between the 15th & 20th I endulge the hope that when we meet you will see no trace of my late indisposition, and that I shall find that in transferring the burthen to you I may not have subjected you to the incident to it which I so severely felt.

I observe that the squadron has sail'd for the Mediterranean, & that the contemplated reduction of the army has been carried into effect. The manner in which the latter measure is announc'd is generally

and much approved here. am satified Is that the public have deriv'd all the advantage from the act enjoining the reduction, and that all the evils incident to it have been avoided, that circumstances admitted. In looking to cases of merit & distress hereafter, as they unfold themselves, the gov$^{t}$ may, & I am satisfied will reward & relieve the parties to the utmost of its power.

Is it not surprising that we hear so little from Europe of the consequences likely to result from the late change in France? The more I have reflected on the probable consequences of that important event, the more confirmed I am in the first impression which it made on my mind. If Bonaparte has been rec$^{d}$ with such unanimity as to prevent a civil war, the foreign war, if one takes place, will be confined principally to England, and probably be of short duration. Bonaparte must retake Belgium to contrast his reign with that of the Bourbons, that would secure him in France, & confining his views to it the other powers of the continent will probably acquiesce without war. Austria, if not a party to his late mov'ment, will soon be reconciled to it by the interest she takes in the fortune of her son, by accommodation which she may obtain in Italy, and by the obvious policy of looking to France for a counterpoise to the otherwise overwhelming power of Russia. France under the Bourbons affords none, Prussia is in fact in the opposite scale, and England is too much separated from the continent by her insular situation & other circumstances to hold a distinct place, & to

be relied on in such a cause. Of Spain & Naples it is hardly worth while to speak. Ferdinand is in the interest of the Bourbons, but he will be driven out after them if he does not act with caution. Murat has probably ascertained that he cannot incorporate himself with the antient powers of Europe, and must rely on the restoration of Bonaparte for his own safety. It seems probable that if Bonaparte confines his views to Belgium, and acts in a manner explicit & decided, to satisfy other powers of it, it will not be easy, if practicable, for England to draw Russia into the war against him, the distance is too great for such an enterprise, if it involves the simple question only who shall reign over France. If Russia stands aloof Prussia must, whatever may be her previous menacings, skulk from the contest. Had Bonaparte avoided his continental system, and the attempt to subjugate the continent to carry it into effect, thereby outstripping England in her usurpations, and aiming at universal monarchy, he might have engaged Russia on his side in the contest against England. It was equally the interest of Russia, or at least equally consistent with her previous policy, as it was of France, to oppose the maritime usurpations of England, & nothing turned her from that course but the overweaning ambition & gigantic usurpations of Bonaparte. It will be more difficult at this time to accomplish the same object, but still I think it practicable, if pursued with a frank and honest policy. A part of this plan should be to leave Holland independent. This would be a proof of the sincerity of

his professions in favor of moderation; it would tend to tranquilize Prussia, & save the honor of Engl^d as to the loss of Belgium. Every day we may expect to receive accounts from Europe which will dissipate all doubt on these important topics.

Whatever may be the lot of Europe I think that the U. S. have gained immense advantages by the stand which they made against England & France, and the honorable manner in which the war has been consummated with the former. These will I trust be improved in all the interests of our country to which they are applicable. It is an object important, as well as of curiosity, to see what effect the expedition against Algiers will have on the powers of Europe, particularly England. I rather think, altho' the temptation is great, that the object is too inconsiderable compared with the consequences for her to attempt the seizure of our squadron. If it makes a successful enterprise the measure will raise us in the estimation of the powers of the Continent. It will also raise us in the estimation of England, tho' at the expense of other feelings, & will raise us in our own estimation.

A question has arisen in the Revenue Department on which I was written to at Washington by Mr. Anderson of this city, & spoke to Mr. Smith while I was there. I intended to have communicated with you on it, but think it escaped me. It has been the practice of the planters & farmers in the upper country to send their produce to this place to the care of a friend, their agent, for sale; he supplies,

in their absence, their place. Their tob^o^ is inspected in his presence; he offers it for sale; several purchasing merchants are present; they request him to offer it to the highest bidder, which he does. For this it is contended that he ought to have a license, & a suit is instituted against him, & some others, for selling without one. The law, if I recollect, requires that the seller of merchandize at auction sho^d^ have a license. The produce of the country was never considered merchandize. It was called *produce* in contradistinction to *merchandize*. The latter term was deriv'd from that of merchant, & there was no merchant in this country, or in any part of the U. States, as I presume, except such as sold imported goods. A seller of lumber, flour, or fish at a northern town to a person collecting a cargo for exportation, tho' the sale be made to the highest bidder, would not, I presume, be consider'd an auctioneer. I submit these remarks to your consideration, on which I will thank you to have the goodness to communicate to me your idea to enable me to say something to the parties here. Be so kind as to drop me a line at Milton, the post office nearest my residence in Albemarle.

Is Mr. Crowinshield in health? Has Mr. Rush return'd completely restor'd? Have you good accounts of the state of Mrs. Dallas's health, & that of your whole family?

Should anything occur I may write you again before I leave this.

I am, dear Sir, with great respect &c

TO WILLIAM MARBURY, ESQ.

December 14th 1815.

SIR,—I have receiv'd your letter requesting, on the part of the directors of the farmers and mechanics bank of Georgetown, that I would state the aid which was rendered by that bank to the government in its military operations to the south under Major General Jackson, while I was charged with the Dept. of War.

I most willingly comply with your request. I remember with great interest the aid which was afforded at the interesting period to which you allude by several of the banks in this district. The directors of the farmers & mechanics bank, being informed of the demand which the department had for money to carry on very important military operations, and of the difficulty of circulating treasury notes in many parts of the country from which supplies and transportation were to be obtained, gave a prompt assurance that its whole credit should be at the disposal of the department. Their conduct corresponded with their declaration, as will be shewn by the amount of the advances which they afterwards made. The call of the dep$^{t}$ was never made in vain. All that the institution could do was done, and on very reasonable conditions. Indeed it appear'd to me that profit form'd an inconsiderable part only of the motive which governed the directors. On the same principle that I render this act of justice to your bank, I shall always be happy to extend it to others having equal claims.

TO ALBERT GALLATIN.

WASHINGTON Decr. 16, 1815.

DEAR SIR,—An attack of the prevailing epidemic has prevented my writing you as soon as I intended.

The prospect of a separation of France from England, and of a better understanding between France, Russia & the U. States, has made it probable that the situation of our minister in Paris will be more eligible than circumstances seemed to admit when you were here. The appointment of the Duke of Richelieu was made in opposition to the British Cabinet, and was resented in an open & harsh manner by the Duke of Wellington. It is understood to have been made at the instigation of the Emperor Alex$^{r}$; from which circumstances, taken together, hope is entertained that a division may take place between those leading members of the confederacy, which may connect France with Russia, & contribute to the independence of the former. Since you were here I have received a letter from the Duke of Richelieu, announcing his appointment, & expressing in strong terms a desire to establish a good understanding between the U States & France. As he intimated at the same time his willingness to communicate with Mr. Jackson on public affairs, whereby the ordinary channel was open'd and wav'd, I have thought that some importance might be attached to the preference given to a direct notification to this dep$^{t}$. I wish I could add that the salary would be encreased. The reasons for it are conclusive, & the President, as well as myself, is heartily for it, but that will depend on

Congress. Your declining has not been made public, so that it is still in your power to accept the mission, if on reconsideration you are so disposed. I have thought that these circumstances were entitled to some attention, and have therefore communicated them. Should they be deem'd by you of sufficient weight to produce a change in your mind I will thank you to have the goodness to communicate it to me.

TO PETER S. DUPONCEAU.

[June 27, 1816.]

DEAR SIR,—I took charge of the Dep$^{t}$ of War on the 30 of Augt 1814. All the letters of which copies have been sent you were written by me. The first to Gen$^{l}$ Jackson bears date on the 5th of Sep$^{r}$. To prevent a mistake as to persons my name had better be signed to each.

The most laborious effort of my life was certainly made in the dep$^{t}$ of war. When I took charge of it the enemy were menacing, with an immense force from Europe, every part of our Union. This city was still smoking, its public buildings in ruin: Alexandria had capitulated to a squadron which lay before it: Georgetown was preparing to follow the example: Baltimore, & in fact the whole coast, was agitated with the impending danger. The dep$^{t}$ of war was vacant. It had become so by the voluntary act of the late incumbent. I had no desire to supply the vacant office.

I have now the pleasure to forward to you copies of

all the documents not lately transmitted, & which have not heretofore been published, relating to Gen! Jackson's campaign, which appear to be of the slightest importance. Of those already published, such as are not in the memoir will be found in Niles' Register. You will arrange them in the manner you think best, & should you find anything deficient, I shall be happy to supply on y^r^ pointing it out.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

June 27, 1816.

DEAR SIR,—I return'd here yesterday morning, having been prevented arriving the preceding evening by the rain.

The case with Algiers is interesting. The sentiments expressed in y^r^ letter of the 25., which I have just received, accord in every circumstance with those of the gentlemen in the administration here. Anxious to communicate theirs to you, we had an informal meeting on the subject yesterday, in which the questions stated in yours were adverted to, and the opinion the same, that is, that the treaty of the last year ought to be maintained, and its ratification by the Dey demanded, prior to which no discussion was to be admitted, or claim heard, for reparation for any injury sustained by the Dey, by reason of the detention of the Brig by Spain. If any gratuity was given afterwards on that account, it should be a mere gratuity, not a condition of the ratification. The force already in the Mediterranean, augmented as it will be by Com^rs^

Chauncey's 74. will probably be sufficient to secure a compliance with our demands.

The conduct of Spain is, in this instance, in accord with it in every other, disrespectful, disingenuous, and unfriendly. I shall write the letter which you suggest to Mr. Onis. In his former letter he intimated that his government had decided to give up the Brig to Algiers, to prevent any misunderstanding between the U. S. & Spain, from motives of friendship to the U. S. Will it not be better to rest the intended one to him on that ground, expressing surprise that the Dey should make a demand on us on that account, especially as we had fulfilled our gratuitous promise, by putting his officers in possession of her at Carthagena? An enquiry may be made of him consistently with that ground, whether the vessel was given up, or the crew, for any consideration made directly to Spain, not by way of implication against his government, but to obtain such evidence as to enable this government to refute any insinuation of the Dey to that effect. If we quarrel with Spain, the more guarded we are in every step we take, and the more we put her in the wrong, the better the effect here & in Europe.

How will it do to appoint Mr. Poinsett one of three commissioners to manage this business with Algiers? It requires skill in all its bearings, especially in relation to Spain. The other two to be Mr. Shaler & Comm^re^ Chauncey. There is a small corvette, Mr. Crowninshield informs me, which would be ready to sail in a fortnight, if you find it necessary to communicate in haste with Mr. Shaler.

Another case has occurred with Spain not less delicate than the preceding. The enclosed papers shew that not less than 25 vessels have turned Cape Horn to take fish in the Pacific, one of which has been seized at Lima by the govt of the place, on the pretext that she wanted a sea-letter. Mr. Gardner of Nantucket has been deputed here by the parties interested, who fear that all the vessels, estimated at ½ a million of ds, will suffer the same fate. The object of his visit is to lay the affair before the govt, & he states confidentially that it would be highly gratifying to the parties interested, and have a happy effect on the public feeling in that quarter, if such application as the govt may decide to make could be forwarded into that sea by a frigate, and suitable agent. Mr. Onis, on application, would probably facilitate the measure, especially as the circumstances attending the case might be explained to him, which would shew that if a sea-letter be necessary, in any view, the parties were not to blame, as the Govt thought otherwise. Mr. Crowinshield says that the Macedonian may be expected back in 2 or 3 weeks, and that she might be spared for such service. Should you decide to send a frigate, who would be the agent to take charge of the business with the Provinces where any of these vessels may be seized?

TO THE PRESIDENT.

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1816.

DEAR SIR,—I had an interview with Mr. Bagot yesterday on the subject of the fisheries. He pro-

poses to allot for our use a certain tract on the Labrador shore, lying between Mount Joli and the Strait of Belle Isle, a distance of more than 150 miles, being between 2 and 3 degrees. Ships which descend the S$^{t}$ Laurence pass generally I believe thro' that Strait by Mount Joli. His idea is to stipulate this right to us, and to preclude us from curing and drying fish in any other part of the British Provinces, or fishing within the marine league of the shore. I am inclined to think that he will agree to such a form of stipulation as will not presume a concession of the right, under the Treaty of 1783, in consequence of the late war, tho' we did not enter into any precise explanation on that point, it being unnecessary to do it until I had ascertained the value of the coast offered. We parted to afford me an opportunity to acquire that knowledge, to obtain which I communicated with Mr. Homary, and have likewise written to Mr. Crowninshield—Mr. Homary knew little himself, but will apply to those who are better acquainted for the desired information. I do not know that Mr. Bagot will extend the accommodation farther, or that he possesses the power. His manner is candid; he wishes to put nothing on paper to irritate; to agree if we can, and in that case in the simplest and most concise form, and if we cannot to let the affair rest, as if nothing had been done.

Two modes occur by which the arrangement may be made without injury to our right—1$^{st}$ the obvious one of stating by preamble that a difference of opinion existing on that point, to obviate which it is

agreed that each party shall retain its right, but inasmuch as Great Britain is desirous of extending to the citizens of the U. S. the advantage which they have heretofore enjoyed of fishing &c.—in a manner not to injure &c.—, and the U. S. are equally desirous to enter into such an arrangement as will prevent such injury, it is therefore agreed &c.—.2d To state that it appearing that the use of those shores, for curing and drying fish, by the citizens of the U. S. had done injury to &c.—by interfering with the inhabitants, and by favoring contraband &c.—to prevent which it was agreed &c.—I shall be glad to know in what mode you think this arrangement, if any is made, had better be entered into, and that you would be so kind, if you have leisure, to sketch on paper the form of an article. I fear that ten days will elapse before I can hope for an answer from Mr. Crowninshield.

Mr. Bagot informed me that he had a power to arrange the naval force on the Lake, which we would enter on after the other should be concluded. On this subject I shall wish your sentiments and direction. I have written fully to Mr. Adams heretofore letters which you approved, but it is probable that some ideas may have occurred to you since on it.

The affair of the Consul with Russia, instruction to Mr. Shaler founded on the communication with Mr. Onis respecting the Algerine brig, and the instruction to Mr. Erving on the same subject, with this business with Mr. Bagot, will, I fear, keep me here a considerable time. I do not see how I can get off till the

whole is concluded, and I shall have no hope of that in less than a fortnight, if so soon.

Very respectfully and sincerely yours,

The enclosed letter from Mr. Adams goes to many points to which the attention was naturally drawn by the expedition and arrangements of Lord Exmouth in the Mediterranean. Altho' I do not think that the British Minister has removed all cause for suspicion that the practice of the Dey is countenanced and sustained by his government, it is gratifying to see that it will not interfere with our operations there.

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TO GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON.

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1816.

DEAR SIR,—I have since my last to you had the pleasure of receiving two letters from you, the last of the 12. of Nov^r. The advantage of the late treaties with the Indians is incalculable. One of the benefits consists in putting an end to all dissatisfaction on the part of Tennessee, proceeding from the former treaty. This has been done on very moderate terms. Another consists in enabling the government to bring to market a large body of valuable land, whereby the public debt may be considerably diminished. A third in extending our settlements along the Mississippi, and towards the Mobile, whereby great strength will be added to our Union in quarters where it is most wanted. As soon as our population gains a decided preponderance in those regions East Florida will hardly be considered by Spain as a part

of her dominions, and no other power would accept it from her as a gift. Our attitude will daily become more imposing on all the Spanish dominions, and indeed on those of other powers in the neighbouring Islands. If it keeps them in good order in our relations with them, that alone will be an important consequence. I have communicated what you suggested, respecting Gen! Coffee and Lieut. Gadsden, to the President, who is, I am satisfied, well disposed to promote their views.

It is very gratifying to me to receive your opinions on all subjects on which you will have the goodness to communicate them, because I have the utmost confidence in the soundness of your judgment, and purity of your intentions. I will give you my sentiments on the interesting subject in question likewise without reserve. I agree with you decidedly in the principle that the Chief Magistrate of the Country ought not to be the head of a party, but of the nation itself. I am also of opinion that the members of the federal party who left it in the late war, and gallantly served their Country in the field, have given proofs of patriotism and attachment to free government that entitle them to the highest confidence. In deciding however how a new administration ought to be formed, admitting the result to correspond with the wishes of my friends, many considerations claim attention, as on a proper estimate of them much may depend the success of that administration, and even of the republican cause. We have heretofore been divided into two great parties. That some of the leaders

of the federal party entertained principles unfriendly to our system of government I have been thoroughly convinced; and that they meant to work a change in it, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances, I am equally satisfied. It happened that I was a Member of Congress under the Confederation just before the change made by the adoption of the present Constitution, and afterwards of the Senate, beginning shortly after its adoption. In the former I served three years, and in the latter rather a longer term. In these stations I saw indications of the kind suggested. It was an epoch at which the views of men were most likely to unfold themselves, as, if anything favorable to a higher toned government was to be obtained, that was the time. The movement in France tended also to test the opinions and principles of men, which were disclosed in a manner to leave no doubt on my mind of what I have suggested. No daring attempt was ever made, because there was no opportunity for it. I thought that Washington was opposed to their schemes, and not being able to take him with them that they were forced to work, in regard to him, underhanded, using his name, and standing with the nation, as far as circumstances permitted, to serve their purposes. The opposition, which was carried on with great firmness, checked the career of this party, and kept it within moderate limits. Many of the circumstances on which my opinion is founded took place in debate, and in society, and therefore find no place in any public document. I am satisfied however that sufficient proof exists,

founded on facts, and opinions of distinguished individuals, which became public, to justify that which I had formed.

The contest between the parties never ceased, from its commencement to the present time, nor do I think that it can be said now to have ceased. You saw the height to which the opposition was carried in the late war; the embarrassment it gave to the government, the aid it gave to the enemy. The victory at New Orleans, for which we owe so much to you, and to the gallant free men who fought under you, and the honorable peace which took place at that time have checked the opposition, if they have not overwhelmed it. I may add that the daring measure of the Hartford Convention, which unfolded views which had been long before entertained, but never so fully understood, contributed also in an eminent degree to reduce the opposition to its present state. It is under such circumstances that the election of a successor to Mr. Madison has taken place, and that a new administration is to commence its service. The election has been made by the republican party, supposing that it has succeeded, and of a person known to be devoted to that cause. How shall he act? How organize the administration, so far as dependent on him, when in that station? How fill the vacancies existing at the time?

My candid opinion is that the dangerous purposes which I have adverted to were never adopted, if they were known, especially in their full extent, by any large portion of the federal party; but were

confined to certain leaders and they principally to the eastward. The manly and patriotic conduct of a great proportion of that party in the other States, I might perhaps say of all who had an opportunity of displaying it, is a convincing proof of this fact. But still, southern and eastern federalists have been connected together as a party, have acted together heretofore, and altho' their conduct has been different, of late especially, yet the distinction between republicans and federalists, even in the Southern and Middle and Western States, has not been fully done away. To give effect to free government, and secure it from future danger, ought not its decided friends, who stood firm in the day of trial, to be principally relied on? Would not the association of any of their opponents in the Administration itself wound their feelings, or, at least, of very many of them, to the injury of the republican cause? Might it not be considered by the other party as an offer of compromise with them, which would lessen the ignominy due to the councils which produced the Hartford convention, and thereby have a tendency to revive that party on its former principles? My impression is that the Administration should rest strongly on the republican party, indulging towards the other a spirit of moderation, and evincing a desire to discriminate between its members, and to bring the whole into the republican fold as quick as possible. Many men very distinguished for their talents are of the opinion that the existence of the federal party is necessary to keep union and order in the republican ranks, that is that

free government cannot exist without parties. This is not my opinion. That the ancient republics were always divided into parties; that the English government is maintained by an opposition, that is by the existence of a party in opposition to the Ministry, I well know. But I think that the cause of these divisions is to be found in certain defects of those governments, rather than in human nature; and that we have happily avoided those defects in our system. The first object is to save the cause, which can be done by those who are devoted to it only, and of course by keeping them together; or, in other words, by not disgusting them by too hasty an act of liberality to the other party, thereby breaking the generous spirit of the republican party, and keeping alive that of the federal. The second is, to prevent the reorganization and revival of the federal party, which, if my hypothesis is true, that the existence of parties is not necessary to free government, and the other opinion which I have advanced is well founded, that the great body of the federal party are republican, will not be found impracticable. To accomplish both objects, and thereby exterminate all party divisions in our country, and give new strength and stability to our government, is a great undertaking, not easily executed. I am nevertheless decidedly of opinion that it may be done, and should the experiment fail, I shall conclude that its failure was imputable more to the want of a correct knowledge of all circumstances claiming attention, and of sound judgment in the measures adopted, than to any other cause. I agree, I think, perfectly with you in the great object, that

moderation should be shewn to the federal party, and even a generous policy adopted towards it; the only difference between us seems to be how far shall that spirit be indulged in the outset, and it is to make you thoroughly acquainted with my views on this highly important subject that I have written to you so fully on it. Of the gentleman of whom you have spoken I think as you do, of which I gave him proof when in the Dept. of War, by placing him in the board of officers for digesting and reporting a system of discipline for the army, and afterwards by other tokens of confidence, and I add with pleasure that I should be gratified, regarding the feelings and claims above stated, to find an opportunity, at a proper time hereafter, (should the event in contemplation occur) to add other proofs of my good opinion and high respect for him.

In the formation of an Administration it appears to me that the representation principle ought to be respected, in a certain degree at least, and that a head of a Department (there being four) should be taken from the four sections of the Union, the East, the Middle, the South and the West. This principle should not be always adhered to. Great emergencies and transcendant talents would always justify a departure from it. But it would produce a good effect to attend to it when practicable. Each part of the Union would be gratified by it, and the knowledge of local details and means, which would be thereby brought into the Cabinet, would be useful. I am nowise compromitted in respect to anyone, but free to act, should I have to act, according to my own

judgment, in which I am thankful for the opinions of my friends, and particularly for yours.

On the subject of fortifications, or works, for the defence of the coast and frontiers, an arrangement has lately been made by the President with which I wish you to be well acquainted. You have, I presume, heretofore been apprized that General Bernard, of the French corps of engineers, under the recommendation of Gen! La Fayette, and many others of great distinction in France, had offer'd his services to the U. States, and that the President had been authorized by a resolution of Congress to accept them, confining his rank to the grade of the chief of our Corps. This resolution being communicated to Gen! Bernard by the late Secretary of War, to whom he was known, he came over, in compliance with the invitation which accompanied it. From Mr. Gallatin he brought letters stating that he was the 7$^{th}$ in rank in the Corps, and inferior to none in reputation and talents, if not first. It required much delicacy in the arrangement, to take advantage of his knowledge and experience in a manner acceptable to himself, without wounding the feelings of the officers of our own Corps, who had rendered such useful services, and were entitled to the confidence and protection of their country. The arrangement adopted will I think accomplish fully both objects. The President has instituted a board of officers, to consist of five members, two of high rank in the Corps, Gen! Bernard, the Engineer at each station (of young Gadsden, for example, at New Orleans) and the naval officer commanding there,

whose duty it is made to examine the whole coast, and report such works as are necessary for its defence to the chief Engineer, who shall report the same to the Secretary of War, with his remarks, to be laid before the President. M$^{c}$ Rae and Totten are spoken of for the two first, who, with General Bernard, will continue 'till the service is performed; the two latter will change with the station. The General commanding each division will be officially apprized of this arrangement that he may be present when he pleases, and give such aid as he may think fit. The attention of the Board will be directed to the Inland Frontiers likewise. In this way it is thought that the feelings of no one can be hurt. We shall have four of our officers in every consultation against our foreigner, so that if the opinion of the latter becomes of any essential use it must be by his convincing his colleagues, where they differ, that he has reason on his side. I have seen Gen$^{l}$ Bernard, and find him a modest unassuming man, who preferred our country, in the present state of France, to any in Europe, in some of which he was offered employment, and in any of which he might probably have found it. He understands that he is never to have the Command of the Corps, but always will rank second in it.

This letter you will perceive is highly confidential, a relation which I wish always to exist between us. Write me without reserve, as you have done, and the more so the more gratifying your communications will be.

With great respect and sincere regard yours.

# APPENDICES.

# APPENDICES.

## NOTES—INSTRUCTIONS—MEMORANDA.

### TO AUGUSTUS J. FOSTER.

July 23, 1811.

SIR,—I have submitted to the President your several letters of the 3rd and 16th. of this month relative to the British Orders in Council, and the blockade of May 1806, and I have now the honour to communicate to you his sentiments on the view which you have presented of the measures of your Government.

It was hoped that your communication would have led to an immediate accommodation of the differences subsisting between our countries on the ground on which alone it is possible to meet you. It is regretted that you have confined yourself to a vindication of the measures which produced some of them.

The United States are as little disposed now as heretofore to enter into the question concerning the priority of agression by the two belligerents which could not be justified by either, by the priority of those of the other. But as you bring forward that plea in support of the orders in Council, I must be permitted to remark that you have yourself furnished a conclusive answer to it by admitting that the blockade of May 1806 which was prior to the first of the French decrees would not be legal unless supported through the whole extent of the coast from Elbe to Brest by adequate naval force. That such a naval force was actually applied and continued in the requisite strictness until that blockade was comprised in and superceded by the orders of November of the following year, or even of the French decree of the same year will not I presume be alleged.

By waiving this question of priority can it be seen without both

surprise and regret, that it is still contended that the orders in council are justified by the principle of retaliation and that this principle is strengthened by the inability of France to enforce her decrees? A retaliation is, in its name and its essential character, a returning a like for like. Is the deadly blow of the orders in Council against one-half of our commerce a return of like for like to an empty threat in the French decrees against the other half? It may be a vindictive hostility as far as its effect falls on the enemy. But when falling on a neutral who on no pretext can be liable for more than the measure of injury received through such neutral, it would not be a retaliation but a positive wrong, by the plea on which it is founded.

It is to be further remarked that the orders in Council went even beyond the plea, such as this has appeared to be, in extending its operation against the trade of the United States with nations which, like Russia, had not adopted the French decrees, and with all nations which had merely excluded the British Flag; an exclusion resulting, as a matter of course, with respect to whatever nation with which Great Britain might happen to be at war.

I am far from viewing the modification originally contained in these orders, which permits neutrals to prosecute their trade with the Continent through Great Britain, in the favorable light in which you represent it. It is impossible to proceed to notice the effect of this modification, without expressing our astonishment at the extravagance of the political pretension set up by it; a pretension which is utterly incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of other States. In a commercial view it is not less objectionable, as it cannot fail to prove destructive to neutral commerce. As an enemy Great Britain cannot trade with France; nor does France permit a neutral to come into her ports from Great Britain. The attempt of Great Britain to force our trade through her ports would have, therefore, the commercial effect of depriving the United States altogether of the market of her enemy for their productions, and of destroying their value in her market by a surcharge of it. Heretofore it has been the usage of belligerent nations to carry on their trade through the intervention of neutrals, and this had the beneficial effect of extending to the former the advantages of peace while suffering under

the calamities of war. To reverse the rule, and to extend to nations at peace the calamities of war, is a change as novel and extraordinary as it is at variance with justice and public law.

Against this unjust system the United States entered, at an early period, their solemn protest. They considered it their duty to evince to the world their high disapprobation of it, and they have done so by such acts as were deemed most consistent with the rights and the policy of the nation. Remote from the contentious scene which desolates Europe, it has been their uniform object to avoid becoming a party to the war. With this view they have endeavored to cultivate friendship with both parties by a system of conduct which ought to have produced that effect. They have done justice to each party in every transaction in which they have been separately engaged with it. They have observed the impartiality which was due to both as belligerants standing on equal ground, having, in no instance, given a preference to either at the expense of the other. They have borne too with equal indulgence, injuries from both, being willing, while it was possible, to impute them to casualties inseparable from a state of war, and not to a deliberate intention to violate their rights. And even when that intention could not be mistaken, they have not lost sight of the ultimate object of their policy. In the measures to which they have been compelled to resort, they have, in all respects, maintained pacific relations with both parties. The alternative presented by their late acts was offered equally to both, and could operate on neither, no longer than it should persevere in its aggressions on our neutral rights. The embargo and non-intercourse were pacific measures. The regulations which they imposed on our trade were such as any nation might adopt in peace or war, without offence to any other nation. The non-importation is of the same character; and if it makes a distinction at this time in its operation between the belligerants, it necessarily results from a compliance of one with the offer made to both, and which is still open to the compliance of the other.

In the discussions which have taken place on the subject of the orders in council and blockade of May 1806 the British Government, in conformity to the principle on which the orders in Council are said to be founded, declared that they should cease to operate

as soon as France revoked her edicts. It was stated also that the British Government would proceed *pari passu* with the Government of France in the revocation of her edicts. I will proceed to show that the obligation on Great Britain to revoke her orders is complete, according to her own engagement, and that the revocation ought not to be longer delayed.

By the Act of May 1, 1810, it is provided that, if either Great Britain or France should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President should declare by proclamation, and the other party should not, within three months thereafter, revoke or modify its edicts in like manner, that then certain sections in a former act, interdicting the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, should, from and after the expiration of three months, from the date of the proclamation, be revived and have full force against the former, its colonies, and dependencies, and against all articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the same.

The violations of neutral commerce, alluded to in this act, were such as were committed on the high seas. It was in the trade between the United States and the British dominions that France had violated the neutral rights of the United States by her blockading edicts. It was in the trade with France and her allies that Great Britain had committed similar violations by similar edicts. It was the revocation of those edicts, so far as they committed such violations, which the United States had in view when they passed the law of May 1, 1810. On August 5, 1810, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed a note to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, informing him that the decrees of Berlin and Milan were revoked, the revocation to take effect on the 1st. November following; that the measure had been taken by his Government in confidence that the British Government would revoke its orders, and renounce its new principle of blockade, or that the United States would cause their rights to be respected, conformably to the Act of May 1, 1810.

This measure of the French Government was founded on the law of May 1, 1810; as is expressly declared in the letter of the Duke of Cadore announcing it. The edicts of Great Britain, the

revocation of which were expected by France, were those alluded to in that Act; and the means by which the United States should cause their rights to be respected in case Great Britain should not revoke her edicts, were likewise to be found in the same act. They consisted merely in the enforcement of the non-importation act against Great Britain in that unexpected and improbable contingency.

The letter of August 5th which announced the revocation of the French decrees was communicated to this Government, in consequence of which the President issued a proclamation on the 2nd November, the day after that on which the repeal of the French decrees was to take effect, in which he declared that all the restrictions imposed by the Act of May 1, 1810, should cease and be discontinued in relation to France and her dependencies. It was a necessary consequence of this proclamation, also, that if Great Britain did not revoke her edicts, the non-importation law would operate against her at the end of three months. This actually took place. She declined the revocation and, on the 2nd. February last, that law took effect. In confirmation of the proclamation an Act of Congress was passed on the 2nd. March following.

Great Britain still declines to revoke her edicts on the pretension that France has not revoked hers. Under that impression she infers that the United States have done her injustice by carrying into effect the non-importation law against her.

The United States maintain that France has revoked her edicts, so far as they violated their neutral rights and were contemplated by the law of May 1, 1810, and have on that ground, particularly claimed and do expect of Great Britain a similar revocation.

The revocation announced officially by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris on the 5th. of August 1810, was in itself sufficient to justify the claim of the United States to a correspondent measure from Great Britain. She had declared that she would proceed *pari passu* in the repeal with France, and, the day being fixed when the repeal of the French decrees should take effect, it was reasonable to conclude that Great Britain would fix the same day for the repeal of her orders. Had this been done the proclamation of

the President would have announced the revocation of the edicts of both Powers at the same time, and, in consequence thereof, the non-importation law would have gone into operation against neither. Such too is the natural course of proceedings in transactions between independent States, and such the conduct which they generally observe towards each other. In all compacts between nations, it is the duty of each to perform what it stipulates, and to presume on the good faith of the other for a like performance. The United States having made a proposal to both belligerants were bound to accept a compliance from either; and it was no objection to the French compliance, that it was in a form to take effect on a future day, that being a form not unusual in laws and other public acts. Even when nations are at war and make peace, this obligation of mutual confidence exists and must be respected. In treaties of commerce by which their future intercourse is to be governed, the obligation is the same. If distrust and jealousy are allowed to prevail the moral tie which binds nations together in all their relations, in war as well as in peace, is broken.

What would Great Britain have hazarded by a prompt compliance in the manner suggested? She had declared that she had adopted the restraints imposed by her orders in council with reluctance because of their distressing effect on neutral Powers. Here, then, was a favorable opportunity presented to her to withdraw from that measure with honor, be the conduct of France afterwards what it might. Had Great Britain revoked her orders and France failed to fulfil her engagements, she would have gained credit at the expense of France, and could have sustained no injury by it, because the failure of France to maintain her faith would have replaced Great Britain at the point from which she had departed. To say that a disappointed reliance on the good faith of her enemy would have reproached her foresight, would be to set a higher value on that quality than on consistency and good faith, and would sacrifice to a mere suspicion towards an enemy the plain obligations of justice towards a friendly power.

Great Britain has declined proceedings *pari passu* with France in the revocation of their respective edicts. She has held aloof, and claims of the United States proof, not only that France has

revoked her decrees, but that she continues to act in conformity with that revocation.

To show that the repeal is respected, it is deemed sufficient to state that no one vessel has been condemned by French tribunals, on the principle of those decrees, since the 1st of November last. The New Orleans Packet from Gibraltar to Bordeaux was detained, but never condemned. The Grace Ann Greene, from the same British port to Marseilles, was likewise detained, but afterwards delivered up unconditionally to the owner, as was such part of the cargo of the New Orleans Packet as consisted of the produce of the United States. Both these vessels, proceeding from a British port carried cargoes, some articles of which in each were prohibited by the laws of France or admissable by the sanction of the Government alone. It does not appear that their detention was imputable to any other cause. If imputable to the circumstance of passing from a British to a French port, or on account of any part of their cargoes, it affords no cause of complaint to Great Britain as a violation of our neutral rights. No such cause would be afforded, even in a case of condemnation. The right of complaint would have belonged to the United States.

In denying the revocation of the decrees, so far as it is a proper subject of discussion between us, it might reasonably be expected that you would produce some examples of vessels taken at sea in voyages to British ports or on their return home, and condemned under them by a French tribunal. None such have been offered by you, none such are known to this Government.

You urge only, as an evidence that the decrees are not repealed, the speech of the Emperor of France to the deputies from the Free Cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck; the imperial edict, dated at Fontainebleu on the 19th October 1810; the report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated in December last; and a letter of the Minister of Justice to the President of the Council of Prizes of the 25th of that month.

There is nothing in the first of these papers incompatible with the revocation of the decrees, in respect to the United States. It is distinctly declared by the Emperor, in his speech to the deputies of the Hanse towns, that the blockade of the British

Islands shall cease when the British blockades cease, and that the French blockade shall cease in favor of those nations in whose favor Great Britain revokes hers, or who support their rights against her pretension, as France admits the United States will do by enforcing the non-importation act. The same sentiment is expressed in the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The decree of Fontainebleu, having no effect on the high seas, cannot be brought into this discussion. It evidently has no connection with neutral rights. The letter from the Minister of Justice to the President of the Council of Prizes is of a different character. It relates in direct terms to this subject, but not in the sense in which you understand it. After reciting the note from the Duke of Cadore of the 5th August last, to the American Minister at Paris, which announced the repeal of the French decrees, and the Proclamation of the President in consequence of it, it states that all causes arising under those decrees after the 1st. November, which were then before the Court or might afterwards be brought before it, should not be judged by the principles of the decrees, but be suspended until the 2nd. February, when the United States having fulfilled their engagement, the captures shall be declared void and the vessels and their cargoes delivered up to their owners. This paper appears to afford an unequivocal evidence of the revocation of the decrees, so far as relates to the United States. By instructing the French tribunal to make no decision until the 2nd. February, and then to restore the property to the owners on a particular event, which has happened, all cause of doubts on that point seems to be removed. The United States may justly complain of delay in the restitution of that property, but that is an injury which affects them only. Great Britain has no right to complain of it. She was interested only in the revocation of the decrees, by which neutral rights would be secured from future violation; or, if she had been interested in the delay, it would have afforded no pretext for more than a delay in repealing her orders till the 2nd. February. From that day, at furthest, the French decrees would cease. At the same day ought her orders to have ceased. I might add to this statement that every communication received from the French Government,

either through our representative there, or its representative here, are in accord with the actual repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees in relation to the neutral commerce of the United States. But it will suffice to remark that the best and only adequate evidence of their ceasing to operate is the defect of evidence that they do operate. It is a case where the want of proof against the fulfilment of a pledge is proof of the fulfilment. Every case occurring to which, if the decrees were in force, they would be applied, and to which they are not applied, is a proof that they are not in force. And if these proofs have not been more multiplied, I need not remind you that a cause is to be found in the numerous captures under your orders in Council which continue to evince the rigour with which they are inforced, after a failure of the basis on which they are supposed to rest.

But Great Britain contends as appears by your last letter, that she ought not revoke her orders in Council until the commerce of the Continent is restored to the state in which it stood before the Berlin and Milan decrees were issued; until the French decrees are repealed, not only as to the United States, but so as to permit Great Britain to trade with the Continent. Is it then meant that Great Britain should be allowed to trade with all the Powers with whom she traded at that epoch? Since that time France has extended her conquests to the North, and raised enemies against Great Britain where she then had friends. Is it proposed to trade with them notwithstanding the change in their situation? Between the enemies of one date and those of another no discrimination can be made. There is none in reason, nor can there be any of right, in practice. Or do you maintain the general principle, and contend that Great Britain ought to trade with France and her allies? Between enemies there can be no commerce; the vessels of either taken by the other are liable to confiscation and are always confiscated; the number of enemies or extent of country which they occupy cannot affect the question. The laws of war govern the relation which subsists between them, which, especially in the circumstances under consideration, are invariable. They were the same in times the most remote that they now are. Even if peace had taken place between Great Britain and the

Powers of the Continent, she could not trade with them without their consent. Or does Great Britain contend that the United States, as a Neutral Power, ought to open the Continent to her commerce on such terms as she may designate? On what principles can she set up such a claim? No example of it can be found in the history of past wars, nor is it founded in any recognised principle of war or in any semblance of reason or right. The United States could not maintain such claim in their own favour though neutral. When advanced in favour of an enemy, it would be the most preposterous and extravagant claim ever heard of. Every Power, when not restrained by treaty, has a right to regulate its trade with other nations in such manner as it finds most consistent with its interests; to admit and on its own conditions, or to prohibit the importation of such articles as are necessary to supply the wants or encourage the industry of its people. In what light would Great Britain view an application from the United States for the repeal, of right, of any act of her Parliament which prohibited the importation of any article from the United States, such as their fish or their oil; Or, which claimed the diminution of the duty on any other, such as their tobacco, on which so great a revenue is raised? In what light would she view a similar application, made at the instance of France, for the importation into England of any article the growth or manufacture of that Power, which it was the policy of the British Government to prohibit?

If delays have taken place in the restitution of American property and in placing the American commerce in the ports of France on a fair and satisfactory basis, they involve questions, as has already been observed, in which the United States alone are interested. As they do not violate the revocation by France of her edicts, they cannot impair the obligation of Great Britain to revoke hers, nor change the epoch at which the revocation ought to have taken place. Had that duly followed, it is more than probable that those circumstances, irrelative as they are, which have excited doubt in the British Government of the practical revocation of the French decrees, might not have occurred.

Every view which can be taken of this subject increases the painful surprise at the innovations on all the principles and usuages

heretofore observed, which are so unreservedly contended for in your letters of the 3rd and 16th. instant, and which, if persisted in by your Government, present such an obstacle to the wishes of the United States for a removal of the difficulties which have been connected with the orders in Council. It is the interest of belligerants to mitigate the calamities of war and neutral Powers possess ample means to promote that object, provided they sustain, with impartiality and firmness, the dignity of their station. If belligerents expect advantages from neutrals, they should leave them in the full enjoyment of their rights. The present war has been oppressive beyond example, by its duration and by the desolation it has spread throughout Europe. It is highly important that it should assume at least a milder character. By the revocation of the French edicts, so far as they respected the neutral commerce of the United States, some advance is made towards that most desirable and consoling event. Let Great Britain follow the example. The ground thus gained will soon be enlarged by the concurring and pressing interests of all parties; and whatever is gained will accrue to the advantage of afflicted humanity.

I proceed to notice another part of your letter of the 3rd. instant, which is viewed in a more favorable light. The President has received with great satisfaction the communication that, should the orders in Council of 1807 be revoked, the blockade of May of the preceding year would cease with them, and that any blockade which should be afterwards instituted should be duly notified and maintained by an adequate force. This frank and explicit declaration, worthy of the prompt and amicable measure adopted by the Prince Regent in coming into power, seems to remove a material obstacle to an accommodation of differences between our countries; and, when followed by the revocation of the orders in Council, will, as I am authorized to inform you, produce an immediate termination of the non-importation law, by an exercise of the power vested in the President for that purpose.

I conclude with remarking that if I have confined this letter to the subjects brought into view by yours, it is not because the United States have lost sight in any degree of the other very serious causes of complaint, on which they have received no satisfaction, but because the conciliatory policy of this Government

has thus far separated the case of the orders in Council from others; and because, with respect to these others, your communication has not afforded any reasonable prospect of resuming them at this time with success. It is presumed that the same liberal view of the true interests of Great Britain, and friendly disposition towards the United States, which induced the Prince Regent to remove so material a difficulty as had arisen in relation to a repeal of the orders in Council, will lead to a more favorable further consideration of the remaining difficulties on that subject; and that the advantages of an amicable adjustment of every question depending between the two countries will be seen by your Government in the same light as they are by that of the United States.

TO JOEL BARLOW.

November 27, 1811.

SIR,—A Revolution in the Spanish Provinces, South of the United States, is making a rapid progress. The Province of Venezuela have declared themselves independent and announced the event to this Government. The same step, it is said, will soon be taken at Buenos Ayres and in other quarters. The Provinces of Venezuela have proposed to the President the recognition of their independence and reception of a minister from them; and altho' such recognition in form has not been made yet a very friendly and conciliatory answer has been given to them. They have also been informed that the Ministers of the United States in Europe, will be instructed to avail themselves of suitable opportunities to promote their recognition by other powers. You will not fail to attend to this object which is thought to be equally due to the just claims of our Southern Brethren, to which the United States cannot be indifferent and to the best interests of this Country. . . .

TO JOEL BARLOW.

March 21, 1812.

SIR,—All the necessary preparations for war, in case it should be necessary, are making with energy and as much despatch as the

nature of our Government and other circumstances will permit. You will receive by this opportunity copies of such acts of Congress as have passed since my last despatch and the papers which are forwarded will apprize you of everything else which has occurred of a public nature.

Great anxiety is felt for the return of the *Hornet*, in the expectation that the French Government will have enabled you to transmit by her, such evidence of an entire change of policy on its part, as will leave the United States free to maintain the ground which has been taken in support of their rights against Great Britain. It was expected that such a change would have followed immediately after the revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees and it is matter of surprise that it has so long been delayed, since it was suggested to the French Government not more by a regard to justice than to obvious policy. This delay tends to paralyse the movements of the United States and you must be sensible how difficult it will be for the Congress to take final and decisive measures towards Great Britain, without having a proof of such a complete change of policy in France before them at the time, because a full view of the rights, the injuries and just claims of the United States on the French Government has already been communicated to you.

Accounts have been recently received of the destruction of several of our Merchant vessels, laden with provisions sailing for Lisbon, by a French Squadron. It is said that the vessels and their cargoes were burnt and the seamen put on board one of the French Ships, to be landed perhaps somewhere in France after the end of the cruise. It is hoped that these reports are unfounded. You will be able to ascertain the truth, and if they be true you will hasten to remonstrate against such aggressions with all the strength the case requires.

This Government expects that a scrupulous regard to the rights of the United States will be observed by the French Government in every circumstance and it is particularly important to it to know, at this time, when it is pressing its claims against Great Britain by measures of the most decisive character, what it may expect in similar cases, from the Government of France. The *Wasp*, the vessel by which the last despatches were sent you and whose

return you will hasten, will afford an early and very favorable opportunity for you to transmit full information on all these very interesting topics to this Department.

On what principle our trade with Lisbon has been interrupted it is not easy to conceive. It will not, it is presumed, be contended that the United States have not a right to trade in provisions, and all other articles not contraband of war, to any port in the possession of Great Britain or any other enemy of France not legally blockaded. And that neither Lisbon nor Cadiz are legally blockaded are facts too well known to be brought into question. When a comparative view is taken of the naval force of the two powers it becomes evidently absurd even to allude to it. In bringing this aggression before the French Government and expressing the just sensibility of this Government under it, you will not fail to claim full indemnity for the injuries received from it.

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TO JONATHAN RUSSELL.

May 5, 1812.

. . . It has produced equal surprise and concern to find that no change has taken place in the measures of the British Government towards the United States since the restrictions on the Regent were removed. As this letter goes by the Packet and is not in Cypher, it is impossible to say every thing that I should under other circumstances. It is proper however to observe that as there is great probability of a rupture between the two Countries, you will do well to apprize our Merchants and other Citizens of it that they may avoid the danger incident to such an event. You will of course give this intimation to them in a way least calculated to excite alarm or to attract the attention of the British Government. Should the event alluded to take place, it will be necessary that some person should remain in England to take care of such of our citizens as may be made prisoners of war. If not disagreeable to you the President would prefer that you should accept that trust as many considerations may make it an important one. . . .

TO THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS.

June 23, 1813.

. . . Our combined land and naval forces have taken York, the British Post on the North side of Lake Ontario, and the Forts George and Erie on the Strait of Niagara, and driven the British forces from that Strait. Our recruiting service succeeds well and our officers have improved in a knowledge of their duty so that our force has already become very imposing. There is a fair prospect of our obtaining possession in the course of the campaign of all Upper Canada. The war too is becoming more popular and taking a more steady and consistent character throughout every part of the United States. The pressure on our coast and the menace of our Towns have accomplished no important objects for Great Britain. The neighboring militia have rallied in defence of New York, Lewistown, Baltimore, Norfolk and other places to the South and more recently New London in the North in a manner to acquire to themselves and to their country the highest honour. These successes ought to have a salutary influence on your negotiations and to strengthen the general expectations of the United States. They will render any accommodation, which falls short of these expectations, the less acceptable to the Nation.

These instructions are formed on a presumption that the British Government will make the restitution of Canada a *sine qua non* in any Treaty you may make, altho' it may happen that it may have no equivalent restitution to make to the United States. Should this be the case it is not intended to carry on the war, rather than yield to that unequal condition, but it may justly be expected, that Great Britain will be the more liberal on other points to be adjusted. And altho' Governments and Nations are apt on such occasions to consult rather the pride of dominion than their true interest, it may be worth while to bring to view the advantages to both countries which is promised, by the transfer of the Upper parts and even the whole of Canada to the United States. In time of peace Great Britain would derive the same advantage from it, in their hands as a source of supplies, as if it were in her own, the United states being precluded by policy as well as by the Constitution from taxing exports. In war she could derive little advantage from it, whether in her hands, or those of the

United States, as her commerce with it in either case, would be much interrupted. The possession of it by England must hereafter prove a fruitful source of controversy which its transfer to the United States would remove. It would also relieve her from the burden of supporting it, which must be considerable, in peace or war, especially in war. That these Provinces will be severed from Great Britain at no distant day, by their own career, may fairly be presumed, even against her strongest efforts to retain them. These considerations shew that her interest well understood is in favor of a separation at the present time. It may be hoped therefore that the view which you may give of the subject may produce a salutary effect, and induce the British Government to adopt such an arrangement as may be equally advantageous to both Nations. In the case of a cession you may stipulate the same advantages in trade to Great Britain for a certain term of years that were secured to France by the Treaty of Louisiana. . . .

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TO THE AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

August 5, 1813.

GENTLEMEN,—I am very sorry to be under the necessity of communicating to you an event of which there was no anticipation when you left the United States. The event to which I allude is the rejection by the Senate of the nomination of Mr. Gallatin, on the idea that his mission to Russia was incompatible with the office of Secretary of the Treasury. After the appointment of Mr. Jay when Chief Justice of the United States by President Washington, and of Mr. Ellsworth when holding the same office by President Adams, by which a member of a separate branch of the Government was brought into an office under the Executive and after the sanction given in practice as well as by law, to the appointment of persons, during the absence of a head of a department to perform its duties, it was presumed that there would not be any serious or substantial objection to the employment in a similar service for a short term and especial occasion of a member of the Administration itself. Altho' the nomination was opposed in the Senate, as soon as it was acted on, yet it was not believed

that it would be rejected until the vote was taken. At an early stage the President was called on by a resolution of the Senate to state whether Mr. Gallatin retained the office of Secretary of the Treasury, and in case he did, who performed the duties of that department in his absence. The President replied that the office of Secretary of the Treasury was not vacated by Mr. Gallatin's appointment to Russia and that the Secretary of the Navy performed its duties in his—Mr. Gallatin's—absence. After this reply, which was given in conformity with the President's own views of the subject and with those of Mr. Gallatin when he left the United States, it was impossible for the President without departing from his ideas of propriety in both respects to have removed Mr. Gallatin from the Treasury to secure the confirmation of his nomination to Russia. It would have been still more improper to have taken that step after the rejection of the nomination. The President resolved therefore to leave the mission on the footing on which it was placed by the vote of the Senate, by which the nomination of Mr. Adams and Mr. Bayard was confirmed. Whatever has been done jointly under the commission given to the three Commissioners by the President when you left the United States in compliance with your instructions will not be affected by this event. Should the objects of the mission not have been completed on the receipt of this you will pursue them jointly or severally according to the tenor of the Commission now forwarded, issued with the advice and consent of the Senate and the instructions now in your possession.

The President desires that you will explain to the Ministry of the Emperor of Russia and to the British Ministers, in case the British Government has accepted the mediation of Russia and sent Ministers to St. Petersburg to treat with those of the United States, that the omission of Mr. Gallatin has resulted from the opinion of a majority of the Senate, by one vote only, that his appointments in Russia were incompatible with his office in the Treasury, and not from any change of opinion or the want of full confidence of the Government and Nation in him. The President feels much solicitude that this occurrence be placed in its true light, more especially to the Emperor of Russia, by whom the principles of our Constitution may not be fully understood, to

prevent the possibility of an inference proceeding from misconception or misconstruction, that a change of opinion had taken place in the President respecting the mediation of the Emperor—the great object of the mission—or any other of the great objects confided to it. . . .

TO THE AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

February 14, 1814.

. . . By an article in the former instructions, you were authorized, in making a treaty to prevent impressment from our vessels, to stipulate, provided a certain specified term could not be agreed on, that it might continue in force for the present war in Europe only. At that time it seemed probable that the war might last many years. Recent appearances however indicate the contrary. Should peace be made in Europe, as the practical evil of which we complain in regard to impressment would cease, it is presumed that the British Government would have less objection to a stipulation to forbear that practice for a specified term, than it would have, should the war continue. In concluding a peace with Great Britain, even in case of a previous general peace in Europe, it is important to the United States to obtain such a stipulation. To withdraw from the war without it, would be to subject the United States to all the expense in blood and treasure, which has been and may be incurred, without obtaining the security for which we have contended, and leaving us under the necessity of contending for it again at a like expense, whenever another war shall break out in Europe, which will probably not be distant and may be very soon. In every view of the subject it must be as desirable to Great Britain to remove this ground of controversy, if she means to preserve peace, as it is essential to the rights and honor of the United States.

TO THE AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

June 27, 1814

GENTLEMEN,—I received yesterday a letter from Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard of the 6th. of May from London, presenting a

very interesting view of the state of affairs in Europe. It appears by their communication that the British government will have the whole force lately employed against France at its disposal to be sent here ; that the popular exultation, in consequence of the success against France, is great, and that the sentiment is general and strong for prosecuting the war against the United States, with vigour, with the most extravagant projects and confident hopes of success : that the restriction of our commerce and fisheries, curtailment of our boundaries, exclusion from the Lakes and even a dismemberment of our union, are among these projects. Mr. Bayard and Mr. Gallatin seem, however, to think that peace may be secured, by foregoing for the present to assert our rights on a principal object of the war ; that tho' they had reason to apprehend that the ministry, profiting of the circumstances of the moment, was more disposed to press an arrangement to prevent abuses in the practice than to pass the subject over in silence in a treaty.

From other intelligence it seems probable that a considerable portion of this force has already been dispatched for Canada and different parts of the United States and it is also said that a Spanish force has been sent either to Florida, Louisiana or the Southern Provinces of Spain. There appears likewise to be great concert as yet between the British Government and Spain and no evidence that Russia has interposed her good offices to prevent the prosecution of the war against the United States by the British Government, with the whole force released from France, for the establishment of its unjust demands, altho' in all questions relating to neutral rights Russia has been hitherto opposed to Great Britain. It appears indeed by an article published in the London gazettes, taken from a gazette at Vienna, that an agreement has been entered into between the other members of the coalition and Great Britain, to which France is to become a party, not to interfere with Great Britain in the prosecution of the war against the United States. This tho' improbable, is not an impossible event, taking into view all the extraordinary circumstances which justly claim attention at the present moment.

If the British Government unites in the popular feeling, and, from the communications of Mr. Bayard and Mr. Gallatin, there

is no reason to doubt that it does, and a strong force has been sent to this country, the experiment suggested, in all its views and pretentions, however extravagant, will doubtless be made. Its success or failure must depend on the wisdom and firmness of our Councils and the virtue and energy of the people. In this view it is to be apprehended that your negotiation will be prolonged under various pretexts, 'till after the close of the campaign, and will then be governed in a great measure by the result.

The omission to send ministers to Gottenburg, without a previous and official notification of the appointment and arrival there of those of the United States, a formality which if due from either party might have been expected from that making the overture, rather than that accepting it, is a proof of a dilatory policy, and would in other respects justify animadversions, if there was less disposition here to overlook circumstances of form when interfering with more substantial objects.

On mature consideration it has been decided that under all the circumstances above alluded to incident to a prosecution of the war, you may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment, if found indispensably necessary to terminate it. You will of course not recur to this expedient until all your efforts to adjust the controversy in a more satisfactory manner have failed. As it is not the intention of the United States in suffering the treaty to be silent on the subject of impressment, to admit the British claim thereon or to relinquish that of the United States, it is highly important that any such inference be entirely precluded, by a declaration or protest in some form or other, that the omission is not to have any such effect or tendency. Any modification of the practice to prevent abuses, being an acknowledgment of the right in Great Britain, is utterly inadmissible.

Altho' Gottenburg was contemplated at the time your Commission was made out, as the seat of the negotiation, yet your Commission does not confine you to it. You are at liberty therefore to transfer the negotiation to any other place made more eligible by a change of circumstances. Amsterdam and The Hague readily present themselves as preferable to any place in England. If however you should be of opinion that under all circumstances, the negotiation in that country will be attended with advantages

outweighing the objections to it, you are at liberty to transfer it there.

## "J. M'S NOTES RESPECTING THE BURNING CITY IN 1814."[1]

The President, secretary of state, and attorney general returned to the city of Washington on Saturday, the 27th of August, at which time the enemy's squadron were battering the fort below Alexandria, whose unprotected inhabitants were in consternation, as were those of the city and of Georgetown, and indeed of all the neighboring country. After the affair of the 24th General Winder rallied the principal part of the militia engaged in it at Montgomery Court-House, where he remained on the 25th and part of the 26th, preparing for a new movement, the necessity of which he anticipated. The secretary of state joined him; a portion of the forces from Baltimore at Montgomery Court-House on the 25th had returned to that city. About midday on the 26th the general having received intelligence that the enemy were in motion towards Bladensburg, probably with intention to visit Baltimore, formed his troops without delay, and commenced his march towards Ellicott's Mills, with intention to hang on the enemy's left flank in case Baltimore was their object, and of meeting them at the mills if they took that route. Late in the evening of that day he resolved to proceed in person to Baltimore, to prepare that city for the attack with which it was menaced. As commander of the military district, it was his duty to look to every part and to make the necessary preparation for its defense, and none appeared then to be in greater danger or to have a stronger claim to his attention than the city of Baltimore. He announced this, his resolution, to Generals Stansbury and Smith, instructing them to watch the movements of the enemy, and to act with the force under their command as circumstances might require, and departed about 7 P.M. The secretary of state remained with Generals Stansbury and Smith.

The President crossed the Potomac on the evening of the 24th, accompanied by the attorney-general and General Mason, and remained on the south side of the river a few miles above the

[1] The original as indorsed.

lower falls, on the 25th. On the 26th he recrossed the Potomac, and went to Brookville, in the neighborhood of Montgomery Court-House, with intention to join General Winder.

On the 27th the secretary of state, having heard that the enemy had evacuated the city, notified it, by express, to the President, and advised immediate return to the city for the purpose of re-establishing. He joined the President on the same day at Brookville, and he, accompanied by the secretary of state and attorney-general, set out immediately for Washington, where they arrived at five in the afternoon. The enemy's squadron was then battering Fort Washington, which was evacuated and blown up by the commander, on that evening, without the least resistance. The unprotected inhabitants of Alexandria in consternation capitulated, and those of Georgetown and the city were preparing to follow the example. Such was the state of affairs when the President entered the city on the evening of the 27th. There was no force organized for its defense. The secretary of war was at Fredericktown, and General Winder at Baltimore. The effect of the late disaster on the whole Union and the world was anticipated. Prompt measures were indispensable. Under these circumstances, the President requested Mr. Monroe to take charge of the Department of War, and command of the District *ad interim*, with which he immediately complied. On the 28th in the morning, the President, with Mr. Monroe and the attorney-general, visited the navy yard, the arsenal at Greenleaf's Point, and passing along the shore of the Potomac, up towards Georgetown, Mr. Monroe, as secretary of war and military commander, adopted measures, under sanction of the President, for the defense of the city and of Georgetown. As they passed near the capitol he was informed that the citizens of Washington were preparing to send a deputation to the British commander for the purpose of capitulating.

He forbade the measure. It was then remarked that the situation of the inhabitants was deplorable; there being no force prepared for their defense, their houses might be burnt down. Mr. Monroe then observed that he had been charged by the President with authority to take measures for the defense of the city, and that it should be defended; that if any deputation

moved towards the enemy it should be repelled by the bayonet. He took immediate measures for mounting a battery at Greenleaf's Point, another near the bridge, a third at the windmill point, and sent an order to Colonel Winder, who was in charge of some cannon, on the opposite shore above the ferry landing, to move three of the pieces to the lower end of Mason's Island, and the others some distance below that point on the Virginia shore, to co-operate with the batteries on the Maryland side. Colonel Winder refused to obey the order, on which Mr. Monroe passed the river, and riding to the colonel gave the order in person. The colonel replied that he did not know Mr. Monroe as secretary of war or commanding general. Mr. Monroe then stated that he acted under the authority of the President, and that he must either obey the order or leave the field. The colonel preferred the latter.

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TO JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

March 13, 1815.

SIR,—The restoration of peace having afforded an opportunity to renew the friendly intercourse with Great Britain, the President availed himself of it without delay by the appointment of a Minister Plenipotentiary to the British Government. Your long and meritorious services induced him, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to confer that appointment on you, for which I have the honor to transmit to you a commission and letter of credence. Of this intention you were sometime since advised.

On entering on the duties of this trust your attention will naturally be drawn to the means of preserving the peace which has been so happily restored by a termination, so far as it may be practicable, of all causes of future variance. These will form the subject of a more full communication hereafter. I shall confine this letter to some objects incident to the new state of things which will probably come into discussion in your first interviews.

A faithful execution of the treaty, recently concluded, on both sides, cannot fail to have a happy effect on the future relations of the two countries. That the United States will perform with

strict fidelity their part, you are authorised to give to the British Government the most positive assurance. Arrangements have been already made for surrendering those posts of Upper Canada which are occupied by our troops and to receive in return the posts that are held within our limits by the British forces. This important stipulation, if no obstacle occurs on the part of the British Commanders, will be carried into effect in a few weeks. Commissioners will also be appointed for establishing the boundary between the United States and the British Provinces, according to the Treaty, who will be prepared to enter on that duty as soon as the British Commissioners arrive. It is hoped that the British Government will lose no time in appointing Commissioners on its part and sending them out to commence the work. . . .

In the Treaty lately concluded at Ghent, Great Britain takes a priority over the United States as is presumed in both instruments; she does so in that received here and it is inferred that she does it in that received by her Government, from the circumstance that she holds that rank in the ratification of the Prince Regent. Great Britain takes the first rank as a power and our Ministers likewise sign under those of Great Britain. This, tho' comparatively an inferior object, is not unimportant. It was, there is no doubt, lost sight of in the very important object of peace. In all treaties between the United States and other powers, the Ministers of each party sign on the same line. This was done in the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, and in the subsequent treaties with her Government. In the Treaty with France of 1803, the United States took rank in the instrument delivered to this Government, which was reciprocated in that delivered to the Government of France. In the Treaty with Spain in 1795, Mr. Pinckney signed before the Prince of Peace; the United States had rank likewise over Spain, in the instrument delivered to them. It is understood that in the treaties between all powers this principle of equality is generally, if not invariably, recognized and observed. In the exchange of ratifications it was thought proper to advert to these circumstances that neither this Treaty nor those which preceded it might become a precedent, establishing a relation between the United States

and Great Britain differing from that which exists between them and other powers. As the Governments of Europe attach much importance to this circumstance, it is one to which we ought not to continue to be altogether inattentive. It is a mortifying truth that concessions, however generous the motive, seldom produce the desired effect. They more frequently inspire improper pretensions in the opposite party.

## TO THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS TO ALGIERS.[1]

April 10, 1815.

GENTLEMEN,—The unprovoked war which the Dey and Regency of Algiers have declared against the United States excited that degree of resentment in their Government and People which it justly merited. Congress at their last session manifested their sense of this Act, by declaring war against power, and authorizing the equipment of such a force as would secure the desired effect. The largest squadron that ever sailed from this country is now ordered against Algiers under the command of officers of great experience and talents from whose judgment and gallantry the happiest result is anticipated. For the conduct of the war instructions will be given to the Commander of the Squadron by the Secretary of the Navy. This letter will prescribe the conditions of peace which you are authorized by the President to conclude, and for which you will receive herewith a commission signed by him.

An honorable and lasting peace is the great object of this expedition. An early one would be agreeable but none must be made unless it be honorable. Whenever such a peace can be obtained you will conclude it. The spirit in which this war has been declared by the government of Algiers, with its well-known policy and character, forbid the hope of obtaining such a peace, by other means than the dread or success of our arms. If a just punishment should be inflicted on those people for the insult and injuries we have received from them, the peace might be more durable than if it should be concluded at the first approach of our

[1] William Shaler, Consul, and Commodores William Bainbridge and Stephen Decatur.

squadron. Let not this however form any motive of your conduct, especially in delaying the peace. It is the duty of the government to terminate the war as soon as it may be done on just and honorable conditions. We may, it is presumed, rely on the credit already acquired by our arms and the known gallantry of our people, for the faithful execution of the treaty, and future respect from that power. Should we however be disappointed in this reasonable expectation, as the United States are rapidly increasing in their population and rising in their importance as a commercial and maritime nation they will, every year, have it more in their power to inflict the punishment on them which for the present may be spared.

Without a strong force presented before the town of Algiers, or collected in the Mediterranean at some advantageous point or station, prepared to act, it is believed that such a treaty as the United States ought to accept cannot be obtained. Whether it will be better to proceed directly with the squadron in front of the town, before an attempt is made to negotiate, or to remain at some distance, your own judgments aided by the intelligence you may obtain of the enemy's force, the state of the city, and other circumstances will be your best guides.

In coming before the town it is usual to hoist the flag of a neutral friendly power to invite negotiation with a view to peace, before proceeding to extremities. The Consul of that nation then comes on board in an Algerine boat and he is made the organ of a message to the Dey, such as the power thus circumstanced may think proper to send him. Should this be done, as the Consul of Sweden, M. Nordeling, has been friendly to the United States, the flag of Sweden is preferred. Supposing it possible that you may take this course, the President has thought proper to address a letter to the Dey which is enclosed to be used by you should you find it expedient so to do. This letter will, of course, be delivered to a discreet and confidential messenger who will be authorized and instructed to give such answers to the enquiries of the Dey and to make such communications to him as you may deem most likely to accomplish the objects in view.

At whatever time the negotiation is opened, whether it be before or after proceeding to extremities, the conditions must be such as

are honorable to the United States. No tribute will be paid ; no biennial presents made ;—the United States must hold the high ground with that power which they ought to hold. They must stand on the footing of the powers of Europe who are most respected there,—such as England, France and Russia. Complimentary attentions and presents, when Consuls are presented, or at other times, such as those powers make, the United States are willing to make ; but none other. These must be voluntary, not compulsory or stipulated by Treaty. That point being secured the United States will not fail to make such as may suit their rank as a nation, having in view the good disposition manifested towards them by the Government of Algiers, on which they will depend.

The discharge of our citizens so unjustly captured will be a necessary consequence of peace. The payment of any money for their liberation, especially by way of ransom, would countenance the late unwarrantable declaration of war by the Dey, and might invite another war with a view to a like claim. It is the object of the United States to put an end to these odious practices, as to themselves so far as circumstances will admit, and in which they cannot fail to succeed if the undertaking is favored by the powers who are supposed to have a common interest in it. Should this however appear to be a formidable obstacle to a peace, which might otherwise be obtained on honorable and satisfactory conditions, it is presumed that it may be removed by an informal understanding that it is not the mere question of the sum demanded, that prevents a provision for it in the Treaty, but the recognition of the principle. In the way of a present, after the conclusion of the Treaty a reasonable sum may be given to him gratuitously.

The honorable termination of the war with England, with which the Government of Algiers is doubtless well informed and the complete liberation of our forces for this service, must satisfy the Dey that he has much to dread from the continued hostility of the United States. From the formidable force ready to assail him, he must anticipate the most serious disasters, and when he recollects how rapidly we have grown to the present height, a sure presage of the high destiny which awaits us, he will find no cause to hope for any change in his favor. Great confidence is there-

fore entertained that you will readily succeed in accomplishing the important objects of the expedition. . . .

TO JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

May 11, 1815.

. . . The late events in France begin a new epoch, which promises to be very interesting to most of the Powers of Europe and may be seriously felt by this country. If the Emperor is restored by the general consent of the French people and especially if his movement was made in concert with Austria, or other leading power, it is probable that the peace of Europe may be preserved whatever may be the indications to the contrary in the commencement. Should the war however be renewed it is hoped that the parties to it will not, as heretofore, encroach on our rights. It is the sincere desire of the United States to remain at peace equally with Great Britain and France. No motive exists here to take any part in their contests. The United States have no interest in beholding the aggrandizement of either at the expense of the other: none in promoting it. Their interest consists in promoting their own growth and prosperity which may be done, most effectually, by standing aloof from their broils and preserving on equal, just and honorable conditions, peace with both powers. It is expected, however, that our rights, national and neutral will not be violated. Our late struggle in their defence indicates what ought to be done again under similar circumstances. It is hoped that it will serve as an useful warning to those powers of what may be expected from us under like causes.

TO JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

December 10, 1815.

SIR,—Reports continue to circulate that the Spanish Government has ceded to Great-Britain the Floridas and Louisiana. It is also stated that measures are taken for an equipment of an expedition to that quarter, to consist of so large a body of men as

would not be contemplated if it was the intention of the British Government to preserve the existing friendly relations between the two countries. Ten thousand men it is said are likely to be sent from Great Britain and Ireland and it has been intimated that some foreign troops will be taken into British pay and employed in the expedition. The Prussian troops near the channel are spoken of.

If the British Government has accepted a cession of this territory from Spain and is taking measures for its occupancy her conduct must be considered as decidedly hostile to the United States. As well might the British Government send an army to Philadelphia or to Charlestown as to New Orleans, or to any portion of Louisiana westward of the Perdido, knowing as it does the just title of the United States to that limit. To send a considerable force to East-Florida even should the British Government state that that it had accepted the cession of that province only, could not be viewed in a friendly light. Why send a large force there if Spain has ceded and is ready to surrender the Province unless the British Government has objects in view, unjust in their nature, the pursuit of which must of necessity produce war with the United States? East-Florida in itself is comparatively nothing but as a post in the hands of Great Britain it is of the highest importance. Commanding the Gulph of Mexico and all its waters including the Mississippi with its branches and the streams emptying into the Mobile, a vast proportion of the most fertile and productive parts of this Union, on which the navigation and commerce so essentially depend, would be subject to its annoyance, not to mention its influence on the Creeks and other neighboring Indians. It is believed if Great Britain has accepted the cession of East Florida and of it only, that she has done it with intention to establish a strong post there and to avail herself of it for all the purposes above suggested. If the cession has greater extent, the design is more apparent.

If none has been made the British Government will it is presumed take an interest in removing the impression which these reports coming from so many quarters could not fail to make. If a cession has been made to Great Britain of East Florida, and her views in regard to it have undergone such a change it will be

agreeable to this government to obtain it of her at a fair equivalent.

The revolution which is making rapid progress in South America becomes daily more interesting to the United States. From the best information that we can obtain there is much cause to believe that the Provinces will separate from the Mother Country. Several of them have already abrogated its authority and established independent governments. They insist on the acknowledgment of their governments by the United States and when it is considered that the alternative is between governments which, in the event of their independence, would be free and friendly, and the relation which, reasoning from the past, must be expected from them as Colonies there is no cause to doubt in which scale our interest lies. . . .

TO ALBERT GALLATIN.

April 15, 1816.

. . . It has at all times since our Revolution been the sincere desire of the United States to cultivate a good intelligence with France. The changes which have taken place in her government have never produced any change in this disposition. The United States have looked to the French nation and to the existing government as its proper organ deeming it unjustifiable to interfere with its interior concerns. The existing government has in consequence been invariably recognized here as soon as known.

Cherishing these sentiments toward the French nation under all the Governments which have existed there it has not been less a cause of surprise than of regret that a corresponding disposition has not at all times been reciprocated by the French towards the United States. The history of the last ten years is replete with wrongs received from that government for which no justifiable pretext can be assigned. The property wrested in that space of time from our citizens is of great value, for which reparation has not been obtained. These injuries were received under the administration of the late Emperor of France, on whom the demand

for indemnity was incessantly made while he remained in power. Under the sensibility thereby excited and the failure to obtain justice, the relations of the two countries were much affected. The disorder which has of late existed in France has prevented a repetition of this demand but now that the government appears to be settled it is due to our citizens who were so unjustly plundered to present their claims anew to the French Government. . . .

TO WILLIAM PINKNEY.

May 10, 1816.

. . . In looking forward even to a distant period the only circumstance in which a difference of interest is anticipated between the United States and Russia relates to their respective claims on the Pacific Ocean. Possession has been taken in favor of the United States of the territory at the mouth of the River Columbia and it is understood that settlements have been made by some Russian subjects on the coast of this continent, not only in the high northern latitude but recently to the South of that River. It is not known that the Emperor attaches any value to the last mentioned of these settlements nor is it presumable, considering the vast extent of her dominions. Remote however as the danger of collision is it had better be provided against. The Northern boundary between the United States and the British possessions is formed by a line which runs from the north-westernmost point of the Lake of the Woods due West on the parallel of the 49° of North Latitude. It was limited by the Treaty of 1783 between the United States and Great Britain West, by the Mississippi which was then supposed to have its source North of that parallel. The territories of the United States were afterwards extended by the acquisition of Louisiana, whose boundaries have not been defined by treaties, but which, according to the principles and usages applicable to such a case, may fairly be considered of vast extent, equally to the West and North as well as to the South. In adjusting these claims with the Russian government it will be satisfactory to the United States to do it by adopting the 49° as the boundary between them on the Pacific Ocean. . . .

TO JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

May 21, 1816.

. . . With the Spanish Minister nothing has occurred of any importance since my last. The impression made in England and perhaps in other countries by the correspondence with him, of the consequences likely to attend it, was much stronger than it ought to have produced. The departure of Mr. Onis from this city was not in a spirit of hostility or menance. He visited Philadelphia because his family were there and some of its members then indisposed of which he informed me. An attempt will be made this summer to arrange our differences with Spain, not without the hope of success tho' former experiments forbid any confidence in such a result. . . .

TO ALBERT GALLATIN.

June 1, 1816.

Mr. Roth, chargé d' affaires of France, read to me yesterday some passages in a letter to him from the Duke of Richelieu one of which related to the difference between the United States and Spain respecting the boundaries of Louisiana. It is stated that France ought not to be relied on in support of our claims beyond what was just in itself; that she did not cede to the United States West Florida; that her cession was limited to the East by the River Iberville and the Lakes Pontchartrain and Maurepas, but was undefined to the West, in fixing which latter boundary, she felt no concern. I remarked to Mr. Roth that I was glad he had made me acquainted with that passage in his letter, as it would enable me to state to him correctly, for the information of his Government, the material facts relating to the transaction; that having been a party to the Treaty by which France ceded Louisiana to the United States and to the subsequent negotiation with Spain for the settlement of the boundaries of that Province and for the contemplated acquisition of Florida, and having had much communication with the French Government on every branch of the subject, and in every stage of those negotiations, I knew everything that had passed and should make the statement

from my own knowledge, and not from the report of others. I informed him that in the negotiation for the cession of Louisiana, Mr. Livingston and I had urged that its boundaries might be defined by the Treaty, to which it was replied that there was no occasion for it, as France would place us precisely on the ground on which she stood herself; that she would cede to the United States every foot of territory which Spain had ceded to her; that if France retained the Province, the French Government would construe her claim to boundaries liberally, which the fair import of the Treaty by which Spain had ceded it to France, justified: that Spain was not in a situation to exact from the United States unjust limits; that France would not have submitted to them. It was finally agreed that there should be no definition of boundaries by the Treaty and that the article in the Treaty by which Spain had ceded the Province to France should be inserted between France and the United States; that I well remembered that all that had passed in the negotiation was favorable to the idea of extensive limits and without reciting anything which had been stated while I was present, I would refer particularly to what Mr. Marbois had stated to Mr. Livingston as well after as before the Treaty was concluded as appeared by Mr. Livingston's letter, which was that in his (Mr. Marbois) opinion our title would be good to the Perdido: that a different view of our Eastern boundary was not taken by Mr. Marbois or Mr. Talleyrand until a considerable time afterwards tho' indeed it was not understood or believed that Mr. Marbois had ever changed his opinion on the subject. Just after the Treaty was concluded, I received a commission from my Government with orders to repair to England in case the state of affairs in which I was engaged would permit. I obeyed the order but before my departure I had an audience of the First Consul, in which he promised his support of any negotiation which the President might institute for the acquisition of Florida, intimating however that that was not a proper time for it, the Spanish government being out of humor at the cession which he had lately made to the United States of Louisiana: that I was presented to this audience by Mr. Talleyrand who attended it. Immediately after the audience I went to England, in July 1803, and returned to Paris in October

1804, on my route to Spain to commence a negotiation for the cession of Florida, when for the first time, I understood that Mr. Talleyrand had expressed some doubt of our right to West Florida under the cession which France had made to the United States of Louisiana. I expressed my astonishment at this information which was the greater on hearing that he favored the Spanish pretention, by which the weight of France would be thrown into the scale of Spain against the United States in the negotiation about to be commenced at Madrid in which I was associated with Mr. Charles Pinckney our Minister at that Court. I remarked to Mr. Roth in distinct terms that I was well acquainted with the cause of this movement in Mr. Talleyrand: that it grew out of a change of circumstances; that Spain owed France money by a former treaty which she could not pay; and that it suited both parties to obtain it of the United States, by the sale of the Floridas, the price being of necessity proportionally greater if West, as well as East, Florida belonged to Spain. I stated that I had been hurt by this proceeding to which I had been a party in every stage, not thinking that considerations of policy would justify it. Being resolved to bring the question to issue while I was at Paris what part France would take in the approaching negotiation with Spain, in regard to the boundaries of Louisiana and likewise to shew that in no possible event could Spain derive any money, or France of course, from the cession of the claims of Spain to territory Eastward of the Mississippi, I addressed a note to Mr. Talleyrand on the of November 1804 in which I stated all the objects of the proposed negotiation with Spain, and particularly the right of the United States to the whole territory between the Perdido and the Rio Bravo under the cession which France had made of Louisiana, and reminded him of the promise of the First Consul made to me in person to support the negotiation whenever it should be commenced by the United States, to take advantage of which had been the object of my visit to Paris. I called on him to fulfil that engagement. To this letter I obtained no answer altho' I waited several weeks for it. Some time after my arrival at Madrid, Mr. Talleyrand addressed an answer to General Armstrong, corresponding with that which I had been taught to expect, to which and the part

which France took in that negotiation I was satisfied that its failure was in a great measure, if not altogether, to be attributed.

I observed to Mr. Roth that I was not surprised that the Duke of Richelieu should have adopted the opinion expressed in his letter, on a view of Mr. Talleyrand's letter to Genl. Armstrong only; that what I had stated was necessary to a full view of the whole subject, as it was to enable him to form a just estimate of the obligations on France as to the part she ought to take in the negotiation which was soon to be resumed with Spain; that I had made the statement with candor, to promote the just and friendly objects of the proposed negotiation.

It seems probable that France may render to the United States essential services in this negotiation provided her government adopts just ideas on the subject. It is to enable you to promote that result that I hasten to communicate the above.

It is important also for you to know that the President is willing to adopt the Sabine as the boundary between the United States and Spain and even to relinquish the claim to indemnity for Spoliations and for the suppression of the deposit at New Orleans provided Spain will cede all her claims to territory Eastward of the Mississippi and provide against fraudulent and extravagant grants of land in East-Florida, after a certain period to be fixed in the Treaty, intending to make a provision for such Spoliations out of the vacant land in that Province. . . .

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TO ALBERT GALLATIN.

September 10, 1816.

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a communication with the Minister of France respecting a Toast which was given at a public feast in Baltimore on the 4th of July last by Mr. Skinner, the Post Master in that city. The Minister has demanded his immediate dismission from office and in the most authoritative tone. This demand has not been complied with. It was declined in the reply to his first note in terms the most respectful and conciliatory. In the reply to a second a proper sensibility has been shewn to the disrespect manifested towards the United States by

transferring the business from him thro' you, to his government, who it is presumed will take a different view of the subject.

From the nature of our Institutions it is not perceived that it would have been practicable under any circumstances to have removed Mr. Skinner from office, for the cause alledged. The peremptory tone however with which it has been demanded renders it utterly impossible. If a Foreign Minister can dictate measures to the United States especially in a case so intimately connected with the vital principles of their government, their Independence is gone.

The Anniversary of our Independence has been always celebrated as a day of festivity throughout the United States. Our citizens have been accustomed on that day to relax from their ordinary avocations, to assemble in their respective circles, and to express without reserve their sentiments on all public subjects. Public officers ought, it is true, to be more guarded at all times in their language than private citizens; but it is equally true that in this great national festival, their official character is lost in that of citizens.

It may be remarked that the freedom of the scene is known not to spare the government of the country, or any of the public measures; that forms of government and those who administer them everywhere are the frequent objects of animadversion; that among the usual ceremonies of the day is the public rehearsal of the Instrument declaring our Independence and yet that no Representative of Great Britain, or of any other Power, has ever interposed a complaint or asked for an explanation; that, in fine, without alluding to any existing Sovereign in amity with the United States, their government looking to characters which in the future course of human affairs cannot fail occasionally to occupy the thrones of friendly powers, could not establish a precedent in favor of the most unexceptionable Prince, without pledging itself indiscriminately to shield the character of all against reproaches however justified by truth and notoriety.

This case admitted of no compromise; a discussion of it, therefore, seemed to be useless even from the commencement, and after the last letter from the French Minister it would have been evidently highly improper, since it must have turned on points